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Aristotle's Essences as Subject and Actuality 
(abstract) 
The question which seeks the essence of something, 
Tc 7v d tvaw; , according to the argument of this thesis, 
was fashioned by Aristotle because of ambiguity or' 
'homonymy' inherent in the nature of universal predicates. 
However successful the conceptual analysis of universals 
may be as such, their meaning or significance cannot be 
fully fixed or determined except as a function of the 
subjects'to which they are applied. The distinction 
between understanding a universal predicate as such and 
understanding its application to a particular subject 
may be roughly expressed as that between the ability to 
recognize the presence of an attribute in a subject and 
the knowledge of what the predicate says about the subject. 
It is in' order to transform knowledge of the first kind 
into knowledge of the second that the 'essence-question' 
is asked. 
It is shown that the Aristotelian notion of an 
essence (lb 'ri. .v 
&IvaLL ) is explained through the notions 
of a subject (cr1rOk"01 Evov) and of an actuality (6vpd'tc-«c) . 
Aristotelian 'essences' express theoactuality or activity 
of a substance conceived from the 'categorial' point of 
view as the subject of qualities and universal predicates 
in general. An 'essence', insofar as the term applies 
to sensible substances, is the being of something as the 
subject of qualities and material predicates, i. e. 
universal predicates in general. Entailed is the denial 
. 
that an essence in Aristotle's sense is constituted by 
attributes, characteristics, or universal predicates of 
any sort whatsoever. The argument exploits the distinction 
drawn by Aristotle on a number of occasions in the 
Metaphysics between material substrata of a substance and 
the subjects of qualities. The development of the 
position hinges on an analysis of matter and form in 
terms of the relations of potentiality and actuality 
conceived as contemporaneous modes of existence. 
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General Introduction 
;, ý, 
The argument of this thesis is that the question 
which seeks the essence of something, what I will call 
the 'essence-question' (Ti 1v&u&'ow),. was fashioned by 
Aristotle because of ambiguity or 'homonymy' inherent in 
the nature of universal predicates. However successful 
the conceptual analysis of universals as such may be, their 
meaning or significance cannot be fully fixed or determined 
except as a function of the subjects to which they are 
applied. The distinction between understanding a universal 
predicate as such and understanding its application to 
a particular subject may be roughly expressed as that 
between the ability to recognize the presence of an 
attribute in a subject and the knowledge of what the 
predicate says about the subject. It is in order to transform 
knowledge of the first kind into knowledge of the second 
that the 'essence-question' is asked. 
It will be shown that the Aristotelian notion of 
n 1' 
an essence (m 7'9, qv ELvocc. ) is explained through the 
notions of a subject (UrMOKE, 1, k. Errov) and of an actuality 
(06' V, 6 6 ). -Aristotelian essences are shown to express 
the actuality or activity of a substance conceived from 
the 'categorial' point of view as the subject of attributes 
ii 
and universal predicates in general. According to the 
argument, an 'essence', insofar as the term applies to 
sensible substances, is the being of something as the 
subject of qualities and universal predicates. This 
view entails the denial that an essence in Aristotle's 
sense is constituted by attributes, characteristics, or 
universal predicates of any sort whatsoever. The 
argument exploits the distinction which Aristotle draws 
on a number of occasions in the Metaphysics between the 
material substrata of forms, actualities, substances,. and 
the subjects of qualities. 
The distinctive way in which Aristotle conceives 
the notion of a subject of qualities depends upon the 
development of the concepts of potentiality and actuality. 
'Misunderstanding and misleading expression of these 
central Aristotelian concepts, as well as the philosophical 
problems which it is their job to resolve, has contributed 
to the perception of deep flaws and inconsistencies at 
the heart of Aristotle's metaphysical thought. concerning 
the nature of substances. Typical of what I understand to 
be the 'received' but misleading interpretation of 
potentiality and actuality are the following remarks by 
A. L. Peck: 
the agent, or the efficient cause, will set 
up in the matter a movement of a definite and specific 
kind, which will result in the matter which is 
Potentially X becoming X in 'actuality, i. e. in 
acquiring the form to which the specific movement 
was proper. (emphasis mine) 
iii 
Also: 
He (the carpenter) then imparts to his hands, anQ 
they in turn to his tools, the KCY76'e1J proper to 
the form "table, " and in this way the matter, the 
wood, becomes actually the table which to burin 
with it was potentially. 
1(emphasis-mine) 
In this thesis it is denied that the potentiality of 
matter either to be or to become a substance expresses 
the capacity of materials to be or become a substance 
in actuality. It is shown that 'potentiality' and 
'actuality' as these terms are applied to the relations 
of materials to substances express primarily contemporaneous 
modes of existence. Peck's view is based on passages 
like the following from Met., 1050a 15: 
Material exists in potentiality (Suv 6t. ) because 
i may come into the form; but whenever it exists 
in actuality (e 4-1-«c) , 'at that point' 3t' 
iis in 
rohe form. 
These remarks need not be understood to indicate that 
material becomes the form in actuality or that material 
'acquires' the form. 'To be in the form' is best understood, 
according to my argument, to describe the reverse relation, 
i. e. the acquisition of matter by the form or substance. 
The material, on the other hand, has become neither the 
form nor the substance, but itself in actuality. But 
for materials to be in actuality is always'a potential mode 
of existence. The potentiality or power of materials is 
most fully displayed when it is in the form as a functioning 
part. 
iv 
Misconceptions about Aristotle's use of the terms 
U V"$ 
and 
4 X*. t,, L result largely from an apparent 
tautology, i. e. that potentiality expresses the possibility 
of future fulfilment and that a potency is exhausted when 
fulfilled. In line with this thinking it is believed 
that Aristotle developed the notion of potentiality in 
order to explain the possibility of change. - 
I. e. the 
possibility of change or movement depends upon precedent 
powers. This position has a genuine plausibility which it 
is not my purpose to challenge. But the sense of potentiality 
which applies to movement or. change is the sense which 
Aristotle in Tret., 9,1 describes as 'the most authoritative 
sense, but not the sense most useful to our purposes'. 
It is the misapplication of this sense of potentiality 
to the potentiality of materials to become substances 
that undermines understanding of Aristotle's thought about 
the relations of matter and form. For it is thought 
that the notion of. potentiality was applied by Aristotle 
to the materials which constitute substances in order to 
address the problem of creation ex nihilo. What is argued 
in this thesis is that Aristotle's difficulty with the 
genesis of substances is only distantly related to the 
spectre of creation ex nihilo, a difficulty which in 
Gen. et Corr. he assigns not to, )himself, but to the fears 
2 
of earlier philosophers. It is in fact the straight. - 
forward assumption that whatever comes-to-be does so from 
what existed before. that gives rise to the Aristotelian 
problem of how the genesis of substances is to be conceived. 
4c 
V 
The problem which to Aristotle is 
3 
'most puzzling' is 
how it is possible to respond to the materialist position 
that all so-called 'genesis' is merely the alteration 
or modification of a pre-existing substratum. For 
Aristotle is never tempted to allow that a man, for instance, 
is modified into existence. Men come to be. Though it 
is correct to say that Aristotle uses the notions of 
potentiality and actuality in order to solve this 
difficulty, he does not use the terms in the same sense 
to effect this solution. When Aristotle says in Met., 
Z, at 1039a 3 that it is impossible for substances to 
be-composed of other substances existing in actuality 
he is talking primarily about contemporaneous relations 
between substances and their components. 
It is shown that the more appropriate model for 
understanding the notion of potentiality as applied to 
the components of substances is the sense in which the 
term applies to the possession of an art by a craftsman. 
A housebuilder does not cease to possess the power to 
build a house when he is building the house. On the 
contrary, his power is most fully displayed when he'is 
building. It is in accordance with the model of a 
-craftsman at work that the relation between matter and 
form is conceived by Aristotle. This relation is 
conceived as similar to the relation between professional 
-activity and developed professional capacity. The 
change from mere possession of an art to its exercise is 
not regarded by Aristotle as a modification. 
vi 
Though this kind of model helps to illustrate some 
of the features of the relation between matter and form, 
it is not quite a model of genesis. Genesis of a substance, 
for Aristotle, amounts to the coming-to-be of a new 
subject. How is genesis possible when the old subject 
remains? If a house comes-to-be from bricks and timbers, 
which remain throughout the genesis of the house and persist 
in their identity throughout the period of its existence, 
how can it be claimed that a new subject has come-to-be? 
Does not such a change represent merely the modification 
of materials which remain perpetually the real subject, 
and on these grounds remain the substance par excellence? 
Could not something similar be true for natural substances 
as well? Could it not be the case that to call someone 
a man is at bottom simply to ascribe a certain configuration 
of materials and qualities borneby the materials to 
this ever present substratum? Even if, as Aristotle 
seems to believe, complete change from one element to 
another is possible as well as complete change from 
elements to other materials like flesh and bone, in what 
sense. can such a change be viewed as genesis of, e. g. 
a man? For in this case the essence of a man may still 
be nothing more than a conglomerate of qualities and 
characteristics. 
Such difficulties as these, according to this thesis, 
were seen as unresolvable by Aristotle provided that substances 
are conceived as the. presence of-one thing in another, 
vii 
e. g. as the presence of form in matter. Further, it is 
shown that to conceive substance in this way involves 
fundamental incoherence of thought. For such a position 
about the nature of things undermines the explanatory 
power with which the position prides itself. Its"ultimate 
effect is to make it impossible that anyone could ever 
know with the precision required what he is saying or 
thinking about anything, especially about materials 
themselves. Clear understanding of the force, significance 
or meaning of a statement about something requires knowledge 
of the subject about which the claim is made, where 
'subject' is understood in a distinctive fashion. 
A simple. example, though not conclusive in itself, 
will help orient the discussion. Suppose someone makes 
the following claim: "The timbers are straight. " An 
ciuditor may ask, "What is it for timbers to be straight? " 
This question, according to this, thesis, is in the form of 
the 'essence-question'. The question could hardly be asked 
by someone who did not know what 'straightness' was, or 
surely the form of the question is misleading. The person 
asking may be a geometer or an expert with tools which 
measure straightness. This knowledge, however, does not 
provide straightness with a precise significance in its 
application to timbers. For this almost certainly would 
depend upon what the timbers are for, and especially what 
subject the timbers will compose. - Only with respect to 
such a subject can an intelligent determination. be made of 
viii 
what is to count as straightness with respect to timbers. 
To know a property 'universally' is for Aristotle only 
the beginning of understanding,: however well the-property 
is known in that mode. ü'. 
The example is helpful for two reasons. First, it 
is clear that in most instances timbers are not themselves 
the subject of the claim. Despite the position of the 
word 'timbers' as the grammatical subject of the sentence, 
such a claim'-would in general be about something else, 
e. g. a house, a woodshed, a merry-go-'round. Despite 
the fact that timbers bear the property 'straightness' 
they are in a crucial sense not the subject of the claim. 
Secondly, the importance of subjects in this other sense 
is shown by the fact that it is impossible to know 
without merely arbitrary imposition of a standard, what 
will constitute straightness for timbers. The foreman in 
a lumber yard may point to a pretty twisted looking 
sample and say, "This is straight. " In no sense does 
it follow that he is misusing the word. He is'saying that, 
for the purposes at hand, this counts as straight. 
Aristotle's position is that no statement about 
materials is determinate in significance apart from the 
knowledge of that subject which, the materials compose., 
Through-the development of this . position he attacks'both 
the Greek materialists and the-Platonists. For if'' 
precision of Understanding is required to explain o 
sensible objects, such precision cannot arise except 
I ix 
t 
for the knowledge of the subject as a determinant of 
significance. On the one hand, statements about materials 
are dependent for their precision on the subject composed 
by them. On the other, the knowledge of universals, however 
complete such knowledge may be, cannot itself determine 
the way in which universals will apply to particular 
subjects. In this sense both universal predicates and 
statements about materials are 'homonymous'. 
For-Aristotle the knowledge of universals and of 
materials constitutes potential knowledge and corresponds 
to potential being. The view that such knowledge is 
paradeigmatic of human knowledge as well as the corresponding 
view about t4e nature of the world that its fundamental 
principles are either universals or materials entails a 
resignation to actual ignorance both of our own minds 
and of the world. In view of such difficulties Aristotle 
^, develops the notion of an essence, To *rý .r etPdc , as 
subject and actuality. 
Another way of adumbrating the strain of Aristotelian 
th;: ought represented above is the following. Human 
knowledge is constituted by knowledge of the causes of 
things. By 'cause' Aristotle means, not what is generally 
construed as a cause in modern speech, but whatever is 
an answer to some form of the question 'Why? '. The 
question 'Why? " according to Aristotle- always presupposes 
that one thing has-been asserted of'something else: ýý This 
seems fairly'clear. What is problematic about Aristotle's 
position both for us and for his auditors is that he 
X 
regards the question 'What is it? ' as a form of the 
question 'Why? '. This difficulty results'in part-from 
#01 1ý an ambiguity in the question Tc e-a'rt. which in Greek may 
mean either 'What is? ' or 'What is it? '. But there 
are further ambiguities involved in either way of 
understanding the question. The former tends, as in 
English, to ask' '''that exists? '. The latter -tends to 
seek a-ýßenus, 'a definition, or criteria according to 
which something can be identified. If the former question 
is understood to ask for an ennumeration of the things 
that exist, this hardly;, seems to be an answer to the 
question 'Why? '. The latter, on the other hand, would seem 
to explain nothing more than criteria for the application 
of a word. Even if the notion of definition is stronger 
than this (as it surely was for Aristotle) it is not easy 
to know what sort of 'Why? ' question the definition 
answers. According to this thesis Aristotle devised the 
questions re 
7r ivdc, in order to focus on one of the 
Jmeanings 
which the question Ti vrr1 may have. The 
question -'What was the being? ' or 'What was it for X to 
be? ''is asked in order to discover the principle, understood 
as the subject, according to which the precise meaning 
of universal predicates is to be', determined. The essence- 
question is asked in order to discover what Aristotle 
calls the 'cause of the matter'. 
This notion is not easy to. understand. Part of 
the reason for this is that material and the laws which 
govern its behaviovras such are regarded both by us 
xi 
and by the Greek materialists as causes, if not the causes, 
of the being of sensible substances. A cause, as 
commonly viewed, is the mechanical power of one set of 
material conditions to necessitate the next. Thqugh 
a great deal of time is spent in the thesis which follows 
on Aristotle's notion of 'the cause of the matter' I do 
not in any direct way discuss the notion of mechanical 
causality. By way of introduction, however, the following 
remarks are appropriate. 
First, it is extremely unlikely that Aristotle 
would have countenanced the view that one material 
state of affairs can necessitate the next. The view that 
in Aristotle's philosophy there is no place for necessity 
of a 'mechanical' sort is forcefully argued 'by D. M. Balme 
and Anthony Preus. 
4 
Preus argues that: 
Aristotle does not have a concept which may appropriately 
be called mechanical necessity, in the modern sense 
of that word. 
5 
Balme helpfully refers to Pte. , 640a 4; _A. , 734a 25; 
and Gen. et Corr., 337b 15 all of which seem unequivocally 
to argue that: 
Aristotle denies that there is any necessity by 
which one. event compels the next to happen. 
6 
When in the Physics (198b 12-14)' Aristotle-poses the 
question whether natural things can be explained as 
follows, 
because the hot thing is constituted in such and 
such a manner and the cold thing as well (and 
similarly for all such things) these results are 
and come-to-be by necessity, 
xii 
his answer'' is. "inggative. 
Though in general convinced by Balme and Preus, I 
prefer to argue the position in a slightly different way. 
What is important for my argument is that, even if 
Aristotle did recognize the existence of some kind of 
mechanical necessity, it is never to this kind of 
necessity that he appeals in order to explain anything. 
Mechanical necessity in the modern sense of the term 
does not fall comfortably into any of the' three kinds of 
necessity he lists.? Simple necessity applies only to 
eternal things and seems to have, more or less, the force 
of our 'logical necessity'. The necessity of force or 
violence is construed by Aristotle atoan impediment to 
a natural process. It is viewed in a teleological . 
framework and is, as such, posterior to nature. 
8 
Such 
necessity has no independent explanatory value. Insofar 
as it explains anything, it explains the failure rather than 
the success of a natural process. The third kind of 
necessity is 'necessity by hypothesis' (Ef u? ag, ýC*&VS) " 
It is'in accordance with this kind of necessity that 
material has an explanatory röte in natural science, i. e. 
as a condition necessary in order, that something else 
exists or comes-to-be. In this sense material is necessitated 
but does not necessitate anything else. The primary thrust 
of Aristotle's position is that even if there is ä 
10 
mechanical'necessity beyond the kinds listed (or presupposed 
by the kinds listed, as some would have it), it is 
devoid of explanatory power. 
xiii 
This view is, on one interpretation, precisely 
what Aristotle argues at G. A., 789b 6% 
There is nothing to prevent teeth being'formed 
and being lost in the way (Democritus) says; but 
it is not on that account that it happens. -c' 
Here Aristotle seems to be accusing Democritus of 
assigning to certain kinds of facts an explanatory r&le 
which they cannot perform. 
In order to draw a more precise picture of the 
part 'necessity' plays for Aristotle in natural science 
it will be helpful to examine in some detail a passage 
found in the Physics at 200a 15. Here Aristotle suggests 
that a plausible parallel can be drawn between 'the 
necessary' in mathematics and in nature. His claim is 
that the analogy applies, however, in reverse (c V? )c). 
As an instance Aristotle cites the demonstration that 
the sum of the angles of a tr 4ngle are equal to the sum 
of two right angles. The construction Aristotle used 
for the proof may be gleaned from Met., 1051a 24l where 
he says: ; 
Why does the the triangle make up two right angles? 
Because the angles about one point are equal to 
two right angles. If then the parallel to the 
side had been drawn up (äv7KTo), the fact would at 
once have been clear from-merely looking at the 
figure. 
The figure, then, i2 the one used by Euclid in the Elements, 
Book I, Proposition 32, viz. 
xiv 
; `, 
D 
Apparent from the figure, according to Aristotle, is 
that, given that CE is a line drawn parallel to line 
AB, since the angles ACE and ECD are equal respectively 
to the angles'BAC and ABC, and since the angles ECD, ACE, 
and ACB are together equal to two right angles (being 
'angles about one point'), the three angles of the 
triangle ABC, will also be equal to two right angles. 
In the passage from the Physics quoted above Aristotle 
says that this proof depends upon the nature of a straight 
5%%tt .0) line ((7r, -' ý*, o m erOcr 'nisi E-crrcv) . It is a commonplace 
of geometry that the proposition depends upon the 
possibility and the uniqueness of parallel lines to a 
11 
given line through a given point. If we attempt to work 
the proposition in reverse, i. e. attempt to prove from 
the fact that the angles of a triangle are equal to two 
right angles that the angles about a point are equal to 
two right angles, we must again appeal to the theory 
of parallels, and in turn to the nature of straight lines, 
especially the fact that the angles standing on a straight 
line about a point are equal to two right angles. A 
petit io principii is involved in the converse. The 
possibility that this fact about triangles could result 
/i 9 
xv 
even if straight lines had another character cannot be 
eliminated. This is why Aristotle says that the proposition 
will not work in reverse (ýbvKEi7`, ýc Tocrýoý 
ýKßcro ). 
Nevertheless it will follow that if a triangle has angles 
unequal to two right angles, lines will not have" 
the 
It, IV Olt I )' *0 ý, 3 1 
character supposed (c(A)ý E'- d'E Toa-To, 1t 1 Ea"rc, oude To Fct1ßcr 
ETC v) 
Aristotle argues that the same relations hold 
between ends and materials, but in reverse. If the end 
is to be, then necessarily certain preconditions ((u77? oG b -V) 
12 
will hold. But the existence of the preconditions does 
not necessitate the end. As in the case of the geometrical 
instance, the proposition is not convertible. Other 
ends may require the same preconditions. From this 
Aristotle concludes that the end is the 'cause of the 
matter' and not the other way around (c(c rco d-"fo orTb 
t* >Ij cr ej 01 
7 5.. $ 1 A7 $c cW ýc V 1P7 rbv Ti) -D" ), 
Viewed in one way all that Aristotle is here denying 
about material conditions is that there is a necessary 
connection between one set and the next. In one sense of 
the term he would be denying 'determinacy'. There is, 
however, another sense of determinacy which is stressed 
in the,. argument of this thesis, reflected in the determination 
of the explanatory role pf a17given claim about materials. 
The importance of this relation between ends, forms, 
substances and material conditions is brought out in 
part by the fact that a materialist need not assert that. 
one set of material conditions necessitates only one 
xvi 
future set in order to maintain that the cause of the 
being of substances is mechanical. One need not deny 
that an identical set of circumstances could result in 
more than one effect in order to wield the notion of 
mechanical causality. Though it is an enormously-, 
powerful fact about human thought that when something 
unexpected happens we look for a difference in the precedent 
circumstances, the claim (e. g. by Kant) that this demand 
is at the very basis of the possibility of rational 
thought and experience is hyperbolic. From Aristotle's 
viewpoint neither side in this debate has a stronger claim 
to the explanation of natural phenomena. For him no 
mere series of material circuinstaneep, whatever-: their 
mode of connection, can form a part of the study of 
natural phenomena unless they can be viewed as necessary 
ex hypothesi. Aristotle would undoubtedly have been 
impressed by the development of modern physics, but he 
need not on this account have been tempted to change his 
view that substance is the cause of matter. 
Introduction to Part I 
The terms 'potential' and 'actual' tend, both in 
modern and ancient usage, to denote mutually exclusive 
conditions. In part this reflects an evidently valid 
position that if X is. Y actually, it cannot, at the same 
time and in the same sense, be Y potentially. For if 
X is Y potentially, this suggests that it is not yet 
Y. One might, of course, claim that X is Y in actuality 
at the same time that X is Z potentially. The difficulty 
arises only with the claim that X is Y in potentiality 
and actuality simultaneously. Thus Aquinas says ; 
Now it is not possible that the same thing 
should be at once. in. actuali. ty .. and.. potentiality 
in the same respect but only in different 
respects. For what is actually hot cannot 
simultaneously be potentially hot; but it is 
simultaneously potentially cold. 
1 
For this reason, when Aristotle, says, e. g., that bricks, 
stones, and timber are a house potentially, there is an 
enormously powerful tendency to assume that if the 
potentiality of the materials is fulfilled in an actual 
house, these materials would have become a house in 
actuality. The bricks, stones and timbers would have 
lost their potentiality by composing an actual house, 
their potentiality, that is, to be. the house they 
actually compose. 
I 
-2 .ý 
There are occasions, however, in which a potentiality 
(especially in the sense of a 'power' or 'capacity') can 
be coherently said to exist simultaneously with the 
corresponding actuality or activity. When a geometer is 
actually doing geometry, when a tennis player is actually 
playing tennis, when a housebuilder is actually building 
a house, these actual doings reflect a capacity or power 
on the part of the professional which is not spent by 
engaging in the activity. -A professional plies his 
craft through a developed capacity. To say that a house- 
builder, for example, becomes or changes into a housebuilder 
when he actually builds would be deeply misleading. 
2 Though 
a housebuilder may be regarded as a housebuilder most 
especially when he is building, this may be explained by 
the fact that his powers are most fully displayed in the 
act of housebuilding. A housebuilder continues to be 
a housebuilder when he builds because the potentiality 
which the term 'housebuilder' denotes remains fully intact. 
In the same way, when an eye sees, it does not cease to 
have the capacity even for the very sight which it sees. 
Rather, an eye, being a professional seer, as it were, 
fully displays its nature exactly by seeing. 
3 
This analysis suggests an alternative way of under- 
standing Aristotle's use of the expressions t/ivcu_iS, 
&vd 
(_ and jc( Tti V* u in contexts in which materials 
are being related to 'forms' or 'actualities'. These 
expressions may express the way in which a man's body, 
for example, is a man, or the wa "in which timber, mortar 
", and bricks are the house that they compose. A man's body 
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may be coherently described as being a man 'potentially', 
not in virtue of something which remains for the body 
to accomplish, namely becoming a man in actuality, but 
because the actuality of a man is accomplished through 
the fully realized capacities of a specially organized 
body. When Aristotle defines the soul as the actuality, 
activity, or form of a natural body having life potentially, 
4 
this can hardly be understood as implying that the body 
is not yet alive., Whät: Aristotle. intends is clarified 
by the following statement. 
It is not what has lost soul which is potentially 
such as to live, but what possesses it. But 
the seed and the fruit are potentially such a 
body. 5' 
A seed, then, seems to enjoy a potentiality in relation 
to a prospective future fulfilment, while the body's' 
power for life seems more like that of a professional. 
For though it might be said that a seed is not yet alive, 
there is no time at which it can be said that the body 
of an animal is not yet alive. 
It is not only with respect to the bodies of living 
things that Aristotle seems content to describe the 
components of actually existing material things as 
potentially the things composed. Indeed, Aristotle asserts 
that not only the parts of animals but also earth, fire 
and air are potentialities, and not substances. 
7 Such 
uses suggest that the term 'potentiality' characterizes 
for Aristotle the mode of being for all materials whether 
or not they compose an actually existing substance. 
-- 
But in spite of such passages, it is usually held that 
when Aristotle says, e. g., that such and such materials 
are a house potentially, he means that these materials 
may, by gaining the appropriate form, become a house in 
actuality. That is, when materials are in-formed they 
become actualities. And certainly it is hard to deny 
that in some sense these views are true. The question 
is whether they are true in a sense which reflects the 
force and intent of. Aristotle's usage of these terms. 
In the course of Part I of this thesis, I will argue 
that such a construal tends to undermine the philosophical 
thrust of Aristotle's usage of the terms 'potentiality' 
and 'actuality'. I will argue that these terms primarily 
indicate modes of being which are signaued by the kinds 
of role played by various sorts of objects in our accounts 
of things. What is at issue for Aristotle, as I understand 
him, is the preservation of what might be called the 'logic' 
of materials and the substances composed by them in the 
light of the fundamental unity of matter and form. Materials 
are called potencies because of the way in which materials 
function in our accounts of things. Forms are actualities, 
signaling. the distinctive role they play in our thoughts. 
The immediacy of-correspondence between potentiality and 
actuality reflects an ultimate unity°between matter and 
form. Thus, -in De Anima, for example, while Aristotle is 
extremely careful to distinguish the logical types of 
matter and forms he argues that the definition of soul 
as 'the first actuality of the natural organic body' makes 
it unnecessary to "seek whether the soul and the body are one. " 
9 
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The difficulty with the view that what is potentially 
becomes what is actually, i. e., that materials may 
come-to-be an Otlotain the full sense of the word, lies 
in the possible implication that the coming-to-be of a 
substance is either the equivalent to, or modelled upon, 
the gaining of certain properties and qualities by 
matter. Such a view would imply for Aristotle that genesis 
is simply a special case of alteration, at least in 
those cases in which the genesis of a substance is conjoined 
with a persisting substratum. But Aristotle's view is, 
I think, that however complete is the list one may give 
of properties, qualities and materials describing an 
object, one will not have answered the question 'What 
is it? '. Such a list, unlike the claim, for instance, 
that Socrates is a man or that thi, s isa statue, fails 
to locate anything but a heap (07, l Qs) 
; Ofails, that is, 
to establish that "some one thing has come-to-be from" 
10 
the items in the list. It is the job of an 6VC-? 'Ecq, 
to establish the role and significance-of the various 
properties and materials in respect to the what to which 
they belong. And therefore, the genesis of a new what 
or substance can never be the mere equivalent of alterations. 
The properties, qualities and materials which compose 
a substance cannot, taken by themselves, account for 
their own explanatory value, since the meaning of properties 
and materials is fully dependent upon the nature of the 
substance to which they belong. It is in accordance 
with this indefiniteness of materials, taken by themselves, 
l 
that they are regarded as mere potentialities. 
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In the attempt to separate Aristotle's-notion of 
potentiality from the potentiality of materials to become 
substances in actuality, a number of philosophical issues 
arise. The focal issue is the question whether substances 
are, for Aristotles predicates of matterv and more generally, 
the question what sort of predicate the substance of 
something is -- if it is a predicate at all. Though 
the more complete discussion of the general question 
will be the primary focus of Part II, it is important 
to establish in Part I that matter is not the subject of 
substance-predicates at least in the way in which 
substances. are the subjects of qualities and properties. 
This question bears heavily on the issue whether materials 
can become the substances they compose in actuality-for 
the reason that if materials. can be said to gain a 
substance as a sort of propertyl then one is hard pressed 
to distinguish the coming-to-be of a substance from a 
case in which a material, say, becomeshot- The upshot 
of my argument is that (1) no-substance is a quality-like 
predicate of matter and (2) materials are quality-like 
predicates of substances. An actuality-is not a qualifi- 
cation of a potentiality. Thus, Joseph Owens' claim that 
'the Aristotelian Entity is predicated of, the matter"'is 
deeply misleading. That ib, it is m sleading to conceive 
a man as the prbdicate of his-flesh and bones. 
Since, howeverl-I claim that a proposition in the 
form 'M is potentially S, (where M is matter and S is 
a substance) assigns to M a-mode of being S, how does 
S function in the proposition, if not as a predicate? 
-7- 
The general claim of this thesis is that the substance 
of something is . an actuality or activity, an 
EVFP-Q 
An EYE7&Cc( is a normative principle according to which 
the roles of materials,.. qualities and properties are 
determined. That is, to say that M is potentially S, 
is to assign a principle in the light of which M is to 
be viewed. Similarly, the: term ". housebuilder`'a6cribes 
toc a. man the' potentiality to build houses' in the light 
of a certain activity, housebuilding. To say that a 
man is a housebuilder is to say that he has developed 
powers to engage in a certain activity. But a man can 
never be the activity of housebuilding, not because of 
any failure on his part, but because the activity of 
housebuilding is of a logically different type than a 
man is. Housebuilding is nevertheless the form according 
to which the properties of a man relevant to his being 
a housebuilder are picked out. The relation of matter 
and substance is similar to this. 
In this context it is extremely important that 
Aristotle on a number of occasions in the Metaphysics 
identifies the form (E2FOS) of something with the 
activity that produces it, 
l-'e. 
g., (c71Kq is the form 
of health, and Octo dog t1, t 
is the form of a house. For 
such passages are meant as a model for the logical relations 
between the substance or essence of something and that 
of which it is the essence, e. g., the soul and the 
natural organic body. 
.-8- 
Chapter 1 
Do bricks and mortar become a house? 
In G. E. M. Anscombe's justly admired essay on 
Aristotle1she makes the following claim: 
. if bricks and mortar, etc., become a house 
by being put together to make one we can say 
that such and such bricks and mortar, remaining 
such, become a house. 
The important thing about Ms. Anscombe's account, and 
also the difficult thing, is the part about 'bricks 
and mortar remaining such'. It is a difficult saying 
because it is hard to tell what sort of change the 
becoming represents. It is an important claim because 
it points. to a fundamental Aristotelian distinction between 
cases in ivhich something Persists throughout a change 
and. cases in which something Passes awav in the course 
of becoming something else. Anscombe rightly includes 
the-coming-to-be of a house in the former casel that ist 
in claiming that bricks and mortar persist in their 
identity as bricks and. mortar when a house is made from 
them. But difficulties arise when we examine the use 
. Aristotle, makes of the distinction between a persistent 
arid non-persistent substratum. 
First of all, non-persistence of a substratum is 
C_ 
a sign of 'simple' orl. full"blown gene'is tthoýight-- s 
to, bel6ng strictly 0111Y'-to, ýsubstances)ý while persistence 
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is a sign of alteration or qualitative change. 
3 And 
there is little doubt that the bricks and mortar in 
the example do undergo alteration in the general sense 
of the term. But the house composed by the bricks and 
mortar does not seem to bea new property or quality 
gained by the bricks and timbers by being put together. 
For a house seems to be a-substance in its own right. 
4 
And in the Physics (A, 7,190b5-9), Aristotle includes 
'house' in the'list of things that 'come-to-be-simply' 
o Yti. q'i2'S (%k through processes of change. But if 
the genesis of a house is a case of simple genesis, it 
is inadequately described as the alteration of the material 
substratum. 
5 This is partly reflected in the fact that 
while 'being made into a house' does not seem to make a 
distinction among bricks as such, -'being made=_ot'- brick'. 
does seem to make al. distinction among houses. Thus, 
when the prodtittion of a house is cönsidered in the light 
of persistence of the material substratum, it looks like 
a case of alteration. When it is considered as a case 
of 'coming-to-be simply', i. e., since a new substratum 
for qualities and alterations has come-to-be, it looks as 
if something should have passed away in the course of the 
change. That is, the distinction between persistent and 
non-persistent substrata seems inadequate to differentiate 
between substantial and non-substantial change. 
But Aristotle, while recognizing this difficulty, 
does not abandon-the distinction so easily. For persistence 
and non-persistence is used also as a criterion for ., .I 
distinguishing the sense in which (a) something comes-to-be 
10 - 
i 
from (st) a privation (Q'r p cr: S) , which Aristotle 
sometimes calls the dv7jke ei4N, from (b) the sense in 
which something comes-to-be from matter. 
6 
In case (a) 
but not in case (b) 'that from which' (Ef ÖLr1) passes 
away in the course of the change. At 1033a20-23 of 
the Metaphysics Aristotle observes that strictly 
speaking (G, ctY 715 ETIýAQýn o"ýo , one ought not to 
say that a house comes-to-be from bricks precisely 
because the matter remains. According to the passage 
we say that a substance comes-to-be 'from matter' by 
default, that is, because the privation of a house, 
o 
the o(VI'tK EYoy, is 'obscure and nameless'. 
? Now it 
is at least curious that Aristotle should deny strict 
use of the characterization of matter as 'that from which', 
since this is . the. very... formula. used. by Aristotle to .. .ý 
define. the material causes 
It seems that Aristotle is pressed by the following 
concerns., The genesis of a house from bricks and mortar 
cannot be treated as a case in which one substance 
comes-to-be another in the strict sense in which bronze, 
for example, might be said to become fire or air. But 
neither can it be regarded as a case of mere qualitative 
change, es g., the case in which a man becomes musical9 
or a lump of bronze becomes hot. 
10The 
somewhat formal 
alternative is to treat the coming-to-be of a house from 
bricks as a genesis in the form of substantial change from 
one substance to another insofat hs, 
_the 
QTeprjG75 of 
form, or' the olý(7'ý KF Erolý, passes -away -when a -house, 
för instancer comes-to-be. 
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Similar issues are involved in the Physics at 190a 
25, where Aristotle says, "We say that a statue comes-to-be 
from bronze, but not that bronze becomes a statue. " That 
is, there are some cases in which, despite the persistence 
11 
of a substratum, we are dealing not with qualitative 
change, but with 'simple' coming-to-be. Barrington Jones 
claims that the traditional translation is misleading 
here and suggests that the last clause be rendered: "We 
12- 
do not say that the bronze statue comes-to-be. " His 
difference in translation, however, does not represent 
a departure in philosophical interpretation from the one 
tI propose. For Jones says: 
Thus, even though the example of the statue 
would seem to constitute a counterexample to 
the general claim about the scope of "from" 
made on the basis of the example of the musical 
man, the example of the statue is shown to be 
different by the fact that even though bronze 
is present throughoutthe change in that both the 
original piece of bronze and the statue are made 
from bronze, the product is not simply a piece 
of that stuff with a new property, that of being 
a statue, but a new thing, a'statue. 
13 
Whether or not the traditional translation is preserved, 
Aristotle is saying that the case in which a statue comes- 
to-be is not rightly considered as one in which the 
bronze gains the statue it composes as a quality-like 
predicate. This view may have been reflected by Greek 
usage. 
It is extremely rare, in fact, for Aristotle to speak 
of materials either coming-to-be or being the substance 
- 12 - 
14 
they compose, except potentially. I believe that 
Aristotle's resistance to this mode of expression reflects 
his repudiation of the philosophical stance whereby the 
coming-to-be even of artificial substances is reduced 
to modifications in matter. That is, Aristotle 
repudiates the claim that what a statue 'really is' is 
15 
a lump of bronze having certain properties. But if it 
is allowed that for Aristotle a lump of bronze may become 
a statue as the result of various changes brought about 
in it by the agency of the craftsman, then the question 
arises, 'In What sense is the bronze the statuet or the 
bricks the house, after the 'becoming' Is completeV. 
I will argue that his answer would be, 'Potentially'. 
0 
0 
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Chapter 2 
Can unwrought material become a statue in actuality? 
In J. L. Ackrill's article, "Aristotle's Definition 
of. Psuche"; ' he helpfully discusses Aristotle's use of 
the term 'potentiality'. And despite certain difficulties, 
Ackrill is willing to attribute the following claim 
to Aristotle. 
Unwrought material is potentially a statue, after 
the sculýor's work it is actually a statue. 
2 
I will argue (1) that this formulation is not to be 
found anywhere in Aristotle's work and (2) that Aristotle 
would not say it. Aristotle does, of course, speak 
pointedly. of change fro m what is potentially 1_0 what 
is actually. 
*3 Indeed, it is highly plausible that in 
the case of qualitative change, what has a certain quality 
potentially may become something which has it actually. 
But the question is in what way Aristotle's general claim 
that "Everything changes from what is potentially to 
what is actually" applies to substantial*changeý.. For 
closely regarded, Aristotle's statement need not imply 
that it is what is potentially that comes to exist. as 
the generated substance in the manner of actuality. Also# 
Aristotle-speaks of what is in actuality coming-to-be 
out of or from what is p. otentially. 
4 
But this need not 
imply that what exists potentially changes its manner of 
- 14 - 
existence when something comes-to-be from it. I believe 
that it is only in the very special case of the definition 
of motion, viz. "the actuality of what is potentially as 
5 
such, " that Aristotle speaks of the actuality or 
actualization of the potential, or speaks of the: -potential 
becoming actual. 
Professor Ackrill is acutely aware of difficulties 
resulting from his formulation. The major, problem is 
that Aristotle seems perfectly content to refer to 
materials of which something is made as potentially that 
thing even after the thing has come-to-be. And this is 
a problem because, as Ackrill puts it, ". .. to say that 
something is potentially an X seems to exclude its now 
being actually an X. " Yet Aristotle asserts, for example, 
that the parts of animals are mistakenly thought to be 
substances though they are really mere potencies; this 
on the grounds that they fail the test of separability. 
6 
Ackrill observes also that Aristotle seem to reserve the 
term potentiality for the animal body which presently 
possesses life. For in the passage noted in the Intro- 
duction to Part I, 7two senses of, the term potentiality 
are evoked. A seed is potentially a body which is 
potentially such as to live. In the first, but not in 
the second use, potentiality implies the possibility of 
becoming something. Thus, according to Ackrill, 
... 'potentiality' and'actuality' can come 
to be used not only for successive phases but also 
for aspects of the composite which are present 
simultaneously. 
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But he adds, "This is only because of a reliance on the 
idea of the matter as it was before being informed. " 
The question is, however, whether for matter to be 
informed involves a change from potential to actual 
existence iri the matter.. In the passage quöted prom De Anima, 
however, it seems to be precisely 'being informed' which 
is prerequisite to the valid application of the term 
potentiality to the body. Therefore, if there is a 
reliance on the idea of matter as it was before being 
informed, it is not because sufficient conditions are 
found in 'this former state' to warrant strict application 
of the term potentiality. Though one might say of a 
lump of iron before it is made into an axe that it is 
a potential cutter, this would not be because of its 
power to cut qua lump of iron. Iron gains this potentiality 
by being fashioned into-an axe. Even if iron were found 
in nature only as the material of ready-formed axest 
it'would be legitimate to say that iron is only potentially 
the actuality of cuitting which is the form of an axe. 
Indeed, it is just in this way that the bodies of animals 
are found. We do not find animal bodies prior to their 
being the bodies of animals. 
Ackrill' s attempt to delimit more fully the scope 
of the term 'potentiality' reveals an, important insight, 
though I think it goes against the grain of his earlier 
remarks. He observes, namely, that the expression 'pot- 
entially an X' is not applied by'Aristotle to stuff too 
IN 
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"remote" from the substance in question. The implication 
is that 'potentiality' does not for Aristotle describe 
-a transitive relation. That is, if A is potentially B, 
and B is potentýally C, it need not follow that A is 
potentially C. More pointedly statedt if A is material 
for B, while B is, material for C, it does not follow that 
A is material for C. Aristotle would not say, for example, 
that airt earth, fire and water are a man 1potentially'. 
As Ackrill puts itt earth is "altogether too remote" to 
be a man potentially. 
Aristotle introduces the issue in Metaphysics, Theta, 
7' 
At what point each thing is potentially and at 
what point it is not must be defined. For it is 
not at ai any point whatsoever . 
(aV 
Aristotle's restrictions upon the use of the term are 
remarkably severe. At 1049a14 Aristotle expresses doubt 
that even the seed or sperm is properly called a man 
'potentially', saying that ". .. whenever, through 
a principle in itself it already is such, at that 
point this is potentially. "9 And the following remarks 
concerning what-is a. house potentially are found at 
1049a9. 
If nothing among these things, that is, the matter, 
prevents a house from coming-to-be, and there is 
nothing which must be added or subtracted or 
changed, this is a house potentially. 
It seems that proper use of the expression 'potentially an 
X' tolerates practically no remoteness at all. To envisage 
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a case in-which the materials for making a house would 
--- be in the condition Aristotle seems to demand until the 
house is actually built requires a feat of imagination. 
For, when, prior, to this, would it be the case that 
nothing would need to be added, subtracted, or in any 
way modified? And the requirement, 'when it already is 
such'., applied to the seed, seems equally difficult to 
satisfy if the potentiality of the seed is to exist 
bcIjore the actuality has come--to-be in an inchoate form 
at least. Such severe restrictions dampen the assurance 
that the idea of matter before it is informed plays 
a. very important röle in Aristotle's development of 
the idea of potentiality. 
Against such difficulties, however, Ackrill points 
out that Aristotle waxes warm in-his argument against 
those Eleatic logicians who are willing to ascribe 
potentiality only when the actuality is present. But 
the-context of this argument-in Metaphysics. Theta, 3, 
makes it clear that the issue is not the potentiality 
of unformed materials to become something but the power 
of a craftsman, for instance, to ply his craft. 
' If 
what it is for a housebuilder to be is to be able to 
build houses, and if this capacity represents a genuine 
development through learning and practice, then it is 
absurd to claim that, a housebuilder as such vanishas 
immediately when he ceases to build. For the housebuildin, - CI 
. 
ýrt does not. cease to exist when a man ceases to build, 
and the loss of a mari's abilities requires, : tor 
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instance, that he forgets them, or is damaged in some way 
in the passäge of time. Aristotle ascribes a similar 
absurdity to the view that what is coldl hot or sweet 
* 12 is so only when it is being sensed as such. In regarding 
unperceivedlnlg; Z 'as potentialitiess Aristotle does not 
here mean that an unperceived X is cold potentially 
before it has come to be cold, but rather that X is 
presently cold in virtue of its capacity to produce 
this sensation. And it is misleading to say that what 
is cold is altered when it is perceived or that a house- 
builderls altered when he' builds. 
131n this context thens 
Aristotle seems not to be addressing the question whether 
unformed materials are potentially the things they may 
compose, but the question whether informed but inactive 
things are potentially active. 
Even if it is granted that in Thetas 7 Aristotle's 
restrictions to the scope of the term 'potentiality' 
are not so severe as to exclude materials prior to the 
11 formation of a substance from them, it emerges clearly 
that although Aristotle provides strict criteria for 
the point at which a potency beGinss he assiGns no ends save 
the destruction of the substance. The conditions under 
which it makes sense to ascribe the potentiality to be 
an X are satisfied completely by the materials which 
compose an actual substance. There is no hint that at 
some point the materials composing an X are actually but 
no longer potentially an X, no sign that the potentiality 
of materials is lost in its fulfij;.., ment. 
ý- 
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The difficulties raised by Ackrill are created, 'I 
think, by the belief that for Aristotle it is the unwrought 
bronze, which, being a statue potentially, later becomes 
a statue actually. The alternative is to say that it 
is a statue of bronze which comes-to-be simply, from 
a previously existing lump of bronze. To say, prior 
to'the genesis of a statuep that bronze is potentially 
a statue means that bronze is a good material for making 
thq 
statuesg withoutimplication that the mateHal mode of its 
existence would change if, through the agency of a 
craftsman, a statue came to be. 
,E. 
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Chapter 3 
In what sense are substances predicates of matter? 
In an article by Fr. Joseph Owens, entitled "Matter 
and Pýýedication in Aristotle", 
'Owens'undertakes to 
explain in what sense matter can become a substance. 
He implies that it does so by gaining a substance as 
a quality-like predicate. Although Owens recognizes 
the oddityiof'the locutions in wh . ich substances are 
predicated of matter, and the scartity of the instances 
in which Aristotle countenances such locutions, he 
4 
maintains that Aristotle held to the view that a substance 
2 
could be predicated of its mxtter. There are two inter- 
connected aspects of Oweris' 
objectionable to me. First 
predicates'. as analogous to 
Second is the view that the 
is "somewhat" like the rela 
accidents. 
interpretation that seem 
is his treatment of 'substance- 
, quality-like predicates. 
relation of form to matter 
tion of a substance to its 
The. primary evidence adduced by Owens in support of 
his interpretation occurs in Metaphysics, Z, 39 1029a 23- 
Here Aristotle says, "The, other things (sc. all things 
other than substance) are predicated of substance, while 
substance is predicated of matter. " The line is awkward 
- 21 - 
to use as support for any position because of the fact 
that it occurs in the course of a reductio ad absurdum 
argument. At the conclusion of the argument. Aristotle 
says-. 
For those examining the issue from this point of 
view it follows that matter is substance. But 
this is impossible. For separability and 'thisness' 
70 seem to belong especially to substancep 
on which account the form or the compound rib<rg 
CýUýc7v') would seem to be substance rather than 
matter. 
Because the argument is complex, it is difficult to 
I 
know exactly what, it is that give's rise to the absurdity. 
3 
If Owens is right and the passage supports the view that 
Aristotle regarded substances as predicates of matter, 
then this premise must remain unscathed by the absurdity 
Aristotle ascribes-to the argument as a whole. Aristotle's 
own introduction to the arguments howeverl leads me to 
doubt this. For he saysl 
Now substance is said in a formal way (71fIW, ) to 
be whatever is insofar as it is not <said> of a 
subject but is that of which other things are 
<sai$>- But one must not say* this'alone, for it 
is insufficient. For the statement itself is 
unclearl and moreover it follows that matter 
becomes substance. 
4 
Thus, Aristotle raises two problems with the definition 
of substance as statedt obscurity and insufficiena. 
If the difficulty arose from insufficiency in 
the definition alone, it would be fairly clear that 
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what is missing is the criterion of separability. At 
1017b 23 of Book Delta, Aristotle sayst 
It follows that substance is said in two ways# (1) 
as the ultimate substratum which is no longer said 
of anything else, and (2) as what is a tode ti and 
is separable. Such a thing is-the shape and form 
(CIkt LS) of each thing. 111-40rA '<ale 7"b &ý 
But it is strange to maintain that these two criteria 
are logically related in such a way that a carefully 
developed argument from the first criterion will establish 
a substance that flatly fails to meet-the second criteriong 
unless there'simply were two or more utterlý different 
kinds of substance. If this is the case, Aristotle 
would be unlikely to conZcude the argument in Z, 3 
bysayingg but this is impossible. For separability 
and thisness seem to belong especially to substance. " 
The more likely account is that the unreflective use 
of an obscure criterion has prodýced a candidate for 
substantiality which fails tc> meet the other important 
criterion. This seems especially right in light of the 
fact that the candidate being considered is in 
itself neither a 'what' nor a 'how much' nor anything 
else.,, 
5 
_The 
procedure described in Z, 3 of stripping away 
6 
predicates in order to discover the ultimate subject in its 
naked reality hinges on two dubious assumptions concerning 
the relation of subjects and predicatesq both of which 
are challenged in the course of Book Z. For the procedure 
assumes, first, that in every case in which one thing is 
predicated of another, the subject and the predicate 
-23- 
are different sorts of things. Secondly, it assumes that 
matter is a substratum WcKe, 12wov) for substances in 
somewhat the same way. as substances are the subjects of 
qualities. For the argument details a procedure whereby 
we first strip off all the quality-like predicates? and 
then, in a similar way# strip away the substance or 
essence_of the subject, leaving behind a characterlessq 
material substratum. 
At 1038b 4, however, Aristotle claims that a 
subject may be said to 'underlie' in two wayst "s ae 
either'-in being a _tode 
ti, as an animal underlies its 
qualities, or in the way that matter underlies an actuality 
9 Thus Aristotle distinguishes two modes 
of being a substratum or subject. This distinction 
occurs in the context of an argument which attempts 
to establish that the gubstance or essence of something 
tannot belong to its subject as a universal predicates 
that is, in a quality-like manner. 
10 Aristotle holds to 
this position despite a number of important difficulties. 
For instances there is the problem thatt if a substance 
is said of no subject, while only the universal is 
always said of some subject, an essence ('I'Z)TL 
ýr 6)(Ylcttý 
being non-universal, will not, apparently, belong even 
to the things of which it is the essence. 
11 Yet, . Aristotle 
remains committed to the view 11 ... that nothing among 
things which belong universally is a substances and 
nothing among things predicated in common signifies a 
12 
tode ti. " Indeeds his commitment is unshaken even by 
- 24 - 
the grave difficulty with which Chapter 13 endsg namely, 
that if substance is neither among universals, nor a 
synthesis of other substances 6xisting in actuality, then 
it will not be possible to give an account of a substance. 
13 
Despite this, Chapter 16 ends with thb following conclusion; 
It is clear that among the things which are said 
universally none is a substance, nor is any substance 
composed of substancess 
14 
Thus it would seem that a major burden of 
Aristotelian philosophy is to develop a sense of substance 
which avoids regarding it as a common predicate while 
it allows at the same time for the possibility of definition. 
A large part of this thesis will be devoted to the 
sorting out of this dilemma. But the point I am making 
now is *that since qualities are paradeigmatic of 'things 
predicated universally' or 'things predicated in common', 
and since substance and essence'Jre pointedly denied , 
this mode of predication, it follows that either substances 
are not predicated of any subject at all and a fortiori 
not predicated of matter, or else they are predicated in 
a different sense; Owens' arGument entails-at least the 
partial assimilation of thesb distinct modes of predication. 
Here, for examplet is Owens' account'of,, -, the way 
f 
ih which matýer becomes bL-substance, 
To say that matter is human, equine, lapideous, 
or that it-is a man$ a horse, a stone, may be true 
enough in this context; but with all its linguistic 
oddity the, way of speaking hardly brings out the 
full import of the situation. It tends to give 
25 
the impression that matter-is of itself these 
things. The Aristotelian meaning, on the contrary, 
is that matter is not of itself any of these thingst 
but becomes them by receiving the appropriate 
substantial forms. As their real subject it 
remains really distinct from'them, somewhat as 
a substance remains really distinct from its 
accidents. (emphasis mine) 
I believe that the only direct evidence in support of 
Owens' view that a substance is in some sense accidentally 
related to its matter occurs in the course of the argument 
from Zi 31 where Aristotle says at 1029a 25 that even 
It 
denials of character would belong accidentally (Ko(Ttt 
'00 6ý4pc-PJJKO) to the substratum. However,. if my account 
of this argument is correct, and the resulting concept of 
a characterless substratum is part of the absurdity 
revealed by the reductio ad absurd=, then this statement 
forms very weak evidence for Owens' view. In factt 
Aristotle frequently uses the term 'matter'. in such a 
way as to exclude an accident. al relationship to the 
substance composed by it. 
In the Physics at 192a 31, for example, Aristotle 
says; 
I mean by the matter the first underlying thing 
for-each thing, from which, belonging not by 
accident within, something comes-to-be. 
Again, in De Anima (414a 19-29) Aristotle argues that 
though the soul itself is not a kind of body, it 
nevertheless exists only in a body of a definite sort. 
- 26 - 
For the actuality of each thing comes-to-be 
naturally in what belongs to it potentially, 
that ist in the appropriate matter (K4C 
Here Aristotle does not find it necessary to describe 
the soul as an accident of the body in order to pre- 
serve the distinct logical characters of soul and body. 
There isg however# considerable indirect evidence 
which may be adduced in support of Owens' ýosition. 
For instance, in De Anima (412a 8) matter is described 
fC #0 
as 'what is not in itself (/ýtC640D) a' tode ti' in 
contrast to/V54j or 'according to which it is 
ýC- 7C CI already called a tode ti 
Because the term C(Mis often used. in contrast to 
the term a possible implication of 
this line is that matter is an ac: tuality only ly accident, 
or that the soul which is the actuality of the body 
belong-s to it as an accidental attribute. 
Thou&h there is evidence weighing,. against this intev- 
pretation, it is counterbalmiced by other passaGes in c 
support of Owens' view. For though Aristotle argues 
strenuously in Metaphysics, Z, that an 'essence is the 
-/ c , 16 
sort of thing which, is saidCc(19 c(U-rb , and further that 
an essence does not belong to things which are 
said by participation, through a quality or through an 
attributel"'These passages may not be conclusive. For 
it is arguable that in these passages Aristotle is 
talking about the relation of essences either to universals 
'or 
to fully formed substances, but not to their matter. 
Thus, though the essence of Socrates may belong per se 
to Socrates, it wi belong only accidentally to his 
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matter. This may be the import ofp e. g., lines 1037a 
33-1037b 8. Here Aristotle argues that in the case of 
"first substances" each thing and its essence are the 
same. * He adds, 
By 'first' I mean what is not said in the way v 
that one thing is in another or in a substratum 
as matter, *e 
Further, Aristotle claims that 
whatever things exist as matter or as com- 
bined with matter, are not the same (sc. as their 
essences), nor are things which are one by 
accidentl for instance, Socrates and the musical. 
For these things are the same by accident. 
Do these passages-imply that Socrates, oi a man or an 
animal is an accidental unity of matter and form? Is 
a man a case of "one thing in another" or "one thing in 
a material substratum? " 
This is a question which Aristotle raises on a 
4 
number of occasions in Books Z and H of the Metaphysics. 
On the one hand, there is.. evidence from Z, 6 which strongly 
-suggests 
that Socrates is the same as his essence. That 
is, Socrates. is not to be included among things which 
% 17a 
exist as one thing attributed to another (XV-4 
I c- '* l7b 
but per se (Kq&CtV7M )', i. e. as an essential unity. 
Regarding the "sophistical refutations" of the view that 
Socrates and his essence are the same, Aristotle remarks: 
There is no difference in the point of view 
from which the question is asked or in the point 
of view from which it is resolved. 
- 28 - 
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Dn the other hand this claim seems to undergo. an important 
6ualification in other places. At 10-43b 2, for example, 
Aristotle says-. 
While a. soul and the essence of soul are the 
same thing, a man and the essence of man is not 
the same, if, that is, the soul is not said to 
be the man. 
Again, Aristotle says, at 1037a 7: 
It is clear that the soul is the primary substance, 
the body is matter, but man or animal is the 
compound of the two taken universally. But 
Socrates and Koriskost if, that is, Socrates is 
his soul, have two senses, (for some they are 
regarded as soul, for others as the combination). 
But if <Socrates and Korisko are simply this 
soul and this bodyq then the universal and 
the particular will be analogous. 
Thus the question arises whether a substance is a mere 
combination of this form and this matter. Is it right 
to conceive a man as a body +a soul? 
This is the sort of question which Aristotle raises, 
for example, at 1036b 3-- 
The form of a mang for instance, seems always to 
be found in flesh and bones and parts such as 
these. Are thýesej thent parts of the form and 
the account? Or are they not anything but matterl 
though we are unable to separate them because 
they do not come-to-be-with respect to other 
things? 
Again at-1043a 33 Aristotle asks whether an animal is 
a soul in a body or just soul. For the soul is 
the substancd and-actualitv-of a certain body. " 
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It. --is, ih the concepti6n of soul!, as the actuality of 
a-certain body that the key to Aristotle's solution 
of this dilemma is found. 
I 
., k The evidence that Aris7tbtle sought a solution to 
problems arising from the treatment of substances as 
mereccompounds of body and soul may be seen in the 
very passage from De Anima which provoked this dis- 
cussion. -18 For in that passage;. Aristotle lists under 
the heading of the "single class of things we call 
substance" first the matter, then the form, and finally 
the compound. Immediately, he says, "The matter is 
potentialityt the form actuality. "' As was mentioned 
earlier, it is precisely in the light of this distinction 
that Aristotle deflects the question whether the body 
19 
and the soul are one thing. The thrust of his argument 
seems to be-that if a form is the fulfil, ment, the 
actualityl-or the 'being-in-possession-of-its-end' 
-of., the appropriately., constituted body, 
the question whether form and matter are one is ill conceived. 
Considerable evidence is found in the middle books 
of the Metaphysics in support ofthis interpretation. 
There isq for instance, a passage at 1035b. 27. 
Man and horse and things whichare applied in a 
universal manner to Particulars are not substance 
but a sort of whole composed of this definition 
and this matter taken universally. But Socrates 
is already a particular composed of the ultimate. 
matter, and similarly in the other cases. 
30 
This passage suggests that there is a mode of speaking 
of things, namely a 'universal modelt which may misleadingly 
tend to imply that substances are mere combinations, e. g., 
of this matter -and t is form. On this account it. seems 
VrobctWe- -Ith ot Aristotle would have denied the 
antecedent in line 1037a 9-10,. which says, @$if 
/, 
"S 
ocrates 
and Korisko S> are simply this soul and this body, then 
the universal and the particular will be analogous. " 
In the light*pf this denial, the thrust of the claim, ". .. 
the soul is the primary substance, the body\is matters 
but man or animal is the compound of the tw6, taken 
universally, " may also be reconsidered. For this 
compound seems not to be a substance, but to represent 
a universal mode in which substances are sometimes 
conceived. 
Further, the'notions of potentiality and actuality 
appear in the Metaphysics, just Ls in De, An-imag to 
suggest ways of conceiving substances as fun damental 
unities and not as combinations. At 1045a 20, for 
instance, Aristotle is addressing the question why 
a man ought. not to be conceived as more than one thing, 
e. g., animal + two-footed. He says: 
It, is clear thit for those who proceed in their ýa 
typical fashion to define and speak, it is not 
possible to answer or resolve the difficulty. 
But if, as we say, there is matter and form, 
the one being potentially, the other actually, 
the solution would no longer seem to be a problem. 
_ 31 - 
Similarly directed remarks are found also at 1045b 17# 
4 where Aristotle says... 
The final matter and the f6rm are one 
and the same thing, just as was said,. the one 
potentially, the other actually, so that it is 
like seeking what the cause is of one thing being 
one thing. For each thing is a sort of unity, 
and the potentiality and the actuality are 
somehow one thing. 
Aristotle points to a resolution of this kind at 1043b 10. 
He says 
A man is not animal + two-footedl but it is necessary 
that there be something apart from these, if these 
are matter, which is neither an element nor a 
combination of elements, but the substance is what 20 
they say. when leaving the matter aside. If this, 
then, is the cause of theýbeing and the substances 
this would be called the substance itself. 
And in a similar context at 1043a 5, Aristotle claims 
that in the case of substances, the actuality itself is 
what is predicated of the matterP 
This$ theng appears to be the mode in which a 
substance may be predicated of its mattert the mode, that 
is, in, which an actuality is predicated of a potentiality. 
But the relation betWeen an actuality and a potentiality 
is no more accidental than is the relation of 'house- 
building' to a 'housebuilder', or the actuality of 
@sheltering people and their belongings' to appropriately 
arranged bricks and mortar. Norl indeed, is this sort 
of predication 'quality-like'. 'Housebuilding' does not 
pick out an dlement of a housebuilder, and neither does 
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3 
I sheltering' pick out a quality or feature of a house. 
It does not follow, of course, 'that just any conglomerate 
of qualities and elements may satisfy the conditions 
for being a substance. For'there is, as Aristotle says, 
"a different actuality, for different matter. ", 
2ý 
Neither 
does it follow that the predication of an actuality 
0. 
will not focus on certain characteristics within a 
conglomerate to the exclusion of others. What does 
follow, I will argue, is that no feature, characteristic, 
qualityO elem6nt; or any cbmbination of these, can 
becomb a substance in actuality. It is for this reason 
I that Aristotle says that matter is not in itself a 
tode ti 
To establish this point I will refer to a passage 
from Z, 16. The passage is intro*duced by the claim 
that among the things most generally thought to be 
substance, most are mere potenciesý3'Included in Aristotle's 
list of these merely apparent substances are the parts 
of animals. These are rejected as true substances on the 
grounds that when separated they exist as matter. 
24 
Also 
included are the primary elements earths air and fires 
which are rejected on the grounds that none of 
them is one thing, but a mere heap, until they are worked 
up and some one thing comes-to-be from them. " This 
latter remark, especially if it is distributed over 
the earlier example of the parts of animalst may be held 
to suggest that at some Point. these potencies may become 
actualities. A crucial passage follows, however, which 
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lays this possibility to rest. Aristotle considers 
precisely the case of fully formed parts of a living 
organism. He says: 
Especially someone might suppose that the parts of 
living things and the parts closely related to - 25 
the soul come-to-be both being in actuality and 
in potentiality, by possessing a principle of 
motion from something in their midsts, for which 
reason some animals live when divided. But 
nevertheless all will be in Potentiality, whenever 
they are one and naturally continuous, but not 
by force or growing together. For such a thing is 
a mutilation. 
Thus the distinction between potentiality and actuality 
seems elegantly absolute. Indeedt'a likely. implication 
from what Aristotle says is that it is only when the 
parts of an animal are properly constituted, i. e., 
"naturally one and continuous, " that they are properly 
called potential. Apparently, they are never actual. 
If this interpretation i-s correct, then the passage 
leads directly to the conclusion of Z, 16, that is, to 
the conclusion that "no substance is found among things 
predicated universally, nor is any substance composed 
of substances. " 
26 
And these two denials can be seen to be 
fundamentally interconnected. For the mode of predication 
of a substantial predicate is not universal, that ist 
does not pick out. common. properties and elements r however 
focal or essential such properties and elements may be 
in respect to the being of the substance. For this 
reason Aristotle says of the Platonists, 
- 34 - 
Those who speak. of., the forms rightly rqgard them 
as separated, if indeed they are substances, but 
they do not rightly claim that a, form is one over 
many. 
27 
The reason why such a view of substantial predication 
is inadequate is that characteristics picked out in 
this way can at best form a "sort of whole" which is 
not a substance. 
28 It seems to have been Aristotle's 
view that only insofar as items picked out-in the 
universal mode are regarded strictly as potencies is 
the unity of a substance rightly conceived. "For, " 
as Aristotle sayss 
29., it-. is-. impossible that-. a substance 
is formed out of substances belonging to it in. actualit-v. " 
So that, if a substance is one thing, it will not 
be composed of substances belonging to itj that ist 
according to this mode. 
30 
In this chapter I have argued that substances are 
n. ot predicates of matter in the manner in which accidents 
are predicated of substances. I have also attempted 
to describe the Aristotelian sources of the contrary 
view. Mainly, as it seems to me, such interpretations 
involve a confusion on the part of commentators between 
passages which are 'aporetic' in character and those 
which truly represent an exposition-of Aristotle's position. 
This seems especially conspicuous in the examination 
of Metaphysics, Z, 3, which on my interpretation serves 
to expose important difficulties concerning Aristotle's 
doctrine of substance. Most especially, these difficulties 
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result from the treatment of an essence as ý mere 
element in a whole, which can be stripped away leaving 
I 
matter behind. Such a view of the Aristotelian essence 
I 
is clearly expressed by Owens in The Doctrine of Being 
in the Aristotelian Metaphysics, in which he says 
that the 7, t qY (-IYcL( is that element in the thing 
which is expressed by the definition. "3lAccording to 
the exposition I have given, this claim would reduce 
the essence to a mere potencyt and would treat an essence 
as itself ]a predicate in the universal mode or as 
an item picked out by this mode of predication. 
Though the evidence I have accumulated in this 
chapter tends very strongly to suggest that an alternate 
interpretation of an Aristotelian essence should be 
sought, the argument is by no means complete. Here are 
some of the difficulties which remain. 
First, I have assumed that the two criteria for 
substance given by Aristotleg that of being an ultimate 
substratum of predicatesp and that of being separable 
and a tode ti, are co-ordinate criteria. Against this 
view it is possible to maintain t*hat týey are separate 
criteria which are used with respect to utterly different 
kinds of substance, one for matter, the other for form 
andl perhaps#---the combination of matter and form. The 
absurdity to which Aristotle refers in Z, 3, might then. 
be the view that prime matter is the only substance. 
Some evidence is found in support of this view at 1029a 18 
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where Aristotle concludes, ". .. so that Vt is necessary 
that matter appears as the only substance for those 
who examine the issue in this way. ', 
32But I will argue 
that the criteria are in fact co-ordinate and that a 
candidate which'did not meet both criteria would 
not beg for Aristotle, a primary substance, i. e. an essence. 
I have made remarks which strongly 
suggest that a Yj a compound of form ýnd matterg 
is not for Aristotle a primary substance, but is rather 
an expression of the way a substance appears from a 
certain point of view. This point of view involves 
Ia universal mode of conception iriadequate for the proper 
conception of individual substances. This position 
requires further discussion due to its novelty, though 
Hartman argues a similar view to. mine in "Aristotle on 
the Identity of Substance and Essence" in which he says*. 
Now Aristotle has written "if each name means 
simply this particular soul plus this particular 
body, " then the material object is an instance of 
the compound universal (1037aB-10). But if there 
is any view Aristotle firmly rejects, it is precisely 
that a man is a soul plus a-body, -which is a 
corollary of the view that a substance is some 
matter combined with some form. 
33 
Third# a great deal more must be said about the 
nature of the relation between actualities and 
potentialities. In Particular I have argued that act- 
ualities are not predicated in the universal mode which 
picks out elements and properties of things. But it maY 
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w 
be argued against this interpretation, that use of 
examples like 'housebuilding' and 'housebuilder' makes 
a prima facie case for'the, po6ition that actualities are 
universal predicates. For in such cases a single activitY 
is predicated of many practitioners. I will argue that 
it is not the fact that an actuality it predicated of 
many individuals that is at issue here but the mode of 
predication. But further, I will attempt an argument 
to the effect that the individual. members of a natural 
species are, for Aristotles actualities in their own 
right. This is to say that individual sub'stances are 
properly said to be rather than have their essences. 
Finally, it may be argued that I have. played rather 
fast and loose with diverse types of concept in my 
association of characteristics, f-eaturest qualities, 
properties, parts of animals, and materiali. This is 
a just criticism. For even the"term 'quality' as used 
by Aristotle rep., ýosLints,. -*a-mixed. -*. bait''of logically distinct 
sorts of things. 
-%4 
But I will argue in detail that materials 
are analogous to certain kinds of qualities in that they 
are most properly conceived, not merely as the substrata 
of actualities, *býit as,. quiili: tications Of them. 
38 
Chapter 
Can matter be predicated of substances? 
, The argument 
found in Metaphysicsl Z, 3, pointedly 
illustrates that matter is regarded by Aristotle as a 
substratum or subject. Because a substance is regarded 
as something which is predicated of no subject, but of 
which everything else is predicated, matter appeared as 
a prime candidate for being substance. Furtherl in 
Re Anima, at 412a 171 Aristotle claims that the soul 
is not a body on the following grounds. 
For the body is not said of a subject, but exists 
rather as a subject and matter. 
In the Categoriest Aristotle may be viewed as preserving 
a genuine place as substances for the material parts of 
things at la 24 where he stipulates that parts are not 
to be included among things 'Present in a subject. 
-Aristotle, indeed, 'seems to put his stipulation precisely 
to this use at 3a 28t where he says: 
Let it not worry us that the parts of substances 
exist in whole subjects, that is, lest we are 
forced to deny that they are substances. For 
was it not stipulated that 'things present in 
a subject' did not mean 'things belonging in vttýe 
something as parts'? 
-39- 
On the other hand, it has been clearly shown that 
Aristotle was entirely conscious of the slippery nature 
of the concept of subject or substratum. Two passages 
bhowing. his consciousness of the difficulty have 
already been cited, viz. 1038b 4 and 1ý49a 27. In order 
to gain a clearer understanding of Aristotle's percept. ion 
of the difficultyj it will be helpful to examine these 
passages more closely. - 
, The first, passage is introduced by a listing of 
four c- andidates for being substance, the substratum 
k . '0 0-1 
f-% 
or subject, the essence (-Ilolrt ýY&ffidt), the compound 
I Oe 
of these, and the universal (TO Kci66AW) . Aristotle 
notes that the'first two have already been discussed. 
For concerning the essence and the substratumg C- le they 'underlie' (UVOAý6(72%t ) in. two ways, either 
being a tode tit as an animal underlies or is the 
subject of his qualities or affections (71b'7S 
-e 
or as matter underiies the actuality. 
Importantlyl Aristotle is nof claiming that matter is 
the only substratum. Rather, his claim is that both 
the'essence and matter may be said to 'underlie', the 
one, bein a tode ti, the otherg in the relation of 
matter to-actuality. 
1 This interpretation is born out 
by reference to a similar distinction drawn at 1042a 26. 
There, Aristotle says. - 
The substratum is a substance. In one way the 
matter is a<substrat> meaning'. by, --matter. tliat 
which, not being a tode ti, is a _tode 
ti pot- 
entially. In another way, the account and the 
form is(a 'substratu"m>o which, being a tode ti 
2 is separable in account. 
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These passages lead to the conclusion that Aristotle 
regarded an essence as a substratum of qualities. It 
is this very fact thati,, provokes one of the major dilemmas 
of Zo 13-16. -Precisely because it is asserted that a 
freckcat *! Ci 
substance 'is A of no subject, the possibility arises 
that an essence may not belong to the very thing of 
which it is the essence, e. g. 9 a man or horse. For 
'belonging' suggests predication and universality. Or 
if the essence does belong to things, this suggests 
that it is disqualified by failure to meet a major 
criterion for substances. The philosophical challenge 
is to understand an essence in such a way that it is the 
subject of the qualifications of the thing of which it 
is the essence. 
The immediate concern of*this chapter, however, is 
to answer the question whether matter can be predicated 
9f substances. The above observations are relevant to 
this question because they suggest'that matter is not 
properly regarded as the subject of qualifications, that 
is, of the qualities and affections of the substances 
they. compose. If this is the case, then whatever kind of 
substantiality it is which matter enjoys may not be 
threatened by regarding it as predicable. In the light 
of this possibility, I will make one more observation 
about the sources'of the dilemmas raised in Z, 13- 
At 1038b 25, Aristotle poses this problem. 
Moreoverl it would seem impossible or unnatural 
that a tode ti and a substanceg if they are 
composed by something, should be composed from 
what are not substances nor from the tode ti, 
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but from quality For this would imply 
that substance is not prior and that quality is 
prior to substance and the 'this'. 
This problem arises naturally from the claim that the 
materials which compose substances are not, truly 
substances because they (1) do not underlie in the 
way that a substance underlies its qualities and (2) 
are not tode ti's. For if substances are not composed 
of substances, it-seems that they must be composed 
of-things in the other categories, for which 'quality' 
stands, here, as the representative. As I argued in 
the last chapters Aristotle's solution to this problem 
i's-suggested in the re-statement of his position found 
at 1039a 3, in'which he says that a substance cannot be 
composed of substances subsisting in actuality. For 
this would turn substances into mere conglomerates 
rather than unities. 
Clearly9 then, to regard materials as qualities 
would, from Aristotle's point of view,. be unsatisfactory. 
Though there is a passage in the Physics in which 
Aristotle claims that matter is a relative (7-bjY IPOS 11 
this should not be understood as a denial that matter 
is a substratum, but a reflection of the fact that 
there are. different substrata 'for different forms. 
There is no evidence that Arist otle in his maturity 
abandoned the definition of matter given at Physic l 
192a 31, as "o -. the first substrat= for each thingo 
from which, belonging not by accident within, something 
comes-to-be. -. 
4 
I* 
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In the second passage earmarked for closer exam- 
ination, 1049a 27, a)inumbbr of these issues come 
into sharper focus. For in Theta, 7P the issues include 
(1) th6 proper delimitation of the term 'potentiality', 
(2) the distinction among kinds of substratum, and 
the comparison of quality-predicated and matter-predicates. 
I will take up the arGument at 1049a 18, which is 
introduced by Aristotle's remark that earth is not 
properly conceived as a statue potentially until it 
is changed into bronze. 
At this point Aristotle, in what appears at first 
to be a digression, praises the Greek tongue for the 
'paronymous'5mode in which materials'are predicated of 
the substances they composes 
What we say is not this (1W&) but that-en 
1ý le - (r. x6tywor) is appropriate. For example a box 
is not wood but wood,. ent nor. is wood earth but 
earthen, and again earth, if the process continues :0 Or- 3/ (0-L oLr-rw-5)j is not something else but 
that-en. 
Aristotle now uses the observation to illustrate the 
point that only the immediate or proximate materials 
are rightly said to be potentially the things they 
compose. He sayst 
In every case that is potentially which follows C- % C/ immediately (cC-7tX"o'S -M Lra? rpoy) For instance, 
a box, is not earthen or earth, but wooden. For 
this is a box potentially and this is the matter 
of the box. 
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But in the procedure of pursuing material qualifications, 
another signpost to ultimate matter or an ultimate 
substratum is suggested. There may be some element or 
group of elements which are neither further qualified 
by something which is them potentially, nor identical 
to any other elements. Fire, for instance, might be 
'first matter'. 
The-procedure described by Aristotle differs sig- 
nificantly from the procedure Of Zo 3. In Z, 3 the 
process involved stripping away the predicates in order 
to locate the true subject. Here, the process is more 
like stripping away the substance in order to find the 
ultimate potentiality. If a box is woodeng but wood is 
eartheng but earth is airy, but air is fiery, while 
fire is nothing else, fire will be first matter. But 
there is an absurdity about such a procedure. Does the 
analysis move toward or away from what is a tode ti 
ind substance? 
6 
At the beginning the subject of 
investigation seems to be a subject of qualifications; 
at the end-a substratum of some sort appears which is 
neither, itself, a subject of qualification, nor a 
qualification of the original subject, i. e., the box. 
Has the procedure moved the'investigator closer to what 
really is? 
Aristotle addresses thi's question by appeal to the 
distinction among kinds-of substrata. 
7 He says: 
( 
4vt4A 
- 
That - about which (70'6 Ch, and the substratum 
differ in thist in being or not being a tode ti. 
A mant for instance, body and soul, is the subject 
of his qualities or affections (IlriS Oce C-41-t) , but e 
to musical and white are quality (77N O-S) 
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Now if a man, body and soul, is the subject of his 
qualities, and this is meant to indicate the kind of 
unity which 'being a tode ti' entails, then it follows 
that the true subjects are matter and form, construed 
not as mere combination, but as the actuality of a body. 
Wilfrid Sellars in "Raw Materials, Subjects and 
Substrata" 
8 
suggests this sort of interpretation*in 
1% Oe arguing -that 
due to the qualification, Kbet (rwý, UeLitbtl 0ý9 
Aristotle is restricting the compass of his remarks to 
the Aristotelian equivalent of Strawsonian P-predicates. 
9 
That is, 'musical' and 'white' are a restricted class of 
predicates, which, like Strawson's beautiful example of 
'smiling', belong to Persons as a whole. For there is 
something weird or macabre about the claim that a 
person's body is smiling, and the claim that a person's 
Soul is smiling has as little meaning as the claim that 
10 
a person's soul is angry. The problem with Sellars' 
interpretation is Aristotle's pointed inclusion of 'white' 
as an example. Sellars meets this objection by suggesting 
that AW1W should be translatedg following Rosso as 'pale'. 
Though this is probably a more accurate, translation in 
the context, it is difficult to understand 'pale' as 
a P-predi6ate, that is, as more typically applied to a 
person rather than his body. 
A somewhat different interpretation, however, will 
give a more cohesive, if more radical, sense to the passage 
in question. Aristotle may be saying that the real 
subjects of all quality-like predicates are substancest 
that iss the tode ti, or to borrow Sellars' useful 
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translation, a 'thing-kind'. Though a man's body may be 
the cause of a man's attributes, it is not, properly 
- speaking, the subject of them. I believe that in this 
passage Aristotle is moving toward an understanding of 
the essence of something, i. e. the actuality of a body, 
as a genuine subject. Part of the justification for 
this view is Aristotle's claim that materials, like 
qualitie-st are themselves predicated of certain kinds 
of entity in a paronymous mode. 
11 
A clearer notion of what Aristotle means in the 
context by a paronymous or 'derivative' modd of predication 
is provided in the lines. 
When the musical art comes-to-be in something 
(nS,, u1vLrC(, '(4S ttJVC-Vý14CYJf) 9 the thing is not 
called the musical art but musical or skilled in 
le 
music ý44VOO(lfdv) , and a man i6 not 'whiteness' 
Oc-t,, kvr-1$ ) but white (WKVý'), nor is a man the 
activity of walking or movement jert. S 
11 
IF" 
S 
KtVJ VS ) but one who walks or moves, e. as 
thaten C/ 
0, 
(&)S 'ýv In such cases (ad-c(, A4 CV JV 
6M) the ultimate subject is a substance 
%. ý" 1) / (77c 6cq(aMV But in cases which are not like 
this but some form (LcCIJ05) and thing-kind (rffC-'rf-) 
is the. thing predicatedg the ultimate substratum 
is matter and material substance. 
The primary mode of predication, that is the non- 
derivative mode, is the sort that tells what something 
is. The inflection of the predicate, however, is by 
no means a certain' tl ' indication of the type of predication 
involved. The sentence 'This is white', for instance, 
is ambiguous bothin English and in Greek. The sentence 
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may be used to say either (1) of a colour that it is white; 
that is, an instance of whiteness, or (2) of a substance 
that it is white without the implication that the substance 
is a white.. The latter case is an instance of*paronymous 
predication. 
12 Aristotle's claim is that the paronymous 
mode of predication is a clue that we are dealing with 
a fully formed substance. His argument is that this 
substance is the ultimate subject in such ca-ses. For the 
enterpriSe which attempts to locate a more ultimate entityq 
either by material or formal reductionismt fails to 
produce the actual subject of predication. It is 
possible that 1049a 24-27 should be read as a parody of 
material reductionism. 
In order to establish that I have correctly described 
Aristotle's intent in Thetat 7, it would be convenient 
to argue that the material substratum of a form or tode 
ti could not be the ultimate subject of paronymous 
predicates. Yet Aristotle could hardly be saying that a 
quality cannot be predicated in this mode of a part of 
a substance. The claim, for instance, that 'his arm is 
white' could, )hardly be understood to mean that the arm is 
a white. In fact Aristotle does not deny but affirms 
that the material constituents of things are the subjects 
of paronymous predicates. The point is that such pre- 
dicates need not apply to the original subject. Whether 
such a predicate indicates a potency with respect to the 
subject is judged in accordance with the applicability or 
relevance of the predicate to the subject. The final line 
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of Aristotle's argument leads toward a more-precise 
analysis 
At 1049a 36 Aristotle says: 
It happens rightly that 'thaten' is said in 
accordance with matter and the qualities. For 
both are indeterminates. 
Part of Aristotle's'meaning here is that qualities and 
materials as predicates do not, as does the form or 
tode ti, determine what it is that has the materials 
and properties. In this sense they are indeterminate 
becu-, hse they-fail to determine their subject. But 
there isg I think, another important sense, which is 
thatq taken by-themselves, they are undetermined. I 
mean thatt-for Aristotle, what counts as matter or as 
quality depends on what, is being talked about. For 
instance, one coult not tell by looking at materials 
per se that a kidney stone was not part of a kidney. 
Aristotle's position seems to be something like 
this. The problem with an argument that attempts to 
show that fires say, is the ultimate subject of a 
box is that in reaching this substratum, the arguer has 
continually change the subject. For the procedure 
involves the confusion of two senseýs of substratuml i. e., 
the substratum as the subject of discourse or invest- 
igation with the substratum of the subject of discourse. 
The original material, e. 9. wood, has itself been treated 
as the subject of discourse in its own right, though it 
arose in the investigation as a. paronymous predicate. 
It is for this kind of error that Aristotle cZrticizes 
10, 
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what is written in the Timaeus. 
13 Aristotle says: 
He does not speak clearly concerning the rec- 14 
eptacle, if it is separable from the elements, 
Nor does he make use of the notion, though he 
says that it is a sort of substratum prior to 
the so-called elements, as gold is prior to 
gold products. Surely even this is not 
well said when it is said in this case. 
C)f, the subjects of alteration it is so, but of 
the subjects of genesis and destructiong it is 
impossible to call them the things from which 
they come-to-be. Yet indeed he says that it is 
truer by far to say that each one is g9ld. 
Aristotle's point is that when something is regarded 
as the material substratum of something, it is not, 
from this point of view, being regarded as a substance, 
that is, as an actuality in its own right, or as the 
ultimate subject of discourse. 
This analysis gives a clearýr content to Aristotle's 
claim that no substance is made out of other-substances 
existing in actuality. At the same time it explains 
the sense and the importance of Aristotle's view that 
materials may be predicated, though paronymously, of 
their subjects. And finallyt the analysis is moving 
closer to the position that the ultimate subject of 
qualitiest properties and materials is the essence or 
form. 
There, is one final problem I will touch upon 
briefly before reconsidering the same issues under 
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a different light in the next chapter. For the argument 
I have so far adumbrated tends to su' . ggest 
that all 
instances of material analysis involve the fallacy 
I have named "changing the subject. " Such a view 
would involve a serious misconstrual of Aristotle's 
position. In the case of the wooden box, for examples 
it is entirely possible that a furniture restorer would 
be very interested in the properties and components 
of wood precisely because he is interested in the 
box. That is, it is possible to conduct an analysis 
of constituent materials without. leaving the original 
subject behind. Aristotle describes such a procedures 
for example, in the Metaphysics, Z, 7i At 1032-b 18 he 
describes-a doctor reasoning about the health of a 
patient. 
If he is healthy, he must be made uniform. What 
is being uniform? This. And this will be if 
he is heated. What is this? This. And this 
belongs potentially and is already under the 
physician's power. 
From this sort of reasoning Aristotle concludes that 
heat in the body is either. a part of health or 
that something follows it which is such a part of 
health, either straight away or through intermediates. " 
15 
But though heat or some state of affairs nearly related 
to heat may fall genuinely within the province of 
the study of man, it does not follow that it is the 
heat which is healthy, or that heat is the sort of 
thing that health ist except potentially. 
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Chapter 
6 
Is the genesis of a substance the equivalent of alterations 
in a substratum? 
Any beginner in the study of Aristotle will answer 
'no' to the title question. The question what the 
significance of the distinction between alteration and 
genesis amounts to is more vexed. Indeeds the formulation 
of the distinction is made impossible by interpretations 
of Aristotle which treat forms and essences As special 
sorts of qualities and characteristics. The distinction 
is obscuredo if not obliterated, by claims like Ross' 
that for Aristotle ". .. Form is never a substance, 
always a characteristic, "lor his speculation that: 
Since one substance cannot contain another 
actually existing substance (1039a3), it follov's 
that if the form were a substance there could 
never come into being an individual substance 
containing it as an element. 
2 
For, if it is the case that the gaining of a characteristic 
amounts to the genesis of a substance, genesis will 
simply be a case of alteration. Genesis for Aristotle 
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always invoives the coming-to-be of a new subject and 
not the modification of an old one. Yet such claims 
as Ross' cannot be dismissed out of hand. Such readings 
are a natural result of puggestio: hs like those found in 
Z, 8, that only a combined substance is capable of 
genesis3 and that the essence 11 ... is what comes-to-be 
in something else, either by art, by nature, or by 
potentiality. " 
4 
It is natural to suppose that what is 
"in something else" is a characteristic, attributes or 
element. And this reading is further justified by 
Aristotle's claim at 1034a 5 that Socrates and Kallias 
are 'I,, oe such a form in this flesh and bones, " and 
that they differ from one another on account of their 
matter, but are the same in form. For if Socrates 
and Kallias share, an essence, an essence would seem 
to be a universal predicate, though perhaps, of a 
special sort. 
Furthert Aristotle makes it clear that the means 
by which things come to -be is simply,. generally 
speaking, modification ol a substratum. 
Of things that come-to-be simply, -some come-to-be 
through change of shape, e. g. a statuet some 
by additiont e. g. things that grow, some by 
subtractiont e. g. Hermes out of stonet some by 
synthesis, e. g. a house, and some by alterationt 
5 
e. g. a transformation in respect to the matter. 
Yet it was shown in the last chapter that the new 
substance which comes-to-be is no*t the old substratum 
with a new property. If the old substratum persists 
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throughout the genesis, it becoffies a quality-like 
II predicate of the new substance. That is, when a statue 
comes-to-be from bronze, the statue is not bronze (or 
a bronze) but brazen. 
6 
But how the shift in subject 
occurs, that is, how full blown genesis is to be 
conceived, is a question Aristotle characterizes as 
a problem of "extraordinary difficulty. "7 
In-this chapter I will examine two passages in 
which the paronymy of matter-predicates is connected 
to the problem of simple genesis, and its distinction 
from mere alteration or modification. The first passage 
occurs at the beginning of Physics, H, 3. The announced 
purpose of the chapter is to establish that alteration 
'to o. belongs only in things which are. in themselves 
said to suffer (change? ) through pprceptible objects. " 
For among the other things, one might especially 
suppose that alteration belongs in shapes and forms, 
and in states (ZTC-fs) and in the acquil-ing and 
losing of these things.., But there is alteration 
in neither. 
It is important to notice that Aristotle is not merely 
claiming that shapes, forms and what, for convenience, 
will call 'states'. are not subjects of alteration. 
Not even fr4gj are subjects of alteration, even when 
regarded as different from forms or states. As the 
argument proceedst it concentrates on the i 
atic assertion that the gainin and losin,,; r 
of shapes, forms and states by, the 
them is not alteration. This is indicated 
aore problem- 
L (Avis nu_ 
subject of 
immediately 
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by Aristotle's use of the passive participles a%qkc(7t eem &ve v .. > 
and Výuc55AA6VWin the following lines. 
For whenever what Is shaped and arranged 
is completed we P 
do not say that is the thing from which it camet 
e. g., we do not say 'the statue is bronze' or 
'the candle is wax' or 'the bed is wood'. Rather, 
we say paronymously that the statue is brazen, 
the candle waxen, the bed wooden. But what has 
undergonethe change and been altered we so 
designate. , 
Clearly it is the subject of the shape or arrangement 
i 
which, at least when completedg is the receiver of 
* That Aristotle uses present paronymous predicatesS 
progressive participles and speaks, literally, of 'what 
is being shaped, or arranged' suggests that his remarks 
about the paronymy of matter-predicates may also apply 
prior to completion of the new substance. The question 
is whether what is being shaped or arranged is the matter 
or the substance. If, as seems fairly clear, Aristotle 
is trying to distinguish the Process of alteration from 
the process of genesist Aristotle could not be arguing 
that the subject of the change, 3:. e., -what is being 
made, is the matter until the instant of genesis, when 
a statue arises in a flash. Thus, ýoss' claim that 
e. that which only comes into being by a certain ; 
rocess cannot be said to be altered by the process# 
since it did not exist before, 
8 
though trivially truep shifts the emphaýis away from a 
distinction between the kinds of subject involved. The 
distinction in processes hinges, not so much on existence 
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or non-existenceg but, on'subject-types. 
Thuss the subjects of the present participles, 
being shaped and arranged', are intended to contrast with 
the subjects of the perfect participless 'having undergone 
and been altered'.. In the consequent lines, Aristotle 
speaks about the latter subjects. 
For we call the bronze and the wax the. wett the 
hot, and the hard; and not only this, but we also 
call the wet and the hot bronze, designatinf, the 
9 
matter homonymously with the quality (11W IRIPCO - 41 
In the context of statue makingg sayl the material is 
designated in a different manner than is the statue by 
its properties. Though it was noticed in the last chapter 
that materials may themselves be the subjects of paronymous 
predicates, 
10 the distinction between what they are as 
substances and what they are in the sense of what belongs 
to them is blurred. 
11 The sculptor is more interested in 
the properties of bronze than its essence, if indeed he 
deigns to distinguish them at all. For what the sculptor 
is making 'is a brazen statue. And it is this which is 
being fashioned, shaped and formed. He is not making 
an instance of bronze. Thus, the processes of alteration 
and genesis have to one another the relation of potentiality 
to actuality, that is, the relation of matter to form. 
Because alteration of bronze is necessary to the making 
of a statue, alteration is potential genesis. 
This interpretation is consonant with the conclusion 
drawn by Aristotle at 246a 1. 
So that-if what has*become in which there is shape 
is not spoken of according to shape and form 
- 55 - 
but rather according to qualities and alterations, 
it is clear that geneses would not be alterations. 
Here Aristotle is distinguishing the substratum which 
'becomes"? n the sense of being 'that in which the form 
resides' from what is spoken of in accordance with the 
form, i. e., the statue. The argument is that if the 
genesis of a statue of bronze were the equivalent of 
a lump of bronze coming to have a shape in it, then 
the bronze would come-to-be the recipient of attributes 
predicated in the same mode as they are of the statuep 
and there would be no distinction between týe processes 
of genesis and alteration. That there is such a 
distinction is indicated by the fact that statues 
receive predicates in a different mode than does the 
bronze which composes them. 
Aristotle completes this part of the argument by 
the following observation. 0 
Moreover it would seem unnatural even to speak in 
this way, to'say that a man or a house or anything 
among the things that come-to-be have bebn altered 
into being. But perhaps when each thing comes-to-be 
something is ne'cessarily altered, for example# the 
matter is condensed, rarified, heated or cooledl 
but surely the things that come-to-be are not alteredo 
nor is their genesis alteration. 
These are, the lines toward which Ross' remarks are 
particularly directed. It is Possible that in translating 
ýAd, eZ'd-&Las "have been altered into being" I have over- 
read the line. Yet if I am right that 'what is being 
shaped and arranged' at 245b 9, refers to the productt 
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then there'is some plausibiliýy to. this reading. Thot; Gh 
it is probably right that a sculptor cannot be said to 
'modify' or 'alter' a statue until he has made it, it 
hardly follows that until the instant when the statue 
arises, the sculptor is not working on a statueg but 
rather on bronze or stone. And it would be equally 
strange to say that, in the process of genesis, the 
. statue 
is being condensedl rarified, heated or cooled. 
But indeedg the occasions for applying such terms to a 
, statue 
would be rare, even if the statue were complete. 
Nor is it impossible that, insofar as a statue may be 
altered at all, it may be altered-before it is complete. 
Thus Aristotle argues not merely that there is 
no alteration with respect to shape or form, that is, 
alteration with the shape or form as the subject of 
new qualities, but also that 'what is said in accordance 
with shape or form' is a different sort of subject from 
what comes to have the shape or form in it. Yet it 
seems that at the time Aristotle wrote the chapter, 
some of the terms needed to draw the distinction more 
easily were as yet undeveloped. 
13First-of 
all# the term 
U716, t6ý"Wbi' occurs nowhere in the chapter. Secondly# 
Aristotle does not apply the term 'potentiality' to 
materials. The only use Aristotle makes of the term 
&bC7'b"[ 
SILFV94(Vis 
in, the discussion of knowledge or skill 
as a capacity at 247b 4ff.. 
14 For this reason the argument 
tends to concentrate on types of property or quality 
rather than on types of subject, e. g. shape in contrast 
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to heat. 
That Ari-stotle is nevertheless concerned about 
different sorts of substrata is evidenced. further by the 
argument with which he opens the discussion of 'states'. 
It is evident that in this argument Aristotle intends 
to argue that the gainin or losing of a state bY its 
appropriate subject is ill conceived as a case of 
alteration. That is, the process of becoming virtuous# 
for example, is misconceived when treated as a case of 
alteration. The reason for this is that a virtue is 
properly understood, according to Aristotlet as 
a completion or Perfection i., e. as that 
state in which something is most in accordance with its 
Jý N1 10 
nature A vice, on the other 
hando involves a destruction or a distortion 
ýýKVIUTIS) 
Aristotle says, ', 24Cc, 11 
Just as we do not speak of the finishing touches 
of a house as alteration (for it would 
be strany; e if the cornice k4S) and the roofing (4* td, 
, 
tile OtV4, AoS) were called 'alteration' and if 
a house being coped tdlko; ý4CVI) and roof ed 
was 'altered' rather. than perfected) 
the argument applies in the same way to virtues 
and vices, both to what has them and to what is 
gaining-them. 
To speak in terms of completing or perfecting something 
is to be speaking of a subject of a certain kindq namely 
one which determines'the appropriateness or relevance 
of properties in relation to it*15The properties relevant 
to the excellence of something aret that isq reGarded 
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in accordance with the form. The fulfil_. ment of a 
subject regarded in this way is not a modification. of 
it, though the fulfil-ment may involve the modification 
of somethingo but simply the doing of its proper job, 
i. e., being in actuality. 
Aristotle does not deny, but affirmsp that materials 
may come to possess shape, form, and the qualities in 
accordance with which something comes-to-be or becomes 
excellent. Indeed, he strongly suggests by his use 
1 *1 ) -L )% 01 
of the expression 11-b reeOrOS C-Y 4F &11--n 7-b qVkto 
characterize the materiall as distinct from what is 
spoken of in accordance with shape and form, that shape 
is not properly conceived as being in the statue. But 
the gaining of appropriate properties by bronze is not 
the fulfilment of bronze as such, 'but the fulfil,, ment 
or genesis of the statue. Thus, that to which the 
shape or form belongs. Is _a 
propertyl cannot'be the 
subject of genesis or perfeciion. 
The doctrine that shape or form is not in the 
statue is reflected also, I think, 'in the Caterorieg. 
First, it is reflected by the denial'*that: -secohdary 
16 
substances are in the subject of which they are predIcated. 
Secondlyl it is reflected by the denial that differentiae 
are present in a subject. Thus, though 'footed' and 
'two-footed' are predicated of a man, they are not, 
according to Arls"totle, in the man*17The function of 
differentiae is not to ascribe properties, just as 
shape is not properly conceived as a modification of 
a statue# but to tell us what something is, or how it 
- 
is to be spoken of. That is, any subject about which 
its shape is a new fact, cannot be a statue. Since 
shape is a modification of a lump of bronze, bronze 
18at least does notj by gaining shape, become a statuel 
in actuality. If it did, there would be no distinction 
between genesis and alteration. 
19 
It is a commonplace of Aristotelian scholarship 
that the distinction-between primary and secondary 
substances is not found in the Metaphysics. Equally 
absent is the distinction between what is present in 
or not present in a subject. What replaces this sort 
of distinction is the division b6tween things universally 
predicable (quality-like) and those things which belong 
in a different wayr i. e., in the manner of essences. 
Fuller discussion of these matters is beyond the scope 
of the present chapter. From the argument so far, it 
seems clear that the question 'What is the essence of 
a statue? ' cannot be answered by saying that it is a 
shape or form in something else. For such a definition 
fails to provide a ground according to which a gtatue, 
and not bronze, is a genuine subject, ind not something 
20 , like 'white man', the mere combination of a substance 
with an attribute. Furthers the essence belongs, not 
to something else, but to that of which it is the essence. 
21 
Thus, Aristotl6treatment of genesis and its distinction 
from alteration is closely related to the question of 
what an. essence is. And it seems clear that in order 
to do "its job, a form or essence cannot be a characteristic. 
For such a view would lead to the unsatisfactory 
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conclusion that art does not make new substancesý 
but merely imposes new qualities, quantities, etc. on 
substancesf" 
22 
At the end of Z, 7 of the Metaphysics-o Aristotle 
considers--. the genesis of artificial substances in the 
light of the ýersistence of their substrata. The passage 
appears as a digression introduced by a discussion of the 
question- whether matter is part of the account (, Vld, 6s ) 
of things, a question which Aristotle seems to answer in 
the affirmatiye. 
23The 
context is iipportant. Because of 
the radical distinctijon Aristotle draws between alteration 
and genesis, and because of the logital gap'such a dis- 
tinction may suggest between alteration of materials 
and the genesis of substances, it is important that the 
distinction be viewed in the light of an affirmation of 
the intellectual significance of matter. 
At 1033a 59 the passage begins with the following 
observation. 
That from which as matter some things come-to-be, 
when they come-to-bel is not spoken of as that but 
thaten. example a statue is not stone but of 
stone (Xi WOS), and a man, one who is healthys is not 
spoken of as that from which, i. e. as an invalid. The 
reason for this is that they come-to-be from a privation 
and from a substratum, which we call the matter. For 
instance, both a man and an invalid become healthy, 
though surely things are said to come-to-be rather 
from a privation, e. g. a healthk thing from an 
invalid rather than from man, on which account a healthy 
thing is not called an invalid but a man, and a man is 
healthy.. 
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So far the passage is reminiscqnt of distinctions drawn 
in Physics, A, 7, where the locution Y comes-to-be 
from X is reserved for cases in which X comes-to-be Y, 
but does not survive the change. 
24That is$ we do not say, 
according to Aristotle, that the musical comes-to-be from 
a man, though a man may become musical. On the other hand, 
we do say both that the unmusibal becomes musical and 
that the musical comes-to-be from the unmusical. Also, 
we do say both that the unmusical man becomes a musical man 
and that a musical man comes-to-be from an unmusical man. 
For, though the man survives the changel thejunthesis, 
i. e., the unmusical mant does not. 25The troublesome case 
is that in which a product comes-to-be from matter. For 
though it resembles the case in which a man becomes 
musical insofar as the substratum survives the changet it 
26 is not a case of a subject pickiný up a new attribute. 
About this case Aristotle says, "We say that a statue 
comes-to-be from bronze, but not that bronie becomes a 
statue. " 
. 
Curiously, in the passage from Z, 7, Aristotle 
attacks the mode of speech in which a statue is said to 
come-to-be-from bronze' rather than from a privation. 
27 
In tfi'e case of those things in which the privation 
'is obscure and nameless, for example, whatever is 
the privation. of shape in bronze or the privation of 
a house in bricks and stones, they seem to come-to-be 
from these things as in the former case from an invalid. 
By "these things" Aristotle apparently means the material. 
But if we were to speak more thoughtfully about such 
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cases we would not say simply 
that a statue comes-to-be from wood, or a house from 
bricks, exactly because they persist throughout the 
genesiJ8 The privation, on the other hand, disappears. 
But there is an important disanalogy between the two 
sorts of cases. For though it is certainly true that 
an healthy man is not called an invalid, this represents 
a trivial matter of fact. That we do not call a statue 
a shapeless lump of bronze (neglecting thý use of such 
an expression in scathing criticism), represents the 
same I trivial fact. The problem is that while the 
healthy thing may be called a man, a statue is not 
29 
called a wood. Furthert though a man may come-to-be 
healthyt Aristotle is silent in the passage about 
whether a lump of bronze may become a statue in the 
same sense. 
There is a possibility", howeverl that Aristotle intends - 
the particular example of health and illness of a man. 
to reflect upon the conditions of materials designed 
for a particular purpose, when they are not serving 
or'serving the purpose. This interpretation gains some 
support from 1044b 29ff. Here Aiistotle raises the 
problem how matter, is related to contrary conditions, 
C. 
especially when one condition is I<Yf)l ilf-r Kau Keavý 
*-% kL cc .', ýýS and the other KtrM YOLr For 
example, he asks, "If, the body is potentially healthy, 
but 'ill' is the contrary of health, is the body 
therefore potentially both? " His answer seems to be 
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that matter is properly so called when it is in accordance 
with the positive state and the form, but is "apart 
from its nature" when in accordance with the privation 
and destruction. 
-Indeed, 
Aristotle argues that it is-, 
by a destruction of the matter itself that it becomes 
the potentiality and matter ofA corpse. 
Interpreted in this light, the passage from Z, 
gains a better senses Aristotle's claim is that the 
change from 'wood' to 'wooden' reflects a change from 
material not doing its job to material doing its job, 
or a change from matter as such to matter in-formed. 
'In the process of genesis the role of ma7tter changes 
from a' heap (CWpos -r%V' ITevi'v ) 
30 to a genuine part of the 
inquiry concerning a substance. 'Understanding the 
passage in this way allows a recorýciliation of its 
significance with the important claim in Physics, A, 
that it is from matted1hat what comýes-to-be 
comes-to-be not by accident; 'but the privation and 
the contrary is an accident. " For the matter which is 
a genuine constituent of a substance is matter which i$ 
3. ý "Peculiar' to it. Matter as a constituent is not to 
be construed either as the heap which exists prior 
to genesis33or as, that into which a substance is 
divided when it is destroyed. 34 Thus in talking about 
things-brazen and wooden at 1036a 4, Aristotle says: 
Of these things there is no definition, but 
they are recognized with thought and perception, 
though apart from the actuality it is not clear 
whether they are or are not. But always they are 
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spoken of and recognized in universal accountst 
35 though matter in itself is unknowable. 
If this analysis is correct, it is clear that 
genesis is reflected in the 'coming-to-be' of matter. 
But it does not follow that materials come-to-be ! %'I 
the- substance they compose. What materials 
become in being in-formed is a potentiality. That is, 
they do-not become the source of their own-intelligibilty 
but intelligible through the actuality. They become 
a professional substance. 
It is notable that this view of genesis and the 
role of the material substratum of substances differs 
significantly from what might be called the traditional 
or 'received' opinion. The contrast may be illustrated 
by examining some of Zeller's remarks on the roles 
of the concepts of matter and form in Aristotle's thought. 
First, it is thought that the problem of genesis has 
to do with the problem of how Being can come-to-be 
from nothingt rather than how genesis is to be distinguished 
from alteration. Thus Zeller says: 
36 
It might seem that out of Being nothing could come 
to be, since it is already: and out of Not-Being 
nothing alsol for ex nihilo nihil fit ... 
The solution to the problem is to posit -. -. a 
substratum whose essence it is to be pure possibility, 
which has not in any relation become actuality. " In 
some ways this corresponds to the position argued in 
this thesis that a substance cannot be composed of 
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substances existing in actualityp a view for which 
Aristotle clearly argues in Metaphysics, Z. But Aristotle 
applies this position to fully in-formed parts of 
things, including those parts most closely related to 
the soul, 
37while Zeller apparently has'in mind, 'not the 
parts of animals or the elements or materials of artificial 
productsq as apparently did Aristotleg but a kind 
of formless entity, which, because it is in its very 
nature pure possibility, allows for the genesis of things. 
If we abstract entirely from anything which is a 
product of Becoming - that is to say, if we think 
ourselves a kind of object which has not yet become 
anything, then we shall have pure Matter without 
any determination by Form. This will be that which 
is nothing, but can become everything - the Subjecto 
namely, or substratum to which no one of all the 
thinkable predicates. belongs, but which precisely 
38 
on that account is equally receptive to them all. 
Thus Zeller construes matterl or_ matter, as 
the substratum which as yet possesses none of 
the qualities that make the Form of things. "39 Furtherl 
Zeller imaýines that Aristotle used the term 'potentiality' 
40 to indicate this elusive entity. As he says; 
Aristotle understands by Potentiality in 
general Being as mere susceptibility - indeterminate, 
undeveloped self-existence, capablel indeedl of 
becoming-d'definite reality, but not-yet made 
into one. 
This view of Aristotle's concept of matter is 
combined with a view of form and actuality'which would 
rend,,, e. r. hopeless. any distinction between genesis and 
- 66 - 
41 
alteration. ' For according to Zeller, when Aristotle 
9"6 identifies Form with actual, Matter with 
potentýal, being, he means to say that the former 
is the totality of the-qualities which the latter 
does not-possess but is capable of acquiring. 
If Form is quality and matter is the subject, then 
the exchange of qualities is coming-to-be and there 
is no distinction between alteration and genesis. 
Aristotle's treatment in Generation and Corrut)tion of 
what he callsa matter of extraordinary difficulty can be 
shown to stand very much.. aGainýt suph an interpretation. 
The following claim is, without question, fundamental 
to Aristotle's position. 
If something comes-to-be, it is clear that there 
will be some substance potentially, but not 
actually, from which the coming-to-be will be 
and into which it is necessary that what passes 
away changes. 
42 - 
But Aristotle irimediately raises the question 
whether something among the other things in actuality 
belongsto thiý3- " 
I mean, for instanceg will what is only potentially 
a this and a being be so much, of such a sortj 
and somewheret though it is simply not a this or 
a being? 
Three . untenable results 
follow from an affirmative 
answer. First, if such a substratum were all things 
only potentially$ then the substratum would be separable. 
Though enthusiasts for prime matter deny that it is 
- 
43 
separablet Aristotle here suggests that this-is implied. 
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Secondly, wfiat Aristotle calls the special fears of the 
early philosophers arisest namely, that genesis will 
take place from a pre-existing nothing'. This is implied 
by the viewl and not resolved by the view, 'that genesis 
is out of what exists in potentiality only$ that is, 
if what is potentially is conceived as sheer possibility 
with absolutely no other content. And finally, Aristotle 
claims that if "being a tode ti and a substance" does 
not belong'; while the other categories do, it follows 
that qualities are separable from substances. This 
final objection is: the one which seems to reflect 
Aristotle's special fears,, since he introduces it alone 
-, P / 44 
with the expression Xdk7PC-, P 6(171ýP&1. 
Aristotle'soanswer to these difficulties is quite 
clear, namely, that the coming-to-be of one thing involves 
the destruction of something else. But this is only 
a solution to the general problem. As Aristotle says: 
Concerning the essence of genesis and deptructions 
insofar as each of the things that are is regarded 
similarly, everyone must hold that this is a 
% 45 
sufficient explanation (5Kd,, V, (, 7, d-V'). - 
The remaining problem, which might fairly be called the 
problem, is to account for the fact that some things 
are said to come-to-be simply (and to pass away simply), 
while others are not. Aristotle gives two answers and 
suggests'a third which he finds unacceptable. The first 
is that it makes a difference into what the 
thing that changes changes.,, 
4 6That 
is, some things 
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signify a tod. e ti and some, thints do not. It is change 
into the former that-is simple genesis. Secondly, some 
differences in matter signify more a tode ti than 
others, which signify a Privation. H6at', for instance 
signifies a "certain category and a form" while cold 
47 
signifies a Privation ((rTfý70S Change into the former 
may therefore be regarded as a case of simple genesis 
while change into the latter would not. Finallys the 
change from what is imperceptible to what is perceptible 
might, be regarded as simple genesis, though Aristotle 
expresses doubts about the value of this criterion at 
318b 19-33- 
This initial treatment of the problem is found to 
be too general by Aristotles exactly because in this 
analysis, 'all things are regarded 'similarly'. The 
answer has a different significance in different cases 
because the categories of what comes-to-be differ. That is# 
we do not answer simil, arly that c6ming-to-be 
48 
and passing away is through change into one another. 
When someone learns something, for instance, he is not 
said to come-to-be simply but to become wise. 
49 
Here the 
relevant distinction is between the category of a tode ti, 
Ya ýrd, 'Ovo 50 and that of a 'such' or 'so much' (*17 
From the categorial point of view, only substance can be 
said to come-to-be simply. 
5lonly 
when every sort of thing 
is divided similarly into columns having substances and 
positive conditions in one row, privations in the othere 
52 can all genesis be. treated as formally similar. 
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It is to be observed that at no time in the 
previous analysis of simple genesis does Aristotle invoke 
the spectre of a being whose essenceIs pure possibility. 
On the contrary# all the problems discussed presume 
the denial that such a non-substance exists. The success 
of Aristotle's argument depends on his ability to draw 
a categorial distinction between substances, strictly 
conceived, and items found in other categoAes, unless, 
that ist there is no distinction to be made between 
alteration and genesis. It is with respect-: to this problem 
that Aristotle raises a question at the end of Chapter 
3. Because the passage may be understood to involve 
a speculation about prime matter, I will examine it 
briefly. 
At 319a 30 Aristotle raiser, the following question. 
With respect to what is not simplyl someone 
might wonder whether it is something different 
than the contraries. For instancet is earth 
and the heavy what is not, while fire and the 
light what is? Or is it rather that earth is 
what is, while the matter of earth is what is 
not, and the matter of fire. similarly? Is matter 
therefore something different for each of them, 
or would they, then, not come-to-be from one 
another and from contraries? ýFor the contraries 
belong to. these, namely, to firet earth, water 
and air. Or is the matter in a sense the same 
and in another sense different? For whatever it 
is that underlies is the sames but the being 
is not the same. 
The passage is clearly too 'aporetic' in character to 
base any firm interpretation upon it. But the passage 
- 70 - 
strongly suggests that even if there is a matter common 
to fire, earths air and water, these, and not the common 
matter, are the subjects of the contraries. Thus, 
even if there is an amorphous nothing existing as pure 
possibility, this could not underlie the properties 
of things. For in that case, qualities would be separable 
from substance, as was observed above. And it seems 
most probable that in distinguishing two senses of matter 
as 'what underlies's on the one hands and 'the being' 
on the other, Aristotle has in mind his distinction 
between kinds of substrata. 
In this respect the passage may be ceen as an 
introduction to A, 4 which deals precisely with the 
distinction between alteration and genesis. Alteration 
occurs when the substratum remains-, 'genesis when it 
does not., Thus, to say that matter is the common 
substratum of all things, while form is the totality 
of qualities, obliterates the*distinction between 
genesis and alteration. And insofar as genesis involves 
a change in the form or essence, it is necessary that 
the form or essence be conceived both as a tode ti 
and as the genuine subject of predication. Even if 
prime matter existst it is irrelevant to the problem 
of genesis as Aristotle conceives it. 
53 
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Chapter. 6 
How can a substance be concei-ýed as the cause of its matter? 
Before approaching the problem which is the focus 
of this chapter I will reiterate briefly the chief points 
which have been argued so far. 
In the first chapter the difficulty of making a 
clean distinction between, alteration and genesis is 
introduced. The difficulty arises because of cases in 
which a material substratum persists in its identity 
during a process of change or alteration which accompanies, 
I 
supports or brings about the genuine coming-to-be of a 
new substance. Insofar as the distinction between 
alteration and genesis seems to turn precisely on the 
persistence or non-persistence of the substratump such 
cases are problematic. If, on the one hand, the genesis 
simply amounts to the gaining of a new shape or arrangements 
this would seem to be a case of alteration. But houses 
and statues are not properties or characteristics of 
material substrata. If, on the other hand, a material 
substratum, becomes a new substance, while persisting in its 
identity, the question arises in what sense the substratum 
is the new substance after the genesis is complete. It 
is suggested that this relation between material substratum 
and substance, i. e. the relation between matter and formt 
t 
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expressed in Aristotle's vocabulary as the relation 
between potential and actual being. 
If this is the case, then it is clear that Aristotle's 
? .1 expressions, iý; vo("s3 and may be used to ascribe 
contemporaneous modes of being. In Chapter 2 it is argued 
that in Aristotle's usage ascription of the term potentiality 
need not imply the possibility of later fulfilment. Bricks 
and stones are potentially a house, the body of a man 
potentially a man, even when the house and the man actually 
exist. It is argued further that the contemporaneous sense 
of the term potentiality is restricted in its application 
to the immediate and fully organized material substratum 
from which a. substance is composed. Though living flesh 
and bone, for example, is a man potentially (in this sense 
of the term)l the components of flesh and bone do not 
enjoy this highly restricted status. What counts as matter 
depends upon the form. 
In Chapter 31 dispute the analysis of the relation 
of matter and form which holds that form is predicated of 
matter in a manner similar to that in which qualities are 
predicated of substances. I argue that this view depends 
on the failure to take into account the important distinction 
drawn by Aristotle on a number of occasions between kinds 
of substrata, i. e.. the kind which is a subject of qualities 
and the kind which, is a material substratum of a substance. 
I hold that the relation of a substance to its matter is 
unlike the relation of qualities to substances (1) insofar 
as substances are non-acci. dentally. related to their matter 
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and cannot be 'stripped away' leaving their matter behind 
and (2) because the unity of matter and form is inadequately 
conceived as a TullcAOV or 'compound'. The 'universal mode' 
in which substances are conceived as a compound of mattet- 
and form is contrasted with the more adequate mode of 
understanding material substances as the actuality of 
a body. For an actuality is not predicated in a quality- 
like way of a potentiality. A man is the actuality of, 
and not a quality ofj his body. 
In Chapter 4 it is argued that to regard something 
as the material substratum of a substance is not to regard 
it as an actuality in its own right. In this sense the 
materials. composing a substance, though not qualities, are 
quality-like. It is shown* that-for Aristotle materials 
can indeed be predicated of the substances, though they 
are predicated in a paronymous mode similar to the mode 
in which qualities are predicated. The attempt to reduce 
substances to their material constituents is misguided 
in virtue of an implied insensitivity to the mode in 
which materials belong to, or are predicated of, the 
substances they compose. Becaude the'material substratum 
is the substance composed only potentially, the materials 
are not, for Aristotlep a subject of investigation in 
their own right. Only if the composing elements of a 
substance are treated as such, i. e. as potentialities, 
can a material investigation maintain the original 
substance as its subject. This analysis of Aristotle's 
position leads toward the view that the possessoý, both 
of qualities and materials9 is'the form or essence. 
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In Chapter 5 Aristotle's*distinction between alteration 
and genesis i's examined in greater detail. It is shown 
that Aristotle's distinction cannot be maintained ift 
as Zeller arguest form is 'the totality of qualities' 
while matter is the possessor, or the potential possessor, 
of form. A better account is that matter by being in-formed 
becomes intelligible through the actuality. That iss in 
the process of genesis mat6rials change from being a 'mere 
heap'. of properties into a genuine part of the inquiry 
concerning a substance or form. The actuality of matter 
. as such 
is to be in-formed or 'in the form'. 
1 The material 
substratum is actually itself when it is in the form. But 
to be 'in the form' for a material is to be in a potential 
mode. For, though the material substratum is a genuine 
bearer of qualities, it is the substance which is the 
possessor of them, i. e. the subject, both of the materials 
and the qualities. 
In the present chapter I will explore the relation 
between a substance and its materials insofar as a 
substance, form or essence may be conceived as the 'cause' 
of its matter. I will examine Aristotle's attempt to 
explain the 'logic' of this relation through the instance 
of artificial production. The distinction between artificial 
and natural substances will be examined in view of the 
special applicability of the question of 'separate substance' 
to natural substances. 'Actuality' and 'potentiality' are 
shown to be concepts through which natural substances 
are viewed by Aristotle, not as syntheses of matter and 
form, but as fundamental unities. 
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At the end of Met. Z, 16 Aristotle concludes a long 
argument the thrust of which is primarily negative. The 
negative claim is that a substance can neither be a 
universal predicate nor composed 
of other more basic substances. In Z, 17 Aristotle 
makes a new beginning. The starting point of the new 
examination is the claim that "a substance is a sort of 
10 %. % 1P /2 
cause and principle (Cý1147 NOILL OL4--4CL. i-15 To seek a 
cause or principle is, for Aristotlel an instance of 
seeking an anwer to the question 'Why? ' or 'On what 
account? '. For the question 'Why? ' to be intelligible, 
it must be asked in a context in which one thing is assumed 
to belong to something else. 
3 In order to ask 'Why? ', 
the questioner presupposes that something is the case 
about something else for which an explanation in sought. 
That is, to ask why something is the case presupposes; 
at least in the posture of the questioner, that the 
question whether it is the case has already been decided. 
The question'why the moon is eclipsed, for instance, 
presupposes that the moon is eclipsed. 
Further, though a question may be asked in the form 
'Why is the musical man a musical man? ', this can not 
ihtelligibly be construed as a form of the question 'Why 
is something itself? '. For in that casel according to 
Aristotle, there would be a brief and common answer to 
t 
every question in that form, viz. each thing is 
indivisible from itselft and this is what it was for a 
single thing to be. " 
5 
Strictly speaking, the search for 
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the account according to which "... he who is a man 
is a man" is a search for nothing at all. one may 
intelligibly ask for the cause of a man's being an animal 
of a certain sort. 
6. 
then, the substance of something is a sort of 
cause$ and a cause is an answer. to the question 'Why? 'l 
then the question which seeks the substance of something 
is a form of the question''Why? '. It follows that the 
question 'What is a man? ', insofar as this question seeks 
the substance of somethingl is a form of the question 'Why? '. 
As Aristotle is awareq this is a rather surprising claim. 
For the question 'What is a man? ' seems at first glance 
not to be asking why one thing belongs to another. Aristotle 
says: 
Especially in those cases in which one thing 
is not. said of something else, this escapes our 
notice. For instýkncej <'ýIt. escapes our notic v1when 
what a man is is sought becauseQa maýis said 
simply (SOL Tb cV-7Aý)S and it is not 
designated that 'these things are this' 
7 
, 
A4-; 7N;, &, 
According to Aristotl. e's treatment of siach questions, what 
is being sought by the questioner is 'the cause of the 
>1 11 C. -I 
matter' (cy-L710v' r95 ()-A 7-S 8 This cause is the form and 
the substance. 
9 In the case of material substances, i. e. 
things which have parts, properties, and elements as 
opposed to things which'are absolutely simpleýothe form 
or substance is the cause of the matter, an answer to 
the question 'Why.? '. 
I 
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The crucial point of Aristotle's analysis is that 
one who seeks the form or substance of something already 
knows or assumes the posture of knowing that, e. g., 
"this is a man or that this body is something possessing 
this. " 11 The questioner is already assur. ed of the fact, 
but is looking for something. else, i. e. the substance 
or essence. 
12 The investigator is not confused about 
what constitutes criteria for the identiýy of a7man. 
Rather, he is concerned to discover a principle according 
to which the elements which constitute a man can form 
the unity which the ascription of a substance term confers 
upon those elements. This means, accqrding to my inter- 
pretation, that. a forml substance, or essence is a 
principle in accordance with which the r'Ole of the elements, 
properties and characteristics which constitute a 
CCSP! aýjeci 
substantial unity*nre Awith respect to that unity as 
their subject. 
In the present chapter Aristotle identifies two 
sorts of answers or 'causes' to the question 'Why do these 
things constitute this? '. The first 
of whi ch', or the final cause, which 
applicable in the case of artifical 
and beds. The. second is 'what moved 
is traditionally called the efficien 
sort of cause is sought with respect 
is 'that for the sake 
is distinctively 
products like houses 
it first't or what 
t cause. The latter 
to genesis or 
destruction. The final cause is sought 'in the case of 
the being also'. 
13Roughly, 
what Aristotle has in mind is 
that the question 'On what account do these materials 
constitute a house? ' may be answered either by I 
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giving the maker, e. g. the architect or builder, as a 
cause, or by-explaining what the materials'are for. In 
the passage at hand, it is unclear to what extent Aristotle 
intends such answers to be answers to questions seeking 
the essence or substance of something. The belief that 
the essence of something is distinct from its final or 
its efficient cause has le., d to ihe editorial seclusion 
Of Lrc; -rt. rc at 1041a,. 28 j precisely 
because the manpscripto as it stands, identifies final 
and efficient-causes with the essence. The objection to 
the manuscript is plausible for the reason that one ought 
to distinguish, it seems9 between 'what something is' and 
1who made it'. Despite this, I favcurýhe manuscript for 
two reasons. Firstt Aristotle's intent 
-in 
Z, 17 is to 
examine the-question what an essence is by debbri-bing 
a. particular kind of question. It is-possible that 
1 1% 1% questions of the essence type, viz. rjelvot-j% jj , or, 
for instance, 'What was it for these materials to be a 
house? ', may have answers other than the essence itself. 
Thus, a question of the essence type may have the final 
or efficient cause as an ansiver. If this is the case, it 
may be significant that Aristotle inserts the qualification 
C 
. Wj at 1041a 28 as an indication that it 
is the form of the essence question which concerns him 
at this point in the argumerh, and not the status of 
the answer. Second, the Possibility should be left open 
that final and efficient causes, appropriately construed, 
14 
may be regarded as genuine answers to the essence-question. 
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This would be the case whenever the final or efficient 
cause is a principle in aboordance with which the unity 
of the material elements composing something may be 
understood. Later in this chapter I will show that 
Aristotle's frequent assertion in the Metaphysics that 
'the art is the form'15amounts to a claim th at efficient 
causes, understood as arts. rather than as artists, are 
essences. And furtherg this doctrine allows Aristotle 
to envisage a unity of formal, final and efficient 
causality. 
16 
The primary thrust of the remainder of Z, 17 is 
Aristotle's argument that the cause of-the matter cannot 
itself be an element or characteristic of the substance 
of which the essence is sought. To list a further element 
of the whole simply provides an additional fact in the 
same order as those already recognized which it is the 
job of the answerer to explains That is, if someone 
asks why such and such an arrangement of bones, flesh, 
sinewo heart and lungs constitute a man, it will not 
suffice to answer that a man also has a liver. Nor 
will the question be answered by selecting a group of 
parts or properties essential to the life of a man, as 
if the question had been 'What are the components 
necessary to the existence of a man? '. For if there 
is a group of elements which are essential in this sense, 
it is precisely the principle according to which they 
are to be discriminated as such that is being sought. 
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This position is argued in the passage beginning 
at 1041b 11. In the argument Aristotle uses conjointly 
the examples of a syllable and flesh, the former being 
composed of letters (q'roýX&cq)j? the latter of fire and' 
18 
earth, or the hot and the cold. The examples are intended 
as cases which, though extremely limited in complexity, 
19 
form unified wholes unlike a mere heap or pile (15IJ? o. ý). 
%C 
The example of-a : ýyllable is paradeigmatic 
By'"elements' of a syllable 
Aristotle means, not letters of the alphabetj but the 
elemental sounds represented by the letterJ00ne reason 
for Aristotle's use of syllables as an example is that letters 
by themselves. do not sound the same as thay do when combined. 
21 
Indeedt some letters are Eute (c; 
ýwv: i) when se;: arated. 
Thus, a syllable is not a juxtaposition of 
discrete entities, but a whole in its own right. When 
the elementary sounds are separated, there is no syllable. 
When fire and earth are separated, wh'enq that is, they 
exist discretely, there is no flesh. From this it follows, 
according to Aristotle, that flesh a: nd syllables are 
. 'something. 
blse' besides what composes them. 
What, thent is the nature of the 'something else'? 
First, it cannot be another element. For in that case 
flesh, say, will involve another element in addition 
to the original two. The original question arises again, 
viz. 'What is it for these things to be flesh? ', and an 
infinite r-,. gress is suggepted. Secondl if the Isomething; 
else' is composed of some selection of the elements in 
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the original whole, then the question 'Why do these 
elements form a whole? ' is left unanswered by listing 
them. As Aristotle says: 
If it is made from an element, it will be made 
not from one but from many (or it will be that 
element)l so that we will apply the same argument 
to this as well as to the flesh and the syllable. 
22 
The question 'What is flesh? ' can not be answered by 
saying that it is something composed of elements. For 
it is precisely the source of the unity of its elements 
which is being sought. Thus, Aristotle says at 1041b 25: - 
It would seem that 'this something' is not an 
element and that it is the cause of this being 
flesh and this a'syllable. 
This caute, according to Aristotle, is the substance 
of ea6h thing; 
Though it is fairly clear in the context of the 
present argument what explanatory role the substance of 
each thing has, namely to explain the unity of the 
material elements, the passage is silent about how 
this role is to be exercised# and about what sort of 
unity is en, ýisageJ for the elements compbsing a substance. 
However, a clue to the nature of the 'cause'*be'ine: soi; gh-, 
is given at 1041b 28-31. Here Arl'stotle says: 
Since, some things are not substances, but those 
that are substances are constituted according to 
nature and by nature, it would seem that this nature 
is the substance, which is not an element but a 
principle. 
23 
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What does Aristotle mean by a cause which is not an 
element but a principle? In Z, 17 three candidates/are 
/. # / .% 24 
suggested. First is the moving cause (Ti c-x(vjV'c--Vf-wrov), 
which is especially associated with genesis and destruction. 
Second is the purpose of final cause. This cause is 
called 'the cause of the matter' in the Phvsicsý5 Though 
the final cause or end is sometimes treated by Aristotle 
as apurely intellectual principle, i. e. as a source of 
26 
reasoning but not of action or genesis, it is regarded as 
a 'cause of the being' in Z, 17. In Met. j Delta, 1022a 7 
Aristotle warns that though the 'end' is regarded as 
something toward which, rather*than from which, motion 
or actiqn aims, there are times when the 'end' is both 
that toward which and that from which (OcriEr-Si cyýxiw, I<OLL 
2 fgf 
ocr Mi. Ej 0) . The third 'cause of the matter' given 
by Aristotle in Z, 17 is the form which he directly 
associates with the substance. 
271n 
what follows I will 
develop an understanding of Aristotelian form or substance 
as a principle representing the unification of formal, 
final and efficient causality. 
The passages which best illustrate in what sense 
the form is a principle are those in which Aristotle claims 
J-* that the art or science (7*6-, Xv-? ) is the form (J4CCDS 
The identification of the art with the form occurs in the 
Metaphysics at 1032b 13,1034a 24,1070b 33p and 1075b 10. 
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The claim that the art is the form, i. e. thai the 
practice of medicine or the medical science is the form 
of hI ealth, and that the practice or science of housebuilding 
is the form of a house is helpful for a number of reasons. 
First, it involves an identification of the 'cause of 
the being' as form and as mover, Secondly, it is an 
instance of a form, which as mover, is not predicable of 
its subject, insofar as the housebuilding art is not 
28 
predicable of a house. Thirdlyq it names as a form something 
which is not an image of ch. ýrac. teristics and properties 
of the subjects of which it is the form. Fourthly, if 
it can be claimed, as Aristotle doest. that the practice 
of medicine is in some way health, then the principle of 
I 
intelligibility as the end can be identified with the 
principle as mover. It is with an eye to all four of 
these reasons that Aristotle claims that the art is 
the form. 
The first passage is found at 1032b 139 where 
Aristotle says: 
The medical art is the f 'orm of health, the house- 
building art the form of a house. And I mean by 
substance the essence without the matter. 
.. The things which come-to-be by art are those of which 
29 the form is in the soul (C-&-P, (ýL- I 
A; 5 )9 presumably by 
contrast to those things of which the form is in them. 
That Aristotle regards such a form as the substantial or 
true form of artificialproducts is clear from 1032b 1 
where, speaking about such forms, he says, "I mean by 
N 
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form' the essence of each thing-, * and the primary 
s ubs I tance. " Thus, the form of artificial products, i. e. 
the-very substance of artificial products, is, in one 
sense, not present in that of which it is the substance, 
The form is not, namely, a characteristic of or an element 
in particular instances of the product. This interpre- 
tation is further justified by the view expressed at 1032b 
ff. that both health and illness have the same form. 
For, insofar as health and illness do not share the 
same characteristics and properties, their single form 
can not be regarded as a definite list of characteristics 
and properties. Rather, the claim that health and illness 
have the same form is an indication that it is in accordance 
with the same principle, i. e. the medical art, that the 
characteristics, properties, and'elements involved in 
both health and illness are grasped. In other wordst 
the knowledge of health is also'the knowledge of what is 
not health, 
30j. 
e. the privation. 
To say that medical science is the form is to say 
that the exercise of the knowledge of health determines 
the parts of health, i. e. determines that such and such 
elements amount to health in any particular case. The 
medical art 'determines'-the parts in two senses. Aristotle 
uses the teleological reasonings of the physician to 
illustrate both the sense in which the active knowledge 
of a science, the activity or exercise of the science, 
is the source of health in the patient and the principle 
according to yihich materials and properties may be 
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regarded as elements of the 
A'op. 5 . 
31 
Thus, a single 
, principle may 
be regarded both. as an intellectual and as 
a productive cause. With reference to the analysis of 
the question 'What is XV in Z, 17 as a question seeking 
the 'cause of the matter', it now seems clear that the 
principle being sought in the case of artificial 
products is the science or, art. For to tell someone 
what health is is to explain the role played by the elements 
which constitute healthp- that is, to display the way in 
which various elements and properties are taken into 
account under the concept of health. 
32 Such an account 
displays the substance of health as end, form and moving 
principle. 
Aristotle appears to be maýing a similar point at 
1075b 10. At b8 he takes up for criticism a doctrine 
attributed to Anaxagoras, namely that the good is moving 
principle. - "For mind, " as Anaragoras says, "is the mover. " 
Normally, howevert the doctrine that mind is the mover 
would imply a separation between mind and the good insofar 
as the good is that at which the mind aims. This 
separation is not implied, however, by Aristotle's concep- 
tion of-the mover. Thus, Aristotle says: 
But it-(sc. mind) moves for the sake of something, 
so that the good must be something different than 
mind - except, that is, in our way of speaking: 
For medical practice is somehow health. 
Here, the mover and the end are indentified with one 
another. An analysis like the following is a probable 
account of Aristotle's meanings Because the completion 
I 
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or perfection of the medical art is the health of the 
patiýnt, the medical art as mover, has itself, i. e. 
its own perfection, as its end. 
In three of the four passages in which the claim 
that the art is the form is found, reference is made to 
a doctrine which, expresses, as part of its meaning, the 
identity of the source and the product or end. I here 
refer to the doctrine expressed at 1032b 11 that 'in a 
certain way health comes-to-be from health, and a house 
from a house., ' In this context Aristotle is stressing 
the cohtinuity between the reasoning of a physician and 
the production of health. When the teleological mode 
of reasoning discovers a constituent of health (or 
something which will lead to it) which is in the doctor's power 
to produce, "at that point the movement from this 
is already called production, the motion towards 
being healthy. " Thusl Aristotle*claims that "in a certain 
sense ... what-has matter comes-to-be from what is 
without matter. " The examples of medicine and house- 
building illustratea fundamental continuity, between 
thought and genesis, form and the source of genesis. For 
at the point at which the physician discovers the component 
of health in his power, to producel. the motion of healing 
has already begun. 
A similar point with a slightly different thrust is 
made at 1034a 21, forming a context in which Aristotle 
once again asserts that the art is the form. Here, 
Aristotle says: 
v 
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It is . also clear from what has been said that in 
a certairi way all things come-to-be from something 
having the same name just as in the 
case of natural things, or from parts of things 
having the same name (For example, a house comes-to- 
be from a house, or through the mind. For the art 
is the form. ), or from a part or what has a certain 
partp provided that they-do not come-to-be incidentally. 
DifficultY in understanding. this passage has arisen 
because of the apparent improbability of the example 
31)N 01 
teýL. OL C-S ocitt%5) as an illustration of genesis from 
'homonymous parts'. 
33The illustration can be understood 
as appropriate, however, ift as my translation attempts 
to stress, 'parts having the same name'-refers to parts 
of the form, i. e. the practice of housebuilding, or to I 
the immediate product of the practiVoner's actions. The 
issue for Aristotle, 'as I will show, is to establish a 
continuity between reasoning (Yolcli 5) and production 
(27-m-y-,. S), both of which are sides or aspects of genesis. 
34 
This is accomplished by showing the connection, continuity, 
or identity of parts of the practice and the non-accidental 
I e- '35 %Ivrt) parts of the product. 
This interpretation is supported by the explanation 
which begins at 1034a 26. Aristotle says: 
For the heat in the movement (sc. heat produced by 
the physician) makes heat in the body. And this (sc. 
heat in the body? ), is-either health or-a part of it, 
or some part of health or health itself follows it. 
This passage is clarified by reference tO 1032b 26, where 
a chain of teleological reasoning has led the physician 
to make heat by rubbing. Aristotle says, "Accordingly, 
I 
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heat in the body is either a part of health or something 
follows it which is such a part. " On such grounds, 
according to Aristotle, heat itself may be said to be 
productive. He says at 1034a 29; 
On this account it (sc. - heat) also is said to be 
productive, because that makes health. which heat 
follows or accompanies* 
At this point in the argument Aristotle draws the 
following conclusion: 
So that, just as in reasonings, the substance is 
the principle of all things. For reasonings proceed 
from the 'what it is', And in these cases the geneses 
do as well. 
It is. - -the nature of the link between the reasoning 
process and the production that'allows Aristotle to 
draw this conclusion. By conceiving the form as the 
practice, that is, by allowing the notion of form to 
stretch through the procedures-of a practitioner, the 
end product of the reasoning becomes the beginning or 
source of genesis. 
36 That is, to repeat the claim made by 
Aristotle in the context of the same sort of discussion, 
"At this point (sc. the point at which the physician has 
discovered that element of health which it is in his 
power to produce) the motion from this is already called 
production. " 
In the light of this argument it seems probable that 
what Aristotle has in mind by the use of the terms 
'homonym' and 'parts of the homonym' at 1034a 23 is the 
double aspect of formal elements which are regarded both 
I 
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as elements of reasoning and of production. It is not 
as if medical science ends just an instant before a doctor 
moves his hand, or that the physical practice of a doctor 
is a mere concomitant of his thinking. It is more in 
line with Aristotle's thought to say that the whole 
I 
business -of picking out and working upon the elements 
which constitute bodily health is the form of health. 
The final passage mentioned in which the claim is 
made that the art is the form is found at 1070b 33- 1 
begin at 1070b 30. 
Since in the case of natural things the mover is 
-"r, -t 38 the same in form (0 
044 10 Cr L 61' &-5 
), 
e. g. man is the 
mover for man, and in the products'of thought 
the form or the contrary is the mover, in one sense 
there are three causes and in another sense four. 
There are three principles_in A sense 
that form, privation, 
39 
and matterg e. g. health, sickness and body, are principles. 
The 'mover' may be 1-Included as i fourth cause, where by 
40 $mover' Aristotle means, e. g. the medical art. Because, 
however, the form and the moving cause are the same insofar 
as the medical art or housebuilding is the form, the mover 
does not count as a fourth cause. For the source of 
generation and the form are one. 
For the medical art is health in a way, and 
housebuilding is the form of a house, and man 
begets man. 
Now in the preceding argument I have tried to make a 
case for the view that in claiming that the art is the 
form. Aristotle is advancing the Position that the substance 
of something is a principle which embodies a unification 
v 
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of formall final and efficient causality. If this view 
holds, then it follows that the substance is, in the. 
fullest sense, the cause of the matter, i. e. the 
answer to the question 'What is it? ' when analyzed as 
a form of the question 'Why? '. In order that an art 
may be conceived as such a principle, I have found it 
necessary to describe an art, not as a picture or blue- 
print in the mind of the practioner, but as inclusive of 
the physical practices in which a practioner engages, e. g. 
'rubbing'. Yet, as has been noticed previouslyp Aristotle 
If 0, S "'M "7iI --- ) says at 1032b 12 that in a certain sense 
what has matter comes-to-be from what. ýs without matter. 
In the context it seems clear that Aristotle is referring 
to the arty the OyDýy in the soUlý and 'the essence', as 
'the substance without matter'. 
42 
Whatever 'certain sense' 
Aristotle has in mind, it is clear from what has been 
shown that genesis from the foým is an unbroken continuum. 
Further, it has been argued that the perfection or 
completion of the art involves, for instancep the physical 
existence of health in a patient or the concrete existence 
of a house. 
It seems clear that Aristotle uses the analysis of 
the principles of artistic production in order to illustrate 
the loGic of natural productibnj and the logic of ndtural 
fotms. For ekampleq afteAr asserting at 1034a 30-32'that 
the 'substance' of something is both a source of intelli- 
gibility and of genesis (of the products of art), Aristotle 
says that 'things constituted by nature hold similarly to 
I 
I 
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these things'. The juxtaposition of natural and artistic 
production is conspicuous also at 1070b 33 where the 
ubiquitous dictum 'man begets,: man'* is conjoined with 
the claim that the art is the form. In general, the use 
of the artistic model to illustrate the teleological mode 
of natural production is a constant (if notorious from the 
modern perspective) feature of Ar istotle's thought. 
43 
The similarity in the logic of the relations between 
the form and the product, and between form and matter, in 
artistic and natural production is reflected primarily in 
the view that the substance of both artificial and natural 
products (as well as of those products,. e. g. health, in 
which art and nature collaborate) is a principle which is 
44 
neither an element of nor a property of the product. The 
differences between natural and artistic production, as 
seen by Aristotle, are equally revealing of his notion of 
substance. 
This difference is succinctly expressed at line 1070a 7' 
where Aristotle sayst 
The art is a principle'in something else, while 
nature is a principle in itself (for man begets 
man). 
Though it has been shown that in the Metaphysics the art, 
conceived as the form, allows for an avenue of thought 
in which the formal and final' causes are identical, insofar 
as the art is completed Or fulfilled in the product 
ý5 
the 
art is also seen as a principle which acts upon something 
else. The disjun. ction between arts and nature as princi- 
ples is the focus of Aristotle's remarks in the Physics 
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at 193b 12: 
Moreover the 'nature' which is spoken of as genesis 
is a path leading towards nature. It is not like 
'doctoring' which is not spoken of as a way toward 
the medical art but rather toward health. For ? rocee q 
doctoring must not /% 
from the medical art to the 
medical art; but nature is not related to nature 
in this way, 
_, 
rathers what grows proceeds from 
a certain thing toward a certain thing, insofar as 
it grows. What is ito then, that grows? Not 'that 
from which' but 'that toiVard which'. Therefore, 
the nature is the form. 
It is notable that Aristotle's perspective in the Metaphysics 
46 
has shifted from what is was in the Physics. In the 
Metaphysics the precisd use of the doctrine that the art 
is the foi! m is to show the sense in which 'a house comes-to- 
be from a liouse'. In the Physics, Aristotle accommodates 
Antiphon's view that a bed does not cofie-to-be from a. '. 
47 
bed. The,,. axi-s upon which the differentiation of artistic 
and nat ural'production turns in the Metaphysics is manifested 
in different terms. There are three especially relevant 
passages in which Aristotle expresses doubts about the 
genuine substantiality of artificial products. The issue 
arises in a context in whichli, curiouslys Aristotle is 
considering the question of 'separate forms', i. e. whether 
there are forms separable either from matter or the 
combinations of matter and form. 
The first passage begins at 1043b 18. Aristotle 
says: 
N 
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Wh*ether there are separate substanceb among dest- 
ructible things is not yet clear, except that in 
some cases it is clearly impossible, namely in the 
case of those things which cannot exist apart from 
certain things, e. g. a house or an implement. 
Perhaps, then, these are not substances, neither 
these very things nor anything else which is not 
constituted by nature. For one might say that only 
nature isl among destructible thingst a substance. 
The second passage is found at 1060b 23. Here Aristotle 
raises the question whether there'is somethipg existipg 
beside the composite (o7c5v-*O ov) or notg that is, apart 
from the matter and 'what goesalong with the matter'. 
'For if no. t, all destruc. ýtjble things"are in matter. 
In which casep this is possible, and in which cases 
it is not, is difficult to determine. For in some 
cases it is clear that the form is not a separable 
being, e. g. the form of a house. 
The third passage begins at 1070a'13-' Here Aristotle says: 
In some cases there is no tode ti apart from the 
composite substancel viz. the form of a house, unless 
the art is separable (there ist however, no genesis 
or destruction of such things, but in another way a 
house, i. e. a house without matterl and health, and 
everything considered as ah art 'are and are not). 
But if there is (sc. a tode ti apart from the 
composite), it will be in the case of things by 
nature. 
Why does Aristotle consider the possibility of separate 
generable and destructible forms for natural things? How 
does the issue of substantiality involve this question? 
In order to clarify the issue I will begin by 
examining in some detail the context of the last quotation. 
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At 1070a 7 Aristotle says that 'the art is a principle in 
something else, while nature is a principle in the thing 
itsAf'(for man begets man)'. The meaning of this claim 
seems to be-that while both the products of art and the 
products of nature come-to-be from Isynonyms'9 they 
differ in that an art works upon something different in 
nature from itself while 'nature' works either on itself 
or on something of the same kind. Aristotle's claim here 
should be compared to the problem introduced at 1036a 31- 
At that place he says: 
In the case of those things which come-to-be 
1> imposed upon things differ6nt in form I). *0 'e 7--ý jo" L: - 
ý- C-TV--ý&/ 
. 
64ýfj), a circle,, for instance, in 
bronze, stoneg and woodg in these cases it is clear 
that bronze and stone, on account of their separation, 
are nothing of the substance of a circle. 
Though Aristotle, in this context9 raises the question 
whether it is the mere fact that the form of man is 
always found in a certain kind of matter that prevents 
us from separating. the form from the matterg, Aristotle 
does not hold that a circle is related tolts matter in 
the way, that a man is related t6 his. ' This is made clear 
at 1036b 24 where Aristotle sharply criticizes Socrates the 
younger for having compared such distinct relations. Such 
a view, according to Aristotle, 
leads us away from the truthl and makes us 
understand that a man can exist without parts in 
the same ivay that a circle can exist without 
bronze, 
- 
v 
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A mang then, is not properly analyzed as one nature 
found in another. This is Aristotle's point at 1036b 28: 
The cases are not similar. For an animal is the 
sort of thing that is capable of sensationt and 
cannot be defined without movement, and therefore 
not without parts having a certain sort of relation. 
48 
For a hand is not in every sense part of a man, but 
only a hand capable of exercising its function, 
so that it must be alive If it is not 17- 
alive, it is not a part. 
The same point is made about a finger at 1035b 24, where 
Aristotle claims that a dead finger is a mere 'homonym'. 
It will be recalled from earlier arguments in this thesis 
that it is only insofar as a'man or horse. is taken universally 
f 
as a compound of form and matter, i, e. as aaVvaýov rather 
49 
than a'substance, that it is divisible into parts 'as 
into matter'. A Mjvv)oV but not a substance can be divided 
into parts 'as into matter'. 
5oFor, "A primary substance 
is what is'not spoken of as one'thing being-in another, 
that is, in a substratum -as matter. 
" 
Returning-now to the argument which began at 1070a 7, 
it is found that Aristotle's introduction to the question 
of 'separate substance' begins with the rather typical 
three-fold division among substances. The first type 
is matter-9 i. e. that, which is characterized by contact 
C ,, I and not by 'organic growth ýkj Unt) it is 
this type which is called a 'substratun. '. The qualification 
$not by organic growth' is important to the course of 
the argument because it strongly suggests that the sense 
of 'substratum' here employed by Aristotle would exclude 
v 
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the body of a natural substance. 
The second type of substance is a 'nature'. This 
rvý Aristotle calls a tode ti and 'a sort of state (C-ýiS) into 
which'. By calling a nature a tode ti, Aristotle may e 
already be suggesting separability. 
5lThe 
expression 'into 
which' or 'toward which' is reminiscent of the 'nature' 
described at 193b 17-18 as the thing that grows 
"What is it, then, that grows? Not that from which, but 
that into which (6/5 cc)/). " In the immediate context, the 
'nature' here mentioned is apparently the 'principle in 
jN %)), 
52 
itself'(cxp I &vdvrw) or what does not work upon some 
I 
)L &I 
foreign substratum but upon itself. Strictly speaking, 
the passage does not suggest the immaterialitv of such 
, substances, 
but the absence of a non-organic substratump 
that is, some other thing '. as matter' in which it belopgs. 
-The already difficult di'ýision'among tkpes of substances 
is aggravat. ed by Aristotle's description"hnd exemplifica-, Ciorý 
of the third type, particular individuals composed of the 
first two types, e. g. Socrates and Kallias. Here it 
looks as if Aristotle regards Socrates and Kallias as 
Onatures' combined with a non-organic substratum. This, 
howeverg represents a mode of conception Aristotle's 
dissatisfaction with which has been amply shown. It is 
not surprising, thereforeg that precisely here he raises 
the question whether, in the case of natural substances, 
there is some tode ti aside from 'synthetic substance'* 
What sort of thing is Aristotle looking for? 
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found that the kind of separation enjoyed First, it is L 
by the art, as form, is not 'satisfactory. The reason 
given for this is that there is no Genesis or destruction 
of such a form. Such a form 'is and is not' in some 
other way than through a process of genesis and destruction. 
53 
In all three of the passages in which the issue of 
separate substance arises, Aristotle is looking for 
forms among generable and destructible beings. Secondly, 
and at least partially on the same grounds, Aristotle is 
not considering the possibility of Platonic forms or 
'ideas'. Though Aristotle praises the view he ascribes to 
Plato that only natural products have forms (by which it 
is understood that 'fire, fleshl head' are excluded), his 
repudiation of'the doctrine of 'ideas' is made clear at 
1070a 26: 
It is clear that on account of these things 'ideas' 
are in no waynecessary. For man begets man, a 
particular man a certain man. It is similar also 
in the case of the arts. For the medical art is 
the account (Aoo'ýoý) of health. 
Thus, the question of the existence of 'separate substance' 
is by no means identical to the question whether there are 
eternal and ungenerated forms. Thirdly, Aristotle seems 
not to be consideringg at least as the fundamental question, 
, hether the form or soul of a natural substance can survive- 
the death of the organism or is capable of separate existence 
in this sense. The question whether the soul or some part 54 
Of it 'remains' is a distinct issue. 
I 
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If, as seems clear from the argument so far, Aristotle 
- is not, in the passage cited, asking whether the soul can 
exist separately from the body, then the question is whether 
the soul can exist separately from a material substratum 
having a distinct or separable nature. This, it will be 
recalled, was precisely the question raised at 1037a 8 
about Socrates and Koriskos, i. e. whether an individual 
natural substance is appropriately analyzed in the universal 
mode as body + soul. It seems9 theng that the question 
whether Socrates is his soul is a species of the question 
,. --hether there are separable natural substances. If a 
flesh and blood man is his soul, not in the sense that 
a universal characteristic attaches to his body, but in 
being the actuality of a living body, then in this sense 
there are separable and generable forms. Insofar as the 
soul is understoodo not as one thing in another, but, as 
a simultaneously efficients formal and final cause which 
is neither an element in a whole nor a universal predicate, 
then the soul is a separable substance or form', i. e. a 
tode ti apart from 'synthetic substances'. This would be 
the case whether or' hot the soul was separable from the 
bpdy, thouýh'it would be separable'from any body conceived 
as its substratum. 
By approaching the issue through the notions of 
potentiality and actuality, either the pospibility of -. 
separate 2orm ari-jes, i. e. because potential and actual 
are not 'synthetically' related to one another, or the 
question itselft because it arises from a point of view 
I 
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in which natural substances are seen as 'combinations' 
or 'syntheses' of form and matter, is short circuited. 
When the substance of natural beings is treated as a 
universal predicate in its application to material instances, 
i. e. as quality-like in its relation to matter, then 
the inclination to seek a separate unifying cause is strong. 
The arts are causes of this sort for artificial products. 
But the parts of artificial products are separable from 
them insofar as bronzel for instance, is still bronze 
when a statue made from it is destroyed. This is not the 
case, however, with the proximate or first matter of 
natural beings. Separated 'flesh' is only equivocally 
so called. The substance or form of a natural being 
determines its matter in a stronger sense than does an 
artificial form. The matter of a natural substance is 
itself in actuality only when it is in the form. The 
unity o-f a natural. substance involves matter being itself 
in a stronger sense than that in which bricks are, by 
composing a house, themselves. 
It was mentioned earlier in this thesis that the 
notions of potentiality and actuality are used by Aristotle 
to account for the unity of matter and formv substantial 
unity. Two instances of this use of the notions are found 
in Met., -H, 6. The question is: 
What is it that makes a man one, that is, on 
account of which he is one and not manj, for 
instance, 'animal' and 'two-footed'. 
Aristotle's Position is that no account of substantial 
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unity that involves 'participation' can resolve the 
-55 difficulty. At 1045a 301 Aristotle says; 
What, then, is the cause of this (sc. unity), 
i. e. of what is potentially being what is actually, 
apart from the maker, among so many things as haýe 
a-genesis? There is no other cause of what is 
potentially being what is actually but that this 
was what it was for each of them to be. 
The same argument is brought to bear upon the position 
Aristotle ascribes to Lycophron that 'living', for instance, 
is a 'synthesis'l 'combination', or 'communion' of body 
and soul. Aristotle says that. the cause of the difficulty 
is that they seek a unifying cause, and a difference 
between, pot. antiality and actuality. " That is, the 
problem of substantial unity arises because matter and 
form are treated as having a distinct causality. Aristotle 
holds the following contrary position: 
The final matter and the form are one and the same, 
the one, poteritially, the other actually, so that 
to seek what is the cause of one thing and its being 
one is similar. For each thing is a sort of unityl and 
what is potentially and what is actually are somehow 
one, so that there is no other cause, unless something 
acts as a mover from potency to actuality. 
From these passages it becomes clear that Aristotle 
views the notions of 'actuality' and 'potentiality' as 
providing a unifying mode of conception different in 
kind than unification by 'synthesis'. It has been shown 
so far in thisIchapter that Aristotle regards the substance 
of something as the 'cause of the matter'# i. e. as a 
sort of conspiracy of causes working on or through matter. 
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At the same time it has been argued that the notion of 
separate substance requires an analysis of the unity of 
substance which does not involve a form predicated of or 
found in a subject. Part of the force of Aristotle's 
ubiquitous claim that the rerr--?, -1ftcc is the form and the 
. 
56 
substance is that it leads toward this further unification. 
It is for this reason that Aristotle stresses both the 
logical and the substantial priority of 'actuality' to 
every sort of potentiality, including every sort of 
principle of change or motion. Thus, at 1049b 10 Aristotle 
says: 
pr The actuality isýff every such potentiality both A 
in account and in substance. 
The actuality is priorl that is, both to 'the principle of change 
in something else or in itself qua other' and to 'nature' 
which is a 'moving principle not in something else but 
- 
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in itself gua itself'. It is the principle 'at work' 
which is substance in the most fundamental sense. This 
was brought out, In the case of artificial production, by 
showing the continuity of thought and genesis implied in 
the claim that the art is the form. But in the cace of 
artificial products, 'the activity is in the thing b. ---inG 58 
made'. Still, even in such cases, the activity is not 
a property or characteristic either oj. the principle or 
of the matsriial ele. -. ^4ents %%Uch comp, -, i--: e the product. For 
it is exactly in the activity that the materials are seen 
in continuity with the form. In the case of natural 
substances, the activity is not in something else, but 
in the thing itself qua itself. The activity is not 
I 
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the 'state' or 'disposition' (Crros) which Aristotle calls 
'nature' at 1070a 12. Nor is it this principle in something 
else, i. e. in a separable substratum having a causality 
of its own. In such cases there is not merely a continT; ity 
of matter and form, but a virtual identity. For the 
potentiality ascribed to the body and the actuality 
ascribed to the soul are modes of being the same thing. 
Through the concept of actualityt Aristotle envisages 
not only the concrescence of formal, final and efficient 
causality, but the unification of matter and form. I 
believe that Aristotle's use of these concepts is developed 
as an alternative to the 'categorial' approach according 
to which form may be regarded as a universal predicate of 
matter-p or a man as a combination of soul and body. At 
the beginning of Met. j Thetay Aristotle in fact presents 
the concepts of 'actuality, potentiality and function' as 
an alternative mode to the 'cateCo. Hes' with which to-think 
about being. As I have tried to show, it is, from the L-. 
point-of view of the categories, the non-predicable character 
of substance which gives rise to the development of the 
notion of actuality. In the second part of this thesis 
I will move in the direction of a demonstration that the 
essence or 7-o n7r is best conceived as the actuality 
from the categorial viewpoint. 
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Part II 
0 
Introduction 
It was shown in the first part of this thesis that 
Aristotle distinguished two senses of the term subject 
or substratum, i. e., (1) the sense in which matter 
underlies the form or actuality and (2) the sense in 
which something is the subject of qualitiess properties 
and even materials. It was argued further that the two 
criteria for substantiality used by Aristotle, viz. non- 
predicability and separability, ought to be viewed as 
co-ordinate criteria at least insofar as they are applied 
to natural substances. It has been observed that the form 
or essence of something is, at least at times, regarded 
by Aristotle both as separable and'as a substratum of 
qualities. Further, the*essence of something, insofar as 
it is predicable of individuals at alls is not predicated 
universallyl that is, in a quality-like way. An essence 
does not denote sets of common properties. Finally, the 
conception of form as actuality, i. e. as a principle at 
work, is offered as a mode of viewing substances, not as 
'syntheses' or 'combinations' of form and matter, but as 
fundamental unities. 
N 
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By 'fundamental unity' I intend to indicate the 
unification of causalityp i. e. the unification of the 
various sorts of 'Why' questions which name the four 
Aristotelian causes. The 'synthetic' account of natural 
substances opposed by Aristotle has as its basis the view 
that the investigation of matter and form are*. distinct 
and separablbs studies, or in. Aristotelian terms, that 
there is a division between the investigation of actuality 
and potentiality. Becauseq however, the activity of the 
formal principle in the soul of an artist is shown to 
exist in continuity with the material elements of the 
productl'and because the materials of natural substances 
are pi-operly regarded as themselves only when viewed 
in their functional relation to the activity of the substance 
composed,, such a division can not be maintained. 'Why 
is this matter a maii? ' is aform-of the question 'What 
is a man? '. That is, the study of the physics of a man 
in the Aristotblian slensel is part of the inquiry into 
the form or essence of man. - Thus, a man is improperly 
regarded as one thing in another. It is not as if, when 
one is talking about the body 6f a man, one is talking 
about a substratum in which a man is found. 
It is the being of a subject as the possessor of 
attributes and quality-like predicates which will be shown 
in-this part of the thesis to be that at which the essence- 
question, 'What was the being? ', aims. That is, the essence 
is the subject, not as the bearer (material substratum) 
but as the possessor of qualities. The subject being at 
I 
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. work on its properties amounts to 
its possession of them. 
In this sense the essence or 'being' of something is 
helpfully conceived as the actuality from the 'categorial' 
viewpoint, i. e. conceived as the subject of predicates. 
which is itself not predicated. 
The development of this position requires first that 
the Aristotelian essence as signified by the formula 
Ir c-/w( is properly regarded as the subject of 
predicates. Secondo the logical role played by an 
Aristotelian essence as the subject must be displayed. 
That Aristotle regards the essence as the substance of 
something and therefore as a kind of subject is indicated 
by the following'arguments. 
le 'As has been noted earlier in this thesis, Aristotle 
quite clearly identifies the essence or the form in the 
sense of, the essence as a subject in at least three 
passages. At 1029a 2 'form' is included along with matter 
and 'the, combination' as a substance in the sense of the 
primary substratum. At 1038b 4 ff. clearly indicates that 
the 
-I n, 
'rc 7P &Ivgt , used here in apposition with 'substratum. 
is a subject, not as the material- substratumq but as the 
subject of 7N99 Again at 1042 a 26 'substratum, ' is I 
given two senses by Aristotlel (1) that of 'matter'l 
which is-a tode, ti only potentially, and (2) that of 
'form', which being a tode 11L is separable in account 
ON t 
2. The 7-i"7e C-44c is frequently called the substance of 
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each thing and 'the primary substance', e. g. at 1032b 2. 
Since 'primary substance' is defined in the Metaphysics 
as 'what is not spoken of as one thing being in another, 
that is, in a substratum as its matter', this amounts to 
prim facie evidence that the essence is viewed as a 
subject in its own right# though not, of courseq in the 
way that matter is a subject. 
3. The essence isl for 
1 
Per se. It is not what 
/2 
qýAAP -7XOS), predicated 4 
attribute. At 1007a 20 
C/ Aristotle what is said XP(L9cW-7v or 
is said attributively (/ýoO o( 
3 
'in common', or through a shared 
-23 Aristotle says that to regard 
everything as an attribute is to do away with the essence 
altogether. In the context it seems clear that to do 
away with the essence is to do away with the subject. 
However, Aristotle uses the expression Ko(&c"ev-7b"in a number 
of different ways. In order to justify my position it 
I Cý. 'P 
will, be necessary to show that the sense of K, 00(o7b which 
Aristotle applies to essences is in accordance with the 
strict contrast drawn, e. 9.9 at An. Post--73b 7: 
Substance, that is, whatever signifies a tode ti, 
is not something different than just what it is. 
Thus, I call KbWo(LlAro" what is not predicated of a 
subject while what is pre'dicated of a subject I 
call 'attributqs' (a*Vý"flC-AJkJDo'* 
4s -The class of-things which, except in a derivative sense, 
can be, said to have an essence at all is substance and 
the-tode ti. That is, essences belong in the primary 
sense neither to attributes or common properties nor to 
I 
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5 
the combination of a substance with an attribute. it 
does not follow immediately from this claim that an 
essence is the subject of which it is the essence. 
Because, however, an essence or form is regarded by 
Aristotle as a-subject of some sort, and because those 
substances which are-not regarded as combinations of 
form and matterg are identical with their essences, it 
is a reasonable conclusion that the essence of something 
is bound up in its. being as a subject. Further, if 
the essence of eac4 thing is the thing itself gua subject 
in the appropriate sense, it would follow that nothing 
which is not such a subject would have an essence. Thus, 
0 
the claim of this thesis that the, essence of something is 
its. being gua subject is consonant with Aristotle's 
denials that the above, mentioned types of things have 
essences. 
The general position argued in this thesis is that 
the essence-question 71 je&tvdL, ' arises in a context of 
categorial asseimtion about a subject of a certain kind. 
In the primary sense of its applicationg the question 
seeks the rile of a subject in deteMIMUg the Whing, 
_sigpifie., 
ance and relevance of the properties and elements 
it possesses. In viewing the Aristotelian essence in this 
way three facts about the grammar of the formula-ro -r, -*4' 
c are explained. The presence of the imperfect 
On. jr is explained by the fact that when the essence question 
is asked, as in all instancýs of 'Why? ' questions, a 
categorial assertion is already presupposed by the 
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questioner. Secondly, the frequent presence of the 
'0, dative in the f ormula as in ro cXV49, airw filv44 or no Tv jvP 
67wic%_t`rwiývOAý7wis explained as a dative of possession 
0"0 
governing the infinitive 61volt Thus, the formula 
T J# -ro Ira, Woj a( Owould be translated 'what was & rf%ý144- 
- a man's being' or 'what was it for a man to be'. This 
allows an explanation of the third fact about the formula, 
namely the occasional presence of two datives, one dative 
as a predicate being attract6d into the dative case by 
the possessive dative. An example is 7'Z`&C"7'&, V(X#JTvJ V 
C, eI, P, % 6 C-X4TCf, W 717 61V*(t which should be translated 'what each 
of their ýelng an animal is' or 'what it is for each of 
1% 
them to be an animal'. In all cases C-iWL is regarded 
asa predicate ofr&" with the finite form of the verb 
C-jrotg , viz. e or 6-trrw 9 as the copula. This interpretation 
of 'the grammar of the essence-formula is to be contrasted 
with those which regard the essence-question as a question 
seeking predicates and characteristics of the subject 
which determine it as being of a certain kindg i. e. as 
asking 'what characteristics doe§ X haVe in order to be 
XI. On my interpretation the being of a man, or a man's 
being, is his being as the subject and possessor of his 
characteristics. The determining-characteristids of man 
may be knovýi or presupposed already by one who seeks a 
man's essence. 
According to this view of an Aristotelian essence, 
to know what something is in the sense of knowing its 
essence is to know, not merely that such and such ,N 
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characteristics belong to it, but how they belong to 
it. Yet even if this is granted an enormous difficulty 
for Aristotelian philosophy remains. For it seems 
impossible that the role of a subject could be defined - 
except in universal terms. How is it possible, then, for 
the mind to penetrate to the being of a subject without 
thinking of it in a universal mode? This problemg or 
some version of it, is by no means unique to my interpre- 
tation. Nor is it unique to Aristotelian philosophy. 
The difficulty may be expressed rather simply in the 
following way: One does not speak or say tables, chairs, 
people. Nor does one think them. Rather we 'speak about'l 
4 
'speak ofI 'say something about', 'think about' or 
'think of' such things. In what way then are things 
present to or in the mind'taken by themselves or per se? 
Aristotle's position seems to be that it is the form of 
things which is in the mind. But is the form merely another 
thing or the representative of a conglomerate of things 
'said about' or 'thought about' other things? What is 
the status, thent of the things. about. which we think and 
speak? I 
If my interpretation is correct, forms or essences 
are not 'said about' other things, at least in the sense 
that they ascribe qualities or properties to subjects. 
Rather, forms express the actuality of things as subjects. 
The form of something is that thing as a subject. But 
this position is incompletý unless there is an absolute 
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. conjunction 
in actuality between what is thought and 
what is., It is my intention that what has so far been 
argued in Part I and what will be argued presently follow 
Aristotle part of the way down this avenue of his thought. 
My argument leads in the direction of the claim that 
for Aristotle the mind is joined with reality not in the 
realm of universals but in the concrete workings of 
individual things. This is the sort of thing Aristotle 
seems to say in the Metaphysics at 1087a 10: 
The claim that all knowledge is universalq from 
which it follows of necessity also that the principles 
of beings (7Zý- 01Yrlr4ov) are universal and that there 
are no separable substances, has especial difficulty 
among the things that have been said. But though 
this claim is true in one way, it is not true in 
another. For knowledge, and knowing as well, has 
two senses, since they are in one sense potential 
and in another sense actual. The potentialityl like 
matter, is uniVersal and indefinite and of the 
universal and the indefinite, while the actuality 
is determined (ý2c-044&vl) and of the determined, being 
itself a tode ti and of a tode ti. It is only 
incidentally that sight sees 
universal color, i. e., because this color which 
sight sees is a color and because what the grammarian 
studies, this alpha, 'is an alpha. 'If-principles must 
be universal, then the things that come from 
principles must also be universal, just as in 
demonstrationss And if this is the case, nothing 
will be separable and there will be no substance. 
But it is clear that knowledge is in one sense 
universal and in another sense not. 
7 
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Chapter I 
Why did Aristotle devise the formula'ro7-Lf-j&* C--tva4e- ? 
It is generally helds rightly I think, that the 
ZrtCr. was a formula developed by Aristotle (or, perhaps, 
non-specifically in the Academy) because of ambiguity in 
the socratic expression T&"d3-0*rt This ambiguity is 
well attested by*the-fa6t that*in Plato's worksl' notably in 
the Meno, it is not always easy for Socrates to make 
clear to his interlocutor wh at sort of answer-the question 
7166M seeks. The focus of the question in Plato's 
hands was to discover a definition composed of the 
distinguishing characteristics and elements of something. 
The elements which belong 
1 
in the definition of something 
compose the 'what it is'. For Aristotle there is also 
the substance of something which, as has already been 
argued, accounts for the unity of the elements in the 
definition. It is in search of substance in this sense 
thats according to my thesis, Aristotle devised the 
-% 0-1% locution 7, ( pe C-jr#(j_ It is this ambiguity in-the 
I 
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meaning of Irt e. roughly between 'what is' and 
'what it is', or what has distinguishing features and 
the distinguishing features, which gave rise to the new 
formula. Thiý understanding is to be contrasted with 
those which view the r. -?. a,. as designed to focus only 
on certain kinds of attribute or universal, namely essential 
ones, in opposition to the vast range of attributes, 
2 
including accidents, which may answer the question Irk ec--, L 
That 7, Lc-m by itself can be used in contrast to all 
other categories than substance, and in apposition to 
the tode tit is shown by reference to Met. $ 1028a 11. 
Here Aristotle has made the familiar point that 'what is' 
(78 ov has- many senses. He explainst 
For it signifies, on the one hand, the 'what is' 
2 rz`&ýrrt ) and the tode tit and on the other 
hand, quality, quantityp and each of the other 
things which are predicated in this ways 
Ross comments on the passage as follows: 
The two phrases (re-" C-crre Kxc 7"o IrL ) indicate the 
ýwo sides there are to Aristotle's doctrineýof 
substance A 7't- C-TTY is the 7-L C-q-re. of something, 
the answer to the question 'what is it? '; and 
whether this something be an individual or a 
universal, its essence can only be stated as a 
universal or a combination of universals. 7% t 1'7L 
in fact points to the distinction between essential 
and accidental predication. A 7b4rc on the other 
hand is not the 7ble-'m of anything; it is simply 
an individual; the term points not to the 
distinction of essential from accidental but to 
that of substance from attribute. 
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Ross is certainly right that insofar as re eirm signifies 
a kind of Predicate, or conglomerate of predicatesl it 
is only -Perge or essential predicates that belong in 
-T rile . r the But there is nothing in the present 
eJ 
context to indicate that 7-1 &0'7z is not here used to 
indicate 'what is', i. e. 'what has such predicates. It 
is this aspect of the'CeC-M which Aristotle emphasizes 
Df 
as the passage continues in saying that Ov in the primary 
sense is the 7LC-V1zwhibh signifies 'the substance', i. e. 
the very sort of being which Ross' comment tends to 
associate with the tode ti rather than with the rL 
It is precisely As predicates of the sort of. being_represented 
0 00 13 by_the expressionri caTj that 'quantity# qualityl affections 
and all other such things are called beings'. For these 
es, 
reasons 7-a &re should be understood at 1028a 12 as 
explanatory of'the use to which Aristotle in this 6ontext 
.0> Puts, the. expression rec-a-rj ,I 
Yet in general Ross is right' in his remarks 
about 7"'z- &OT1. and TbOrC- 7', - . In support of his position 
reference will be made to Met., -1022a-25 ff. This passage 
concerns various senses of the term MCSýý, a term 
crucial in this discussion because of the distinction 
Ross mentions between essential and accidental attributes. 
In one sense of this central Aristotelian terml it serves 
to delimit those characteristics or predicates which are 
essential to something insofar as they belong in its 
definition. The passage is important because it involves 
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a contrast between the sense of this term which applies 
. -. 7 to the elements of the m6r-re and the sense which applies 
to the r. I. Cv- . 
/CI 
In one sense each thing's -r- 1.6. is tjAOb1V'rb. 
For instance Kallias is IW60r; Kallias and is 
also Kallias' r. But in another sense, 
or 3j -e ., e whatever belongs in the n 64"re is Kc(8 Uu? 'O 
For example, Kallias is an animal KOOW7V". For 
'animal' belongs in the'definition of Kallias 
because Kallias is a sort of animal. 
In this passage the sense in which the 7-. 7. C-. is per se 
is related, to the sense in which a thing is itself, while 
the 71LE-Tn seems to be a composite of essential predicates. 
A natural conclusion is that the, r&*e-aý? e_ as here used 
is 
-the 
rk"em of something, the 'r. is not. For 
Kallias is not the Kallias of himself. 
_, 
Strohg evidence for this interpretation is gained 
by the comparison of this passage with one found in the 
Posterior Analytics at 73b 7: 
Substance, that ist whatever signifies a tode ti, 
is not something different than just What it is. 
Thus, I call W what is not predicated of a 
subject while what is Predicated of a subject I 
0" call 'attributes' (O'quAV7, vvrX, ) . 
A few lines earlier (73a 34) gives as another meaning of 
/ C_ / 104RD the very definition which was seen in the Metaphysics 
applied to -the elements in the In this other 
C/ sense of the terml Aristotle defines MgS(Orý as 'whatever 
belongs in the what it is'. This in turn is further 
clarified as 'whatever belongs in the account given by 
someone saying what something is'. 
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The juxtaposition of the passage from the Metaphysics 
and the one from the Posterior Analytics yields the 
following conclusion. The-, M 1-e- is the substance and 
the tode ti, which is 'not something different than just- 
what it is', while the rL C-crr( compriL-es essential 
attributes khich are predicated of something in a universal 
mode. A plausible supposition, therefore, is that it 
I. 'e I is precisely this ambiguity in the expression -ri. &rre- 
which the formula 1*-. ). e. was invented by Aristotle to 
50 
obviate. For rtoecrrt taken by itself may indicate either 
the elements in a definition or the subject of those 
eI 
elements. Insofar as rL Crarc can mean both 'what is' 
and 'what it is't the r- 7-Cr. has the former sense alone. 
When the n c-6-n is the definition, and thus the sort of 
thing. which is universally predicated as one over many, 
the 7'. 1, e-. is what is defined. Thus, as Aristotle says 
at 1017b 21: 
The 7.07.6. -j I 
that of which the account is a definitions 
is also said to be the substance of each thing. 
Immediately following this Aristotle gives the two criteria 
for substance mentioned already in this thesis, namely 
being an ultimate subject and being a separable tode ti. 
Ifp as I claim, the essence of something is that 
thing as a subject and, co-ordinately, as a tode tit it is 
implied that there is something further to be sought, in 
asking for the essence of something)than a definition, 
its attributes, and its material constitution. If providing 
the material substratum together with the distinguishing 
N 
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characteristics of something adequately delimits a subject 
of discourse, how is it signific*ant to ask a further 
question 'about its essence? If a being has already 
been defined and identified, how can the question 
'What was the being? ' elicit any further information? 
This further question arises bebau6e of the following. 
First, no universal predica: tel-which*wbuld. for Aristotle 
include everything possessed by a substance including 
its materials, is determinate of its own meaning. In 
this sense all universal terms are 'homonymous' and 
can be fully explained only by reference to the subject 
to which they are attached. The significance of a predicate 
depends upon the subject to which it is attributed. Here 
I mean, for example, -that it is not the same thing for 
13 Kallias and an ox to be an animal. This I believe to be 
part of'the thrust of three central Aristotelian doctrines: 
(1) the view that the accounts of all things other than 4 
substance involl. es the account of substance, here 
understood to, mean the very substance to which a property 
belongs and not substance in general; (2) the indeterminate 
nature of qualities and matter as well as their universality; 
(3) the-inseparability of both ualities and matter from 
'Aat is' in the primary sense. 
The second matter giving rise to thp essence question 
is the problem of unity. The mere fact. that soixothing is 
capable of exhaUStive definition-does not establish unitý 
of -the sort-whichs according to Aristotle,, the presence 
I 
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of an essence implies. For this reason the very appli, 
is denied 
cability of the essence questionAto certain sorts of 
7 
things, at least in the primary sense. The question does 
not applys for instance, to a mere, congregation of 
elements, or the mere presence of a property in some 
substratums though such 'unities' may-be capable of 
definition and identification. Aristotle's example of 
'cloak' as a name applied to, white man' illustrates this 
8 
point. About the question 'What is a cloak's being? ' 
Aristotle saysp "But surely this is not among the things 
said per se. " Thust the partial thrust of the essence 
question is to discovert given that something has criteria 
of identity, whether there is a principle of unity beyond 
the presence of 'one thipG in another'. For the presence 
9. 
, of one thing in another does not constitute a tode ti. 
The essence-question should be understood in the general 
context of the problem raised by Aristotle at 1037b 10: 
I mean this problem: On what account do-we say that 
that of which the account is a definition is one 
thing, e. g. of man 'two-footed animal'. For let 
this be the definition. On what account is this 10 
one thing but not manyg viz. two-footed and animal? 
Here it, is important to notice that the expression 'that 
of, which the account is a definition' is precisely the 
essence., as defined at 1017b 21. 
Aristotle's position may be expressed in different 
terms as follows. The statement 'Socrates is a man' may 
be understood in-two ways, The statement may mean it. 
I 
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that Socrates has the characteristics which are criteria 
for his being a man. But the statement may also . 0. 
indicate that Socrates is, as a subject, related to his 
attributes in a particular way. The former meaning 
involves the use of the term 'man' to classify or 
identify Socrates. This use, regarded as such, fails to 
determine Socrates as the sort of thing which has an 
essence at all. That is, this use fails to identify 
Socrates as a subject acting asýa principle which determines 
the meaning of his attributes and characteristics. Such 
a principle, in activity, is thd 'b6lng' sought by 
the essence-question. 
0 
These remarks having provided pL-ýhilosophical. 
o. -blentation in which'to view the ess6nce-formula, % I-. w, &. ll 
begin the analysis of the formula by reference to the 
first chapter of the Categories. The chapter begins 
by defining the term 'homonym' as follows: 
Those things of which the name alone is common, 
while the account of the being (-r"" C d-5 7' oýT ) in 
accordance with the name is different, are called 
homonyms. For instance, both a man and a drawing 
are animals. 
It is critical to notice that it is not names but things 
which in Aristotle's use of the term are 'homonyms'. He 
does not, in this passage, claim that the term is 
equivocal or homonymou's but that a man and a drawing are 
homonyms. The definition does not, thereforet depend 
upon equivocity of the word wbv, but on the different 
I 
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are given 
accounts things in accordance with the name3pjov. A& 
Commentators on this passage have been misleýd, I think, 
by the fact that in Greek the word ýwoV may be used 
both of a living animal and of an image in a picture, 
whether or not the picture is of an animal. Aristotle's 
definition of 'homonyms' does not depend upon this 
ambiguity in the sense of the term 'animal', however, 
a fact which is clearly shown by reference to De Animal 
412b 20-23. For at that place Aristotle says that an 
eye which has lost its sight is not an eye, except 
homonymously, just as the eye in a sculpture or painting 
is an eye homonymously. Here Aristotle does not require 
a pun in 
ýhe 
Greek to make his p. oint. It is not a sheer 
accident that an eye in a picture is called an eye, yet 
it is a different thing for an eye in a drawing to be 
an eye than for a living eye to be one. Homonymy arises 
here. because the account of the thing with respect to 
the name differs. When a person in a photograph is 
identified as 'Tom'l the name 'Tom' neeJ not mean something 
different than when it is applied to the person himself. 
The argument represented here should not be 
understood to imply that there can be no am iguity or 
equivocity in the, namds which'things are called or in 
attributes themselves. Aristotle in, fact considers this 
possibility but rejects it as a complete solution to the 
problem of how comparison is possible with respect to 
the attributes of differeni things, 
12 
My argument is 
120 - 
that Aristotle's definition neea not imply equivocity 
in the name itself. The focus of Aristotle's remarks. is 
the subject and its account with respect to a given 
name. This emphasis is made clearer by Aristotle's use 
of the essence-fornula in order to explain the definition 
of 'homonyms'. He says: 
For the name only is common, but the account of 
the being with respect to the name is different. 
For if someone should say what it is for each of 
them to be an animal, he would give an account 
peculiar to each. 
13 
It is by giving an account of a'picture's being an animal 
and a'man! s being an animal that their homonymy is 
revealed. Giving an account of the name '-animal' would 
not necessarily help here. For as Aristotle says in 
the Physics at 248b 15, even the definitions may be 
homonymouse Even terms like 'growing', 'sleeping', 
'being born", 'dying', 'running' may be intelligibly 
applied to animals, in pictures. Yet it is not the same 
thing'for an animal in a picture to do anything of these 
things as for a real animal to db theni. 
These remarks are rete3tant to the general claim I 
have made that all universal predicates are indefinite in 
meaning and that'their precise determination depends upon 
the subject to which they-a' re applied. But the immediate 
task of the present'chapter is to explain the essence- 
.05) 0% formula. The grammar-of the expression rc ed'rc qv7wv 
6Kc(T, -P&J *rO SýO C-Iva(t as here f ound in the Categories &L 4- - 
-I 
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should be explained in the following way. The root 
. 40 7N --j% I sentence is 7-G &, Cr(. 'rO CrIVIO(I what is the being' The 
#4 term ), %W has been attracted into the dative case by the 
dative Ce-WrYO. The force' of the locution can be broug. -,. . 
out by imagining the following sequence. Someone claims 
that a-certain subject is an animal. The question is 
then asked, 'What is it for this thing to be an animal? '. 
The question need not be understood to imply that the 
qIu. estioner does not know what'an animal is. He is 
trying, ratherg to discover the way in which the thing 
in question manages to be one. -If an antecedent is 
provided for C-/b: <7-1w , the question becomes 'What is it 0 '74- 
for (e. g. ) apicture to be an animal? ' or, translating 
theýarticular infinitive with the English gerund and 
rendering the dative as a possessive, 'What is a picture's 
being an animal? ', or, 'What is being an animal f or a 
picture? '. 
Oe Can In C-r-r(ra(v7I-vvI C-KAOIX-PW To w4) (BWLbe taken IL 
as a model for understanding -rb -rj IyC.. q VA -ro *rL ?r 
W-% V- *L/? ) -71, 
Eivok VatorTr j and 7b 7-c #7 r c: 04/07rW C-141dt ? Ross, at least, 
A -, 71T 
claims that Tb IrL a1v &)Lft(, L I which he defines as 'the 
answer to the question, what was it to be so-and-soll 
f in is a generalization from such phrases as ri"'jv, 
C. 
EVAq7t, C-) 14L (P - A. 649b 22) v vrT (sC7W. *Lykd-r%- ) ro Ot, 
While Aristotle would, I believe, disagree with Ross' 
C insertion of 71w, c4ytocrt as the antecedent for ciu7-63 on 
the, grounds that to seek an account of something being 
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15 
itself is 'to seek nothing', and while his translation 
is misleading insofar as it, as Ross'clearly intends 
indicates that the essence of something is composed of 
universal characteristics, his general claim is correct. 
Whether the essence-formula is a generalization from 
these more complete expressions or whether, on the-contrary, 
the essence formula itself as well as these fuller 
16 
versions is an expansion fromp as E. Buchanan suggests, 
%311 in the simple expression -ro acvll, wirk) eVoCe-, is unimportant. 
It is desirable, howevery that without very strong 
evidence to the contrarys the ekpressions be understood 
in such a way that they are compatible with one another. 
The; e are, howeverg'a nutber of difficulties'which 
must be overcome if this unified approach is to be 
maintained. Most of these may be handled under two 
rather pointed headings. First, it is noticed that the 
e_rrv of the Categories is replaced in nearly all instances 
by the imperfect Jv. Though the formula as it appears 
in De Partibus Animalium has the identical syntax with 
1v as does the formula in the Categor. ies with C-o-, ýL , the 
use of the, imperfect is the subject of much debate. An 
, -account 
of it should be offered. The second difficulty 
is the rarity with which the formula is found with two 
datives. Other than the instances already mentioned 
only 419a 9-10 of De Anima is without further argument. 
It will be shown in the next chapter that -T-e> C-77rC V. C- C. CP( 
ed, C at 1029b of the Metaphysics ought to be included. eLVC-eC'q6-r_C< 
C_ 
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in this list. Other questions are (1) wbether in the 
I. ")" 3 64 1; 11 formula To rL. 7ruv wina e-cr*((. , the dative is to be Ile Lo 
understood as possessive and therefore as the subject 
of the infinitive (viz. 'what was a man's being') or 
as'a predicate (viz. 'what ikwas to be a man'), (2) 
1), 
whether 6tvotc is an existential or copulative 'is'. 
The imperf ect 
Scholarly views about Aristotle's use of the 
imperfect in the essence-formula range from the claim 
that Aristotle preferred the imperfect primarily for 
17 
reasons of euphony to those which impute metaphysical 
significance to the imperfect. Buchanan roughly 
divides this field of interpretation into two campsp 
namely, 
18 
., those which. assign a metaphysical significance 
to it as indidating the timelessness-of the essence 
or form, its logical or temporal priority to the 
concrete being, or its persistence or duration 
throughout the existence of things, while their 
accidents change; and those which take it as the 
so-called "philosophical imperfect, " referring to 
something already said, meant, or supposed. 
The position argued in this thesis falls into the latter 
camp. The imperfect reflects, on this view, the fact 
that the essence-question seeks a principle beyond the 
criteria fiýo the identity of a subject. Thus the imperfect 
indicates that a. further question is being*posed about a 
characterization which has already been offeredl assumed 
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or supposed. The imperfect signals the fact that in 
asking what the essence of something is, one is asking 
for a cause in the Aristotelian sense, that is, in the 
form of the question 'Why? '. If it is true that nothing 
said about a subject in a u: 
advance the significance of 
subject, then a natural way 
significance of a predicate 
its determination isq OWhat 
that predicate? "- 
niversal mode can determine in 
its application to a particular 
of asking for the special 
or the principbL source of 
was it for X to be or have 
Curt Arpe maintains a similar position in Das 7-e'O'! 2v 
19 
C-Lret bei Aristoteles. Arpe's claim is that the essence- 
question most appropriately arises when a predicate has 
already been attached to a subject in previous conversation. 
If it has been said already thekSocrates is a man, it 
may be asked, "What was it for Socrates to be a man? " or 
"What did you mean by calling Socrates a man? " In defense 
of this position Arpe points out that at 1029b'28 of the 
Metaphysics Aristotle in a rare instance uses the present 
tense in asking, "What is it to be a cloak? " The. 
present tense is appropriate here, according to Arpet 
because 'cloak' is a new word, the definition of which 
has just been stipulated as 'white man'. It has not in 
fact been predicated of any pal-tibular. Though Fr. Owens 
points out that the present tense occurs also in the 
first chapter of the Categories without the invention of 
a new word, and though it has been shown in this thesis 
I 
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that the essence-question as posed in the, Categories 
does presuppose an earlier assertion, the particular 
context of Z, 4 invites the thought that the shift in 
tense is significant. For there is a shift in tense from 
the immediately preceding line which has rj"ýe A &vj<3 v49? w7rw 
and from the use of the imperfect five times in the 
chapter prior to this. The problem with Arpe's position 
is that he fails to locate the right reason for the 
shift in tense. For the issue is not whether or not the 
made-up word 'cloak' has been predicated of anything, but 
whether anything can be predicated of 'cloak' as such, 
i. e. whether 'white man' is as such a subject of qualities. 
In-the context Aristotle is arguing that 'cloak' is not 
the sort of thing that has an essence at all. It would 
not matter how many times 'cloak' had been predicated 
of white men. Thusp insofar as the shift from the imperfect 
to the present tense is significant, it indicates that 
the term being asked about has not been used as a subjec 
'White man' is not a unity of the kind that having an 
essence would indicate. Arpe's view will be considered 
further in the-discussion of the dative(s) later in this 
chapter. 
Whatever the-implications, may be of the use of the 
imperfect in the essence-formula, the use of the so-called 
'philosophical imperfect' is well attested in Aristotle's 
works. Here are a few examples. In the, Categories. at 
3b 8 Aristotle say st "Synonyms were the things of which 
N 
- 126 - 
the name is common and the account is the same. " Here the 
20 
imperfect is used to refer to a definition given earlier. 
In the Metaphysics at 1071b 3 Aristotle saysq "Since there 
were three substances ... " which clearly means that 
three kinds of substance haJ been delineated earlier in 
the work. In De Anima at 419a 9-10 a version of the 
essence formula itself appears (viz. rot"I, ro 
Yýwp, -, An which in the context is natural to 
translate with the philosophical imperfect as 'This is 
what it was for. it to be colourl. While such instances are 
clear evidence for this use of the imperfect, no instances 
to my knowledge can be found which, having a clear 
metaphysical significance, can not be rendered appropriately 
as philosophical imperfects. 
The following instances have been adduced in support 
of the metaphysical. view. These include De Caelo, 278a 
t C/ - ,), C/ C 11- (710 v14-c19-1716V of-, Uv" C-v' 7ýt 4111 
qp 
4r! rqpxLv) which J. L. 
Stocks renders quite naturally as 'Everything that is 
perceptible subsists, as we k_now, in matter'. The Rhetoric 
at 1363a 8 says, "That at which everyone aim. ý., -this was 
the good. (o. L) 77WVrC-; &OIEVI-5(c. 'rbvr o(pOov 2be) In the 
0% C Theaetetus, at 156 At Plato writes 0)Tptj Oc)? j-cCvrWv1 7' t. -VS 0 
'1""' "'7"-' ?v or, "This principle of theirs was that 
everything was motion. " Nothing metaphysical iS contained 
in the meaning of the imperfect, In all these three 
instances the imperfect tense seems to indicate only (1) 
the report of, a view previously argued in the text itself, 
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(2) the report of a view known to be commonly held, or 
(3) the report of a view known to be held by an opponent. 
In addition to these passages Antisthenes' definition 
21 
ofA 
" 
oS, as it is reported by Diogenes Laertius, has or 
been offered, though not very convincingly, as a possible 
22 
source for Aristotle's essence-formula. But the imperfect 
in 0M ri IV &04ri, We seems to have its ordinary 
temporal significance. 'That which makes clear what was 
or W seems to be a perfectly satisfactory translation. 
No metaphysical importance can be ascribed to Antisthenes' 
use of the imperfect and therefore none on this ground 
to Aristotle's inheritance of it. The more probable 
view in any case is that the essence-formula was the 
invention of Aristotle. 
Finally, here are two pAssaG@s in which th6 essence 
itself is treated as having temporal or logical priority 
in that the essence is held by Aristotle to be what-is 
aimed at by a natural process or prior in the'explanation 
of natural processes. They are important because they 
show that tne metaphysical sigmificance of Aristotelian 
essehces, is not-restricted by a more limited understanding 
of his use of the imperfect in the essence-formula. 
The first passage is De Partibus Animalium 640a 33-35- 
Here Aristotle argues that the presence of bodily parts 
is best explained by the essence and not the other way 
around. He says: 
Hence it is best to say that since this was a mants 
being, on account of this these things are 
For it is not possibleKfor the essence> to be without- 
these parts. 
- 128 - 
The argument is that the parts of man are best explained 
by 'hypothetical necessity'. That is, because this was 
given as a man's being, certain bodily constituents are 
necessary. A passage with similar purport is found in 
the Physics at 198b 8, a line in which the imperfect 
%/ --)% I n. jv ra TL, Iv &I'Vett Here both occurs twice, viz. 7bLr-rf I 
imperfects probably indicate the presupposition or 
priority of the essence in the explanation of natural 
23 
phenomena. But the imperfects themselves need contain 
no metaphysical meaning in order to indicate this kind 
of priority. 
The evidence here accumulated indicates that a 
metaphysically neutral understanding of the imperfect in 
the. essence formula is to be recommended. This, however, 
in no way prevents a metaphysical interpretation of 
Aristotelian essences. Nor indeed does my interpretation 
treat the imperfect as philosophically unimportant, a view 
which Buchanan seems to hold when he expresses a preference 
for Dimmler's suggestion that the imperfect was used by 
24 
Aristotle for reasons of euphonyi For-the imperfect may, 
as I claim, signal the fact that in asking 'What was the 
being? ' a cause or explanation is sought for, and therev- 
fore beyondg criteria for the identity of a substance. 
Furtherr if it is true that nothing said about a subject 
in a universal mode can determine the significance of 
its application to a given subject, then the essence- 
question with the imperfect is a natural way of seeking 
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such significance. Whether a subject can be so conceived 
that it acts as a principle determining the significance 
of its predicates with. out being itself a universal predicate 
is a philosophical question of great importance and 
difficulty. 
The Datives. 
The essence-formula very rarely contains two datives. 
Nevertheless, it ist as has been saidr desirable to 
translate the formula in such a way that it can accoriaodate 
two datives. This is possible only if one of the datives 
is allowed to be the subject of 6iYo(c , the second dative 
being thus 'attracted' into the dative case as a predicate. 
If the dative is translated as a Possessive then it is 
rIN 
always possible for (jV4( to connect this term 
to a predicate by rendering EWA as an English gerund, 
a grammatical function which only the Greek infinitive 
can accomplish. The criterion that the formula be 
interpreted in such a way as to allow two datives, despite 
their. rarityg excludes certain translations. Thus 
Buchanan, invoking this criferion, comments as follows 
on Leon-Robin's renderings, viz. 'ce qu'il a Ae donne a 
chaque choseq d'etre" and 'ce Wil luý appartient et lui a 
dans le passe toujours a] 
%/ 101 Th 'm 7v' cýýv-(c with 
. after 
this pattern; 
01 'r(. is the predicate 
are two datives one 
ppartenu, d'etre't 
two datives cannot be construed 
for in Robin's interpretation 
IF 
with C(vc4L,, but where there 
of these is the predicate. 
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OP 
However,, Buchanan observes; 
To this objection one may reply that the examples 
with two datives are rare and do not conform 
of strictly to the pattern 7o ri. P)v &1vAt, 
Therefore, Buchanan raises another objection to translations 
in the Robin stylet namely the improbability of taking 
.- 'P Ct / Irt. ? rskaa-7w, to mean 'what belongs to each thing' 
which Robin's translation requires, Though Buchanan's 
criticisms are strictly correct, it is less clear that 
Robin's rendering cannot be understood as an interpretation 
of the formula, even when two datives are present. For 
% 1,7) -) --t % 'I'll instance 'rocrrv rV? go, tjurw -iD IJ 7LCYWtwhich Buchanan 
&P 
ý4A 
would correctly translate 'This is what it was for it 
to be colo"' can be understood to mean 'This is what 
belonged to it to be colour'. This same point may be 
made about the translation of the formula in its 
general form as 'what it was for each thing to be', which 
may be understood to indicate those features which belong 
to something in such a way as to determine its being 
what it is, either as a kind or as an individual. The 
disadvantage of this interpretation is that it makes it 
., e I difficult to distinguish the 71, G. Opre from the 7". 1. &. The 
advantage of Buchanan's translation is that, by diminishing 
the emphasis on the relation of belonging and by placing 
the-emphasis more squarely on the being, interpretation 
more consonant with Aristotle's distinction between the 
, 0,2 7L C-cm and W. -). f. becomes more viable. . But it cannot be 
expected that a grammatical analysis will do a philosophical 
ob. 
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The most extreme position regarding the datives 
was advanced'by Kurt Arpe who claims that when the 
second dative is missing in the formula, it should 
be mentally supplied. It is unclear, however, which 
dative is to be supplied, the subject or the predicate. 
only thisInuch is clear on grammatical groundsp that 
tI -P . the term represented by a single dative (e. g. 7o r(, Iv 
71 n ýO 64 C-'wKL, 7"W c4v&PwIrO ) should not be taken as a predicate a. A, - 
without an assumed subject. Otherwise there is no 
reason for the predicate to be in the dative case. This 
fact of grammar is used by Aristotle to make a distinction 
at 1031b 4 of the Metaphysics where he says: 
By Ibeing'separated' I mean, for instance, if the 
"') does not belong to being of good (7b GiVbCL%P9W &I'; % J# the good itself I nor being good (7b C-ivtCL. CjIv(6týv, ) to t5 5 
this. 
0: 
I%/)I on Arpe s position is ýhat in such cases as Irb M P)r C-LYOCE T&O 1.0 
tly", &OIA4 'man' should be regarded as a predicate and ýO IL that some particular subject like Socrates or Kallias 
should be mentally supplied. What this achieves, according 
to Arpe, is a special emphasis on the search for a 
definitio v i. e. the specific criteria according to 
which some particular thing qualifies as being a man. The 
question Tt. crrq is thus distinguished from Irt. 7 wl C-LYdij' 
insofar as the latter seeks more specific or definitive 
criteria while the former may be answered by the ascription 
of any general characteristic or the genus alone. Thus, 
While the question 'What isa mafi? ' may be answered by 
11 
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providing the genus 'animal' and in a more distended sense 
, an accidental characteristic of man, even by providing 
the question 'What was it. for Socrates to be a man? ' or 
also 'What. was it for a-man to be (a man)? ' can not. 
Thus, the ambiguity which the essence-formula was 
designed to remove on this account is not that between 
subject and predicate, but the degree of specificity 
involved. The question, thenj is whether the essence- 
question seeks a different kind of answer. than does 
'What is itV or a more definitive answer of the same 
kind. My preference for the former position, and reasons 
for itl have already been given. Further argument will 
be given in the next chapter. 
25 
Buchanan argues forcefully against Arpe and for the 
view that, most of the time, the single dative should 
be understood as possessive, C-Ivc(c as absolute. When 
it is convenient or natural to translate the dative as 
predicate, Buchanan suggests that the predicate should 
in such cases be regarded as an 'interior' predicate on 
the model of a cognate accusaiive. Is there a case in 
which this is necessary? Buchanan cites only Met., 
1046b 34-35 as an. -instance in which the single dative 
is "most naturally taken as a predicate. " The line reads, 
71 
r 71b Dixo dqrrLV OIkO4"(V-. 
But even here there is no reason not to translate the 
line as 'For a builder to be is for him to be able to 
build"where 'for him' is. understood in the context. 
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The meaning oý the claim is that the very being of a 
builder is his capacity to build. 
The argumentg as so far adumbrated in this thesis, 
suggests that it is necessary to supply a subject'only ,: 7. en 
the essence of a non-substance, i. e. either a universal 
term or a combination of such a predicate with a subject, 
is the focus of the questioh. The doctrine that essences 
C belong simply or absolutely (k7rZ3) to substances alone 
may, in part, be reflected in"the grammar of the 
essence-formula, whichs as Ii! understand ito applies 
primarily to the subjects of universal predicates and 
only derivatively to the predicates. All categories and 
predicates other than substance presuppose a certain 
26 
subject. To give an account of them involves the account 
of the subject to which they are applied. The question 
'What was the bein of such-and-such a universal? ' has, 
therefore, a derivative application to such things. 
Aristotle expresses this position exactly by attention 
to the word 'being' or 'is'. He says (1) that 'is' does 
not belong to the other categories than substance primarily 
C P. 27 
but 67MýA&v&JS or derivatively and (2) that items in the 
%f 28 categories other than substance are called 'beings' (ovr4) 
not 'in accordance with one thing' (MefG"'r) but 'in relation 
Cý/ to one thing' MfOS W) His remarks at 1030a 29 are 
in a similar vein% 
The 7-'J-& will belong similarly (sc. in reality to 
the way it belongs in speech) primarily and simply 
to substancep but if to other things as well, 
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'e .3 just as the rc Ecrrz, does, the what was the being 
will not belong simply but rather what 
was the being such and such a quality or so much. 
Here Aristotle has in mind the fact that quantities and 
qualities exist as predicatest just as they are defined, 
in relation to subjects. The comparison to the 'what it 
is' reflects the ambiguity pointed out at 1030a 18 where 
Aristotle says; 
3 
For the r-& C-Oýrt in one way signifies the substance 
and the tode ti, but in another way, each of the 
things predicatedo viz. quantitys quality and other 
things of that sort. 
In con&lusion, the evidence discussed supports the 
,#2 view that insofar as &rrc ambiguously indicates either 
a subj ect or universal predicates j the 7' , 7.9r. was regarded 
by Aristotle either as a subjectýdn its own right or as ' 
belonging to a subject in the way that something belongs 
to itself. In his usb of thB essence-fbrrhula'his-attention 
is focusea primarily on the being of something-which 
inýthe fundamental sense is, its being as a subject. Insofar 
as the rq-6- may be said to belong to something, it does 
not belong in the way that a quality or a quality-like 
predicate does. In accordance with this line of thought 
Aristotle says in De-Anim at 430b 26: 
An assertion says something about something, just as 
a,,, denial does, and they are all either true or false. 
This, however, -is not true of every thought, but 
.3 the rz'O&v-r4 of something in the sense of 
the r. -7-0. is true even though it is not something 
about something. 
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Here, as elsewhere ýn my interpretation, the essence- 
formula specifies the sense of 71-c"Irrc, which does not 
Involve predication, at least in the ordinary sense. 
In the foll6wing chapter the-view of,,! the essence 
here advanced will be tested in the context of certain 
passages in Met., Z and also against contrary positions 
represented by some. modern commentators. The ultimate 
goal is to capture at least part of the philosophical 
thrust of Aristotle's thoughts about essences. This 
thrust may be illustrated against a modern background 
by considering the Russelian formula . 
3x #(v), which 
Aristotle would have regarded*as incomplete. ' For if 
someone says, "There is an X such that X has quality 0 off 
the sthtement would be regarded as obscure and indefinite 
by Aristotle until it is known what X is. The quality 
insofar as it is known by itself or only as belonging 
indifferently to any subject, is known in a universal 
mode which amounts only to potential knowledge. It is - 
known in actuality only with respect to an essence which 
determines the meaning of the quality. To such a formuia 
Aristotle would need to ask, "There is a what such that 
what is 7" Knowledge of the essences of things is that 
knowledge which determines the meaning of those things 
which, -in terms of the Physics# A, 19 are initially 'clear 
to us' but not '61ear by nature'. i. e. things which are, 
puzzlingly on other accountsl calleduhiversal and 29 
indefinite by Aristotle. - 
N 
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Chapter 2 
ist 
d/ 
ssad A409"tym ? 
/ -'. I '. 'w 
t 41, c-('& 
Pierre Aubenque in Le Probleme_de 1"Eltre chez 
Aristote'(pp. 458-472) proposes an interpretation which 
differs significantly from the one offered in the last 
chapter. This difference rests primarily on a disagreement 
about Aristotle's uqe of the expression ýOY07r, as it 
applies to theT, According to Aubenque the essence 
of something is jlýO; 
ývc7vlt and in this respect differs from 
the TI, &0-'r4 insofar as it excludes all accidents*. of a 
sQbjbbt except per se accidents ana includbi All per se 
predicat&, g, especially per se accidents. While the formula 
can be answered by accidents in the strict sense 
or by providing a genus alone, the r. -7, r-,. has greater 
specificity. Aubenque comments as follows on Aristotle's 
definition of 7, ýj7, Cz, found at Lle'"ý. j Z, 1029b 13; which 
he translates 'ce que chaque etre est dit 'e4tre par soi': 
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Elle se refere d'abord au langage: la quiddite 
slexprime dans un discours par lequel nous disons 
ce que la chose est. Maisp d'autre part, tout ce 
que la chose est Wappartient pas a la quidditeg 
mais seulement ce qu'elle est par so!, ce qui exclut 
les accidentrou du moins ceux des accidents qui 
ne sont pas par soi (crýý, ý921<0"m J646'067ý) .1 
It was not solely to restrict the class of attributes which 
may function as a response to the question n C-O-rt; that 
the essence formula was devisedt according to Aubenque. 
C- Cr rz For even a strict interpretation of the question 
which would exclude accidents as appropriate responses 
allows responses too general to capture the fundamental 
individuality and concreteness of things. Fort as 
0- >2 Aubenque says, "Le 7'1 crop--rc de Socrate est son humanite. " 
. 0') And the question re Cron; even in the strict sense may be 
answered by providing the genus. According to Aubenque: 
Aristote ne se contente pas des discours 
0- 00, universels et aes definitions generiques: puisque 
les choses sont singulieres, c'est dans leur singularite 
qu'il faut les saisir. Le -r4"6): crc socratique ou 
00 .0 
. platonicien n'epuise pas 
la richesse de determinations 
duThCe-77-, cest-a-dire de Vetre individuel et 
., concret. 
4 
The solution is found by distinguishing between 'accidents 
properly speaking' and accidents per -se, 
that is, 
e C- / 
0ý41ý7111'4 rOOZcýýk. Accidents per se belong in the 
answer to the question 'rt 7e e(WIP, but not to the question 
C- rr1; 
The sort of attribute Aubenque has in mind is, for 
example, 'la sagesse de Socrate, la richesse de Creo'sust 
I 
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ou la propriete f des angles d'un triangle d'e"tre e"gaux at 5 
deux droits'. Though such properties would be given 
improperly in answer to the question 'What is itV 6 
when strictly understoodl they are appropriate in answer 
to the essence-question. In view of this interpretation 
01 
7 
the imperfect in the formula signifies 'un etat habituel' 
with rlaspect to those attributes determinative of an 
individual. 
Aubenque divides types of pdsition'with respect 
to the formulation of the 71-1.6, into two camps, (1) those 
which regakd the -fZ)rmula'as a 
"complication de 14., question 
/ -j IN &M anj (2) tho-so which view it-as 
lune application 
%, 1 -81 
particuliere de Vexpression 7b .s. &'voct I avec un 
/. 8 
datif intercale!. Aubenque favours the former type of 
interpretation on the ground that the latter turns the 
essence-formula into an answer to the question -re c-9- 
A. la-question,, qu' est'ce? on repondraits. Vetre 
de ce que la chose '0 etait. 
Since the two questions are 'symmetrical', they should not 
be understood in this way. Therefore Aubenque regards 
71c 7r as the interrogative ri'eý'Tre- with the verb in the 
imperfect tense, the whole formula being translated 
Ice que c'e"'tait que d'etre' rather-than 'l"'e*'tre de ce 
que cI etait' And the question 7'4"'0 looks for those 
properties which are distinctive of an individual and 
habitually present in him just in being, presumably, who 
he is. 
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Aubenque fails to consider the possibility presented 
in this thesis, i. e. that the essence-question seeks the 
role of a subject with respect to 'the uhiversals'which 
belong to it, even essentially. For if this is the case, 
the, question 'What was being? ' or 'What was the being? ' 
asks a further question beyond''Whatis it? '_insofhr. as 
that qubstion ihvites universal predicates. Insofar as 
the que stion,. so understood, seeks a clarification of 
attributes applied to a subject, the sorts of answer to 
the essence-question suggested by Aubenque, e. g. 'the 
wisdom of Socrates'l would be exactly the sort of predicate 
the clarification of which is sought by one who asks the 
essence-question. For the question 'What was Socrates' 
being? ' is asked in order to discover the rSle of Socrates 
as a principle determining the significance of his 
characteristics. It is precisely in this way that the 
0 
concrete individuality sought by Aubenque in the essence- 
formula is in fact revealed. The possibility not 
considered_býr Aubenque as'a translation of the formula is 
ýt'ait' 1111ýtre que c'e 
In whichever manner the formula is rendered, however, 
Aubenque's crucial claim is that, per, se accidents are 
included in the essence (or quiddite" as he puts it). A 
fundamental question to ask, then, concerning this 
position is whether Aristotle ever speaks of 
/VC0 /C/ Wvý in the sense required by Aubenque. One of the 
instances used by Aubenque to illustrate this type of 
N 
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essential accident is 'the property of the angles of a 
triangle of being equal to two rightsý.. The passage in 
th6-. Metaphysics in which Aristotle characterizes this 
property as accidental per se can barely be construed to 
support Aubenque's position. Aristotle says: 
An accident is also spoken of in another way, e. g. 
as so many things as belong to each thing per se 
though they are not included in the substancey for 
instance a triangle's possessing two right angles. 
9 
Here Aristotle denies that such an attribute, though per ge, 
is included in the substance. Thus, in order to maintain 
that such per se accidents belong in the 7-7-6. it is 
required that Aristotle be using 'substance' in the passage 
in such a way that his remark. wouldinot apply to the 
If Aristotle means merely that this fact about 
triangles is hot a part of their definition, he could 
have said so. It is at least awkward to understand the 
word 'substance' as referring to the general rather than 
the specific nature of something. 
% 
A dse of the expression 7'k ozý+E-FIXOM W&4*? Ur#4 found 
to have some frequency in the Metaphysics arises in 
contexts in which Aristotle is asking whether, or claiming 
that, a single science should study both substances and 
the accidents which belong per se to substances (7-*L 
1 .41C .4-, * e 
10 
6 't 0 ro( 4eecý 'r 7-de 7 00CU/5) The sorts of things 
Aristotle gives as examples are 'same' and 'other', 'like' 
and "unlike', 'before' and 'after', i. e. -terms which, 
despite the fact that they. may be said to belong to 
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substances per se, are notorious for their ambiguity. 
They are hardly terms which could specify the concrete 
individuality of anything, however certain it is that 
something to which such terms did'not apply would not be 
a substance. 
Another expression, used-by'. Aristotle in, a-senýe Very 
similar to the one required by Aubenque Is fSIcaLvbý#ptvvhich-' 
occurs at--Met-., 1004b-11. . 
Here Aristotle lists as 
examples 'oddness' and 'evenness', 'comparability' and 
equality', 'excess' and 'deficiency', i. e. properties 
which numbers have Ntd9,, 4,3(vrrO(j., 5. Such attributes are defined 
in the Posterior Analytics as those the definition of 
11 
which involves the subject to which they belong. His 
examples are 'straight', and 'curved' with respect to lines, 
'odd' and 'even# 'prime' and 'compound'p 'square' and 
'oblong' with respect to numbers. Such terms sebm to 
be those which bither apply uniqubly to. a-certain subject 
or have a distinctive or peculiar ap: ýI: ication to a-giiren 
subject.. Are such attributes, what*ib sought Ohen the 
essence-qubstion is asked? Is 'oddnesb' for instance 
Encluded in the*answer to the essence-question as applied 
tp the,. *number three? Or is it rather that the kn6w1edge of 
the essence is the knowledge which allows one to know 
I the special mode with which 'oddness' applies to the 
number?. In the passages here c1t6d Aristotle says nothing 
which determines an answer. ,I 
Another class of per se accidents are those which 
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belong of necessity to a certain kind of thing, either 
absolutely (1ý0a) or in the manner of opposites. 
12 In 
the. latter group is included, e. g. j evenness or oddness 
as applied to number. For if a number is not even it must 
be odd. Are such necessary attributes RXd2ab" in the 
sense which the 7'., 1.6. is? Again, the text is silent. 
Though it follows from the nature of numbers that evenness 
is. an inference from non-oddnessl'though as far asnumber 
goes: su'bh*qualities are 'inherentes a% sa nature', it need 
not follow that such qualities are, themselves, included 
in the essence except as a special sort of universal 
predicate-of it. 
A'final instance of the sort of attribute which 
Aristotle regards as joc9-*a*wTb j though it falls formally 
within the class mentioned at Po. An., 73a 38-b3 cited 
aboves is 'snub' in relation to nose or 'whi-te' in 
13 
relation to surface; I list this sort of attribute 
separately because it seems most pointedly to serve as 
the sort of example which is friendly to Aubenque's position. 
Alsop the instances listed above from the, Posterior Angly-tics 
seem to be applied especially to things which Aristotle 
14 
says are 'knowable absolutely'. Aubenque believes, 
however, that the'r. ?. C-. l at least as it applies to 
110, sensible substances,.:. is, responsive to 'la precarite*' 
fondamentale du pouvoir-'e. 'tre-autrel or-the contingency 15 
of such substances. As Aubenque'puts it: 
L'imagination 'et Vintellect figent le devenir de 
la chose, interrompent le flux indeýfini de ses 
I 
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attributs et manifestent par la ce que la chose 
le c'est-a-dire sa quiddites son essence. 
'Snub' in relation to nose is a good example partly because 
of the formal criterion that it belongs only to noses 
and partly because a particular nose may be especially 
memorable because of its snubnessq 'despite the fact that 
this attribute may change. In the same way the essence 
of Socrates may be manifested or revealed by the attachment 
of the property 'wisdom' to him, partly for the reason that 
this property has a distinctive application to men 
(neglecting its application to gods) and partly because 
Socrates is especially memorable as a paradeigmatic 
respresentative of this quality. We do not think of 
Socrates not being wise even if, at some time in his lifel 
he was not. Further, it is with respect to Socrates' 
UO 
wisdom that we are inclined A 
view all the events and 
characteristics of Socrates' life. In this respect 
wisdom plays a very special r6le in the notion we have of 
Socrates. 
It-is in the recognition of this sort of attribute 
that the strength of Aubenque's position lies. Further, 
it is the recognition of this sort of attribute which may 
furnish Aubenque with a serious objection to the view 
represented'in this thesis. For Aubenque's position is 
that it is precisely through the recognition of essential 
attributes, that. the essence of an individual is revealed. 
This objection is virtually raised in his criticism of 
v 
- 144 - 
Tugendhat. 16 
Plus proche de la verite nous parait gtre---* 
Ow Vinterpretation recemment proposee par M. 
7 
Tugendhat: remarquant que le 'rt"7e 4:! -Tv. Ae, est 
01 .0 ýIpWj , il en plusieurs reprises oppose au dy&ýOe 
conclut que le re', 
Tv 
&? Viet, de'signe ce que la chose 
etait avant l'adjonction des prerdicats accidentels, 
clest-al-dire ce que la chose est par soi, dans 
sa_suffisance essentielle, dans sa purete initiale. 
% *-* . 00 Mais on lui objectera que si le i4c4M"O-j&VSevoque 
bien Videe d'une adjonction s'opposant au depouille- 
ment du l'opposition disparalt dans la 
notion si proprement aristotelicienne du 
e- -, 
, *X6ýwb . 
The reason why this characterization does not apply to 
the position proposed in this thesis that the essence is 
the subject as a principle determining the meaning of 
universal predicates is that the subject so viewed is 
not conceived as a subject without attributes or prior 
to their attachment,. but as the subject of them. 
The essence so conceived is not an independent and ideal 
entity revealed when all the characteristics of something 
have been stripped away, but the actuality of the material. 
The independence or separation of the form or essence is 
con&ed in this thesisl not as the abstraction, even in 
thought, of an ideal entity from matter or qualities, but 
% -p 
as the being (7-0 of something which cannot be 
conceived as a presence of one thing tn a substratumt 
which is other. In short, the fact that something has 
qualities is not a-reason for claiming that it lacks them. 
N 
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The issue is not whether the subject has properties but 
how it has them. The essence-question presumes their presences 
This, however, does not constitute a refutation of 
Aubenque's position. For his view is that it is precisely 
certain types of accidental predicate which by their 
inclusion in the essence reveal it. Wisdomp for instance, 
reveals the socrate"'lte*of Socrates. The problem with 
this view is that the mere presence of wisdom in Socrates, 
even as a criterion of his identity, does not itself 
determine how it belongs to Socrates. And though it 
I/C 
01 
may be claimed that the locution/, &Avm could be used 
to indicate that a certain characteristic determines 
the nature of something as a subject, Aristotle's usual 
use of the locution is the reverse of this, i. e. it 
indicates that the subject is distinctively in the account 
of the predicate. Even if wisdom is always-a very 
special predicate of a man, i. e. insofar as it does not 
represent a mere qualification but a fulfilment of his 
nature. in which sense wisdom may be regarded as a 
/ C- e 17 Md4a; v predicate of a mang this would establish only 
that . its meaning is most especially dependent upon 
the nature of man. If Socrates is wise kXj9Oocvrov , the 
knowledge of this indicates, but does not constitute, 
knowledge of Socrates'. beihg. This is not a denial that 
Socrates was a paradeigmatic instance of alwise man, but 
constitutes an assertion that it is with respect to 
3 the fulfilment (6i-rciAl of something or the C VePX, 18 -, 4ý- 4 
OC 
which 'stretches toward' this fulfil. mbnt that the 
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things predicated in a universal mode are most fully 
. significant. 
The primary ground upon which. judgement about Aristotle's 
use of the expression K4i927b with respect to the 
must be based is Metaphysics, Z, 4. It is in'fact 
line 1029b 13 upon which Aubenque bases his opinion that 
C things attributed 14(0ýdv7vf to a subject are included in 
the "r. -7. S. Aubenque translates the definition given of 
7-., 7. C-. , as has been mentioned, 
Ice que chaque 9tre est 
dit Itre par soi', or 'that which each being is said to 
be by itself'. While this is a possible reading of 
the line, Ito be' is supplied by Aubenque. Even if, 
. 'as does Aubenque, we 
follow Bonitz' emendation of the 
r, #I Ce text and read cot4aTts f or the manuscripts' 6. Voto-rov it is 
unnecessary to supply 'to be'. For &vor4. ro rL. Ibr ejv4e 
C 0, J/CI 
C. &dv-r%u 0 
Uy&rofe- MWO(o7b may be rendered 'the essence of 
each thing is what is spoken of by itself'. But if the 
manuscripts are followed, the line may read, 'the essence 
is each thing which is . spoken of by itself'. though I 
favour preservation of the manuscripts' text in this instance, 
I will defer, for the sake of argument, to the enviable 
philological judgement of Bonitz, Jaeger, Ross, and 
Aubenque. There 'are, 'however, philosophical motives for 
the manuscript change which may be gleaned from Ross' 
comment on the emendation and which are fully evident in 
Aubenque's translation. 
Ross comments as follows: 
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There is. no other case in Aristotle of the accusative 
with 71 #7V C-IWI, (in 6.1016a 34 rt 61 ec(L is 
probably a gloss, df. n. ad loc. ), so that the 
I ", 
manuscript reading Cc-'OecAv'rVso Sý"TBLL. will not stand 
(uý, less, which is unlikely, the meaning is 'the 
7 
ri 106&qis each thing, viz. what it is said Per, -se 
to be', or 'the 7L", 
Tý- 671%c is what each thing is 
said Per se to be'). 
19 
It will be noticed that the-former translation of the 
manuscript is mine-except for the explanatory clause, the 
latter is Aubenque's. Why does Ross reject these readings? 
The answer is discovered in his comment on 1029b 16t 
Aristotle rules out, as not the TZ6TM of A, a term 
4/ e- e B which is ýWO o(on to A in the second sense recognized 
in An. Post. (73a 37), viz. that (1) it CE-Vel-rcoy6c 
in A, is an attribute of As and (2) A C3-4171Yft in 
the definition of it. For this sense and the instance 
cf. 4.1022a 30. He thus in effect implies that 
the rc. "'ýe &Wdl of A is that which is xX&ýN'-ro to it 
in the first se*nse (73a 34)i viz. that it is present 
in the 7i'eZO-re and definition of A. 
ýO Cf 
That Aristotle does intend to rule out ý6(c4ffvZp predicates 
of the sort Ross calls 'the second sense' seems clearly 
right, a fact which is awkward for Aubenque since this 
happens to be the normal way in which Aristotle uses the 
f /IQ 
expression "eýejtone tocdýv%ý But that he intends 
instead to ascribe the sense ofW&kh which applies to 
/3 
the elements of the Irl. C-, krTf also to the 7', #1.6. is false. 
That Aristotle distinguishes even the 'first sense' of 
, Wt 
C- / 
O(Ol't from that which applies to the 77- has been 
established both by reference to'the Posterior Analytics 
v 
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and by referenqe to the lines in-nediately preceding those 
to which Ross refers in Metaphysics 4. The sense in which 
the 71- 1. C- -isis the 
. sense in which Kallias is 
Kallias as opposed to the sense in which Kallias is a 
sort of animal. But it is this latter sense which Aristotle 
ascribes to the elements of the 71LE(rn In recognizing 
this distinction Aubenque is. closer to the truth than is 
Ross. The q, 4estion is whether Aristotle in defining the 
C .4 
essence as what is said /, k4cn . means- to'inclu'de some 
things said ab. put*a subject-, or-only what, though noTl said 
21 
of a subject, is (something)p which in the. primary bense 
charact-eHzes only substance. 
The argument of Z, 4 supports the latter interpretation. 
Aristotle begins the argument by eliminating sheer 
22 
accidents like 'your being musical'. This, howeverl is 
/C r 
insufficient to delimit the sense of A4ý&ý4Aw Aristotle 
has in mind. He next rules out the sort of predicate that 
belongs archetypically to a particular sort of subject, 
that is, as 'white' belongs to surface. This is ruled 
out as in the appropriate sense probably because 
'for a surface to be is not for it to be white't where 'for 
it' is understood in the context. He may also mean that 
the mode of being, : ýor a. surface'(h sýirfacb's being) is 
not the same as the mode of being for white (white's being). 
AristotLe next,. notes that it will not suffice to say that 
for a white surface to be. is for a white surface to bel 
for the obvious reason that the thing itself is thus 
included in its account. It is required of the account 
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of the 7.1. C. that ivhat is defined not be included in the 
definition. It is Ross' view that having reached this 
point in the argument, Aristotle has already delimited the 
sense of M&ýv'ýra'which applies to an essencep namely the 
sense which applies to the elements of a definition. 
This, however, is only a stage in the argument. For 
this difficulty in the definition of 'white surface' is 
circumvented, however tentatively, at 1029b 21, where 
Aristotle says, sp that if for a white surface to 
be is for a surface to be smooth, for white to be and for 
smooth to be will be one and the same thing. " Rossq of 
course, argpes that even this fails as a def , inition of white 
surface, however well it succeeds in defining white. 
23 
But even if Aristotle does not regard this'last'attempt at 
definition as successful; as far ab'it goes, he moves on 
immediately to consider a similar case in which success 
in definition is stipulated. 
The general, question is introduced at 1029b 22. 
Since there are also combinations in accordance with 
the other categories (for there is a certain subject 
for each of themp'e. g. for quality, quantity, timet 
placel and movement) we must examine whether there 
is an account of the 7.7. e. for each of them, that 
is, whether the 7". *2. C-- belongs even to these things, 
viz. for a white man what it was for a white man to 
'be. 24 
Aristotle now stipulates that the name for 'white man' will 
be 'cloak'. Now that cloak has been defined as one thing 
in another, ' viz. white in man, does a cloak have an essence? 
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Aristotle denies that it does. He askst "What is a 
cloak's being? " His answer indicdte6'that the question 
is'irlapplicabl-e to this sort of things, viz., "But surely 
this is in no sense among the things which are said 
25 
per se. " In uhat sense d6eiý a. 'cloak' fail the test of 
being 
The argument which follows (1029b 29-30a 2) is a 
tentative one which does not entirely express Aristotle's 
intent. This is indicated in part by his iise, of the 
26 
particle at 1029b 299 which Apostle translates 'perhaps'l 
and the strong 
> 
at 1030a 2, where Aristotle beeins to 
express what is emphatically his final position. At the 
beginning of the argument he says, 
The expression 'not Perae' may be said in two 
ways, one being because of addition, the other not.. 
k%)/ 
Ross mistakenly assumes that ra 
Sý 
o4f means -'by omission' 
Aristotle now gives two senses in which something can 
fail to be /OCGqOdv'cn/ by addition. The first is by the 
addition of the thing being def31ned'to, sbmbthing elset 
e. g. if someone should offer 'white man' as a definition 
of white. The, second is by the addition of something else 
to the thing itselft e. g. if 'cloak' is uded to signify 
a white man, and cloak is defined as 'white'. It is 
the latter, instance which is problematic. For it might 
be said that insofar as 'cloak' means 'white man' White does 
not add something else to 'cloak'. This, however, misses 
Aristotle's pointp which is that 'white' insofar as it is 
N 
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an addition to man fails to define the fundamental entity 
involved. But now it might be objected that, if cloak is 
not a fundamental entity, this has not been established by 
the argument so far. Even if it is admitted that, as 
Aristotle saysq 'a white man is white indeedl but surely 
not, what it was for him to be white', the relevance of 
e- "' this to the q&estion Whetheit aý 61bak is an entity /<ct. 9 "aU-1i is 
still in doubt. 
'This Aristotle knowst and responds accordinglys 
,f0 But is a cloak's being a certain ' 1.6. generally 
speaking? Or, rather, is it not one? For the 
is whatever is something. But whenever one thing is 
said of another, there is not whatever is a definite 
something (7&& ri- ), For instance a white man is not 
whatever is a definite something, if indeed the 
. 
definite (7trJ*&) belongs to substances alone . 
27 
It is these remarks which apply to the sense in which 
something fails to be MtOduc'7b" without addition. This 
interpretation is supported by what follows. Aristotle 
says, as a conclusion from the last sentence quoted, that 
the -r., 7. C-. will be among so many things of which the account 
0 ýp 05 is a definition (c tc5; u )'. Aristotle place's a lot of 
stress on the word q , 
p(5kcpS . To establish that something is 
a definition, it is insufficient that there be a name 
which signifies a certain account. In that case, as in 
the case of white man, all that would be needed to make 
any account a definition is a name for it. The Iliad# 
for instancep would be defined by the set of words which 
compose it. Thust despite the fact that 'white' does not 
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fail by addition to define white man, a cloak fails to be 
per se, ' 'Secause its account is not of somethin primary. 
(01w'erStr ., 
28 
II-vv-S )fi. e. something which is not 'one thing 
said of something else'. 
ýfl Ce 
What, then, is the sense of)W& 'um which applies to 
an essence? Aristotle is explicit, about this at 1030a 
13t namely, essences will belong to those things 'which 
are not said according to participation and a quality, 
and are not said as an attribute. Evident from this is 
that if the essence itself belonged to that of which it 
is the essence in such aýway that the thing could be said 
to 'participate' in it, the whole point of talking about 
essences would be undermined. It, follows, thereforet that 
the 71, I. e., is the being of something as the subject and the 
definite somethi which underlies all the other categories 
as their determinant.. That is, the essence of something 
01 C /- , is 1W& aw7lo in the sense described in the Posterior 
Analytics-(73b 7) as 'what is not predicated of a subject'r 
i. e. as substance. 
29 
As , Aristotle says at 1037a 34 of the 
Metaphysics, 
.-7 -1) the 7%. ?e Owt, and each thing are in some cases 
the same, as indeed they are ip the case of primary 
substances. .. and I mean by primary what is not 
spoken of as one thing being in another, that is, 
in a substratum bLb ý 'its, matter. 
It will be noticed, however, that Aristotle-moves 
too quickly to this'conclusion. For according tb the 
criterion of definability, an essence will belong to 
30 
no'fo'rm or spe6ies--*hidh-, As not of a genus. But does not 
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this very criterion commit Aristotle to th, 
he is striving to avoid? And this for two 
every definition comprises universal terms 
this very reason, suffer from homonymy and 
ana (2) every definition is of a universal 
therefore, a definite thing or. a subject. 
e very position 
reasons: First, 
which, for 
indefiniteness; 
which is not, 
Though the 
former difficulty may be avoidable by claiming that the 
elements of a definition do not apply to the'. definiendum in a 
quality-like wayg the latter difficulty cannot. For it 
would seem that universals are not subjects. 
Aristotle was as thoroughly aware of this problem as 
any philosopher who ever came to test hia own insight. 
Z9 13 is a paradeigm of such self examination. Here 
Aristotle sets out the position which has been shown in 
this thesis to be hiý, namely. that the 71- 1. c-, f is primary 
substance precisely insofar as it underlies qualities, 
not as a material substratum, but as a definite something 
(715ýr* 're. ). But the role of the, essence as the fuhdamental 
principle which gives significance to its universal 
predicates is challenged by*the universals themselves. 
So formidable is this challenge that many commentators 
have, in one way or another, come to hold the view that 
there. is fundamental inconsistency at the very heart of 
Aristotle's. mbt, tphysical thought. 
31 
-The argument begins at 1038b 6 in which Aristotle 
entertains the claim of a universal as a candidate for 
substance on the grounds that it may be regarded as a 
cause and a principl-e. He immediately expresses what, 
I 
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from his own point of view is an obje6tion to this 
candidacyt 
For it would seem impossible that anything said 
universally is substance. For in the first placd 
the substance of each thing is peculiar to it, 
that which belongs to nothing else, but the universal 
is common. For the universal is said to be that 
which, by its very nature, belongs to many. Of 
what, then, will this be the substance? Either 
of all (sc. _of 
those things of which it is the 
substance) or of none, but it cannot be the substance 
of them all, since if it ib the substance of just 
one, the others will be this very thing. For 
things of which the substance is one and the 
essence is one, are themselves one thihd. 
Moreover, substance is what is not said of a 
subject, but the universal is always said of 
some subject. 
32 
Aristotle's objectionst then, to the claim that universals 
are substances is based on (1) the peculiarity of substance 
to the individual of which it is the substance and (2) 
the non-predicability of substances. 
Here the problems begin. First of all, the two 
positions enunciated seem to be incompatible. For the 
latter criterion *see. ras to imPly'thkt an essencb cannot belong to 
that of which it is the essence in the way that 'animal', 
for instance, belongs both in man and horse. 
33 
But this must 
be accounted for in some wayy presumably through the 
causality of universals. Further, it makes no, difference 
if Aristotle's position does not apply to everything which 
is in a substance so that, e. g., terms like 'animal' May 
be eliminated. For in any case the essence will be the 
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essence of sompthing, so that man, say, will be the essence 
of the man in which it belongs. * "For it will be the 
, -substance of that in which form it peculiarly belongs. " 
Thus, it is objected that the sheer relation of 'belonging' 
which Aristotle has attributed to essences, violates 
the criterion that a substance*is-not predicated. This 
has been offered as an interpretation of lines 16-23, 
A second objection begins at 1.23- 
Here Aristotle says the : ýollowing in objection to 
his own position: 
Moreover, it is both impossible and absurd to 
suppose that the this and substance, if they are 
composed of certain things, would be: -composed neither 
fron, substances nor from a 'definite something, but 
from quality. 
For, from this it would result that quality is prior ' 
to' substance and the definite something. But this 
contradictý one of Aristotle"s most firmly-esPoused 
doctrines, namely, that qualities are not prior to 
substance 'in time, thought, or genesis'. This is an 
extremely subtle attack on Aristotle's position and one 
which, like the first, uses Aristotle's own doctrines 
against themselves. The argument goes something like this. 
Aristotle has himself, as a fundamental tenet of his 
thought, distinguished radically between kinds and 
qualities. It is'only terms expressing kinds which truly 
say what something is. But if even these terms, in virtue 
of being universal predicatest do not represent substantial 
10 
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entities, then there is no ground for the distinction 
between substance and quality. Since there is, then, 
nothing to underlie the qualities, they are 'separable' 
ana--th6refore prior to substances. 
That this is an attack on Aristotle's'positlbn is 
clear frpm*the fact that Aristotle, later in Chaptbr'13 
and at the end of Chapter 16, holds to the view that' 
substances are not composed of substances. The significance 
of this doctrine has been discussed in Part I and may 
be expressed now in slightly different terms by saying 
that nothing which coinposes a substance is said 
" *- 7' 
in the sense in which that term applies to substances. 
Though there are parts of substances which belong to them 
/C/I this. expresses the fact that their accotint is 
dependent upon that of the substance to which they belong. 
They are, in this respect, like qualities. Whatever 
explanatory value the components of substances have, 
they have this in virtue 6f - the substance they compose. 
In this. respect they arep as has been saidl potentialities. 
As Aristotle says in his Own voice: 
If a substance is one thing, it will not be composed 
of substances belongi 
' 
ng to it and in this respect 
what Democritus says is right. For he says that 
the number one cannot come-to-be from two, nor two 
from one. 
Before pursuing this further, there is one more 
obje'cti'o'n to be considered as well as the ultimate difficulty 
with which Chapter 13 concludes. The third and final 
N 
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objection in the series beginning at 1.16 is found at 
1.291 "Sub stance will belong-to Socrates, so that 
substance will exist in two ways. " Possibly the primary 
force of this objection is that if substance is a subject 
but also belongs to something (both claims having been 
made by Aristotle)# then substance has two aspects, i. e. 
as predicate and as subject.. The objection may also 
be that if a substance belongs to Socrates, then both 
Socrates and the substance which belongs to him are 
substances. The former reading has the advantage of 
attributing to Aristotle the very fault which he ascribes 
to the platonists at lo40b 27: 
Those who speak of the Forms. speak rightly in claiming 
that they are separable, if indeed they are substances, 
but not rightly in claiming that there is one Form 
over many. 
The disadvantage of-this interprPtation is the particular 
reference to Socrates. It may be that Aristotle has 
more in mind the nature of the relation between a 
particular soul and a,, particular man. If a particular 
essence belongs to a particular thing in the manner of 
Lýone thing in anoth6r' this would be as devastating an 
-admission on Aristotle's part as the admission that 
universals are substances. Notably, it is tantamount to 
the claim that both Socrates, the composite of body and 
soulp and Socrates, the soul, are substances in the 
full sense. In this respect this objection should be 
regarded as a genuine criticism of a view which Aristotle 
I 
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often seems to express, as was shown in Part 1. 
Before moving on to the final'difficulty raised by 
Aristotle against his own doctrines at the end of Chapter 
l3tý)it is important to examine whatp according to the 
interpretation here presented, is his response to these 
objections. This is especially important because it 
is precisely this response which gives rise to the ultimate 
difficulty. The response begins at 1038b 30, 
On the whole (OAws) it follows thatp if a man 
C1 
and so many things as are spoken of in this way 
are substances, then none of the things found in 
their-. account is the substance of anything, whether 
1hey exist' (ue, 71cL"? X e-ýv ) separately from' them or are in_---". 
something else. And I mean as an example that the 
sort of 'animal' that is apart from certain instances 
is not (sc. a substance), and that anything else 
found in their accounts is in no way (sc. a substance). 
From this viewpoint it is clear that nothing among 
the things predicated in common is a definite 
something (. rz T"L but a such (r*(olWar) . 
If this were not the case, the third man and many 
other absurdities would follow. 'Moreover, this also 
is clear, that it is indeed impossible that a substance 
should be composed of substances belonging within 
them in actuality. 
34 
One way of understanding these remarks is to hold that 
Aristotle preserves as substance-terms only the species, 
viz. man, but that he rejects as substance anything found 
in the definition of the species. 
35 
If this is the case, 
then it follows that species are not predicated universally 
36 
of'individuals- That is, such terms, though surely 
predicated of manyt are not predicated in a universal 
1. 
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mode, i. e., in such a way as to ascribe common properties 
37 
to the individuals falling under the species-term. Woods 
goes so far as to claim that the statement 'Socrates is 
a man' is an identity statement. The difficulty which 
follows from this, namely it seems to*entail that Socrates 
and Kallias are the same man, is handled by pointing to 
such statements as 'The same word occurs three times on 
one page'. It is this kind of model which Modrak has 
in view when he speaks of the relation between 'types' 
and 'tokens' as illustrative of the mode in which a kind 
38 
is predicated of something. That Aristotle distinguished 
bet-men the predication of kinds and the predication of 
qualities seems beyond dispute. What is at issue is 
whether Aristotle appeals to this distinction in order 
39 
to resolve the problems which arise in Z, 13- Some help 
may. be gained by vie. wing the dilemma which follows from 
the response quoted. 
At 1039a 14 Aristotle says; 
The resul-t involves a difficulty. For if it is 
impossible that a substance is composed of things 
universal because they signify a such but not a 
definite thingv and if it is impossible that any 
substance be a combination composed of substances 
existing in actuality, every substance would be 
non-synthetic, so that there would be an account 
of no substance. But it seems to everyone and 
was said long ago that either definition is of 
substance alone or especially of substance. 
The problem seems no less severe than this. How can it 
be maintained that what cannot be defined is the most 
v 
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definite thing. there is? If the terms used to define 
definite things refer either to universals or to elements 
held in common by the defi iiiendum, e. if it is possible 
only to say and think things about subjects, then the 
essences Of things will remain logically inaccessible to 
speech and to thought. In this case it makes no dif. L 'erence 
whether- the essence is a speQies or an individual. For 
neither the mind nor speech has direct contact with 
what is, is' e. the subjects of discourse. Though the 
platonist may claim that only the Forms are accessible 
in'this way, the instant an attempt is made to use a 
Form as a predicate of something else, l6gical difficulties 
40 
arise. If the ultimate realities, are the atoms of 
Democrituss then the instant they are used to explain 
something else, their own claim to be real in the fundamental 41 
sense is violated. 
Does Aristotle have a solution to this problem? 
The claim at the end of Z, 13-isý. frustratingly Aristotelian, 
viz.: 
Therefore there will be definition of nothing. Or 
rather, this will be the case in one way, but in 
another it will not. What this means will be more 
- clear from what follows. 
Ross refers to Z, 15 and H, 6 and then remarks, '. Aristotle 
is not very successful in solving the problem. " But in 
fact the solution, however successful# has already been 
offered in Z, 13- Woods notices this but is unable to 
make anything of it. Woods says, "Aristotle's own solution, 
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which is admittedly not easy to understand, is to invoke 
the notion of potentiality. " Since Woods refers to this 
solution nowhere else in his article, one wonders to what 
extent the solution he offers is meant to be Aristotle's. 
Aristotle's position is that the components of a substance, 
whether these be the material elements of Democritus or 
the universals of Plato, are substances only potentially. 
For-if their reality is complete, that is, if they exist 
in actuality, there will be no resolution of the difficulty 
posed by Aristotle. That'is, 'a:. man and so many things as 
42 
are spoken of in this way' will not be substances at all. 
This would be a strict and unavoidable logical consequence 
of the claim that'4nyýthing. in_the account of'a substance 
is itself a substancep whether thbse are elements capable 
of separate existence or not. But it is not implied that 
the elements in the, account of a substance have no existence 
whatsoever. Their existence is as a potency, which is, 
according to the argument of Part I, a genuine mode of 
. existence and not to be confused with a disposition toward 
a future fulfilment. Insofar as an essence may be said 
to belong to something, it belong s in t he way that an 
actuality belongs to a potentiality, i. e. not as an 
attribute of it but as the possessor of the attributes, 
as the subject of potentialitiest as what is saidMO c<vro 
Before attempting to draw these threads more firmly 
together,, it will be worth following Ross' references to 
zi 15 and-, H, -6. -Ross, is surely right that no solution 
to the problem of definition is found in Z, 15. What 
It 
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goes on in Z, ý5 is an exacerbation of the problem. 
The thrust of the chapter is that it is impossible to 
define particulars and thatt therefore, there is no 
demonstration (OM1OXC-(Yjr) concerning them. Part of the 
argument depends upon the destructibility of sensible 
particulars, i. e., the fact that 'they have matter of 
which the nature is such that it is possible to be and 
43 
not be'. Aristotle says: 
If then demonstration is of the necessary and 
definition is productive of knowledge in this 
sense, and it is not Possible that knowledge be 
knowledge at one time but ignorance at another, 
such a thing being opinion, and in this way neither 
can demonstration or definition, but opinio is 
of what is capable of being otherwise, it is clear 
that there-is neither demonstration nor definition 
, of them 
<sensible particulars). 
Nor, -according to the argument of the chapter, ýill the 
abiding presence of a particular nullify the force of 
the argument. For if the sun, say, is eternal and was 
defined as 'going around the earth' or 'hiding at night', 
it wouldýnot cease to be the sun if it ceased to do these 
44 
things, "'Lor-the sun is a certain substance'. Furtherg 
no definition can be framed in such a way as to apply only to 
a single individualq e. g. the sun, or Kleon, or Socratest 
because something else may always come along having the 
same characteristics. 
45 
-Several points about this chapter are worthy of 
notice. - First, the argument hinges on the premise that 
I 
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there are two kinds of substanceg viz. 
ýoyaS combined with 
46 
matter) or the avlvoXay, and 
Ao"rvs simpliciter, (ccill-AZ5) . 
Second, it is assumed that all generable and destructible 
47 
substances are 'combination' substances. Third, it is 
assumed that knowledge and ignorance are incompatible, even 
48 
when separated in time. Fourtht definition is regarded as 
the fundamental producer of ýnowledger rather than, say, 
the individual essence of a house whose existence is 
49 
nevertheless affirmed. Finally, the argument is directed 
primarily against the theory of Ideas. 
Of these premises it has already been shown that 
Aristotle would either have denied the first three or# at 
least, cherished grave doubts About them. In Chapter 6 
of Part I it was shown that the possibility of separable 
generable forms, i. e. forms which are not adequately 
described as I one thing in another I or Aý, Y05 in m atter is 
seriously considered by Aristotle on several occasions. 
And this consideration was shown to occur precisely in;. 
the'light of the inadequacy of the description of substances 
as a ýe, "Xor in a material substratum, i. e. as one nature 
in another. Furtherp the view that knowledge and ignorance 
are incompatible even when separated in time is a position 
Aristotle is unlikely to have held. That he could not have 
held it is shown by the fact that he regarded even simultaneous 
knowledge and ignorance of the same object as possible, this 
in the sense that potential and actual knowledge have the 
50 
same content. More will be said about this.. 
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Finally, does Aristotle regard the definition of 
something as the ultimate ground of'human knowledge? 
Here the question itself is too ambiguous to give a very 
definite answer. Surely it would be wrong to deny that the 
proper formulation of definitions was a primary concern for 
Aristotle or that apodeictic knowledge, iý e. of demonstrable 
and universal truths, dependý upon definition. But the 
fact that definitions are composed of universals constitutes 
a challenge to their primacy. For universals gain a 
definite significance only in relation to subjects which 
are, on this accountq primary. These considerations lead 
me to the view that Z, 15 was not intend6d by Aristotle to 
solve I the problem with which Z. 
1 
13 ends. 
51 
H, 6 is more auspicious. But though the unity of 
substances-is here shown to be properly conceived through 
the notions of potentiality and actuality, the relevance 
of this viewpoint to the problem of defining them is left 
unclear. About definition Aristotle says the following 
things. First, the unity of a de: Cinition is not-- 
constituted by the way in which it is put togetherbut by 
52 
its being of one thing This, of course, is not to deny 
that definitions*must be constructed according to certain 
principles, but only that their unity, even when-prbperly 
so constructedt depends upon the thing defined. Secondly, 
Aristotle claims that the unity of a substance cannot be 
accounted for by its participation in the elements of a 53 
definition. From these arguments it would seem to follow 
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that the difficulty with which Z, 13 concludes results 
- from the expectation that a definition can perform an 
intellectual function which it cannot and is not even 
intended to performp i. e. explain the definiteness of 
the thing defined. In terms, of the argument of this 
thesis, this false expectation amounts to a confusion 
between the -re crr4 and the i. e. between what 
something is and what is. The view that to ask the 
essence-question is to seek a definition is a red herring. 
In the Introduction to Part II a passage from 
MI 10 is-quoted in which Aristotle says that if the 
principles of things must be universal, it follows that 
nothing, will be separable and there will be no substance. 
Aristotle claims further that potential knowledge is like 
matter in that it is universal and indefinite, its objects 
being universal and indefinite as well. Actual knowledge, 
on the other hand, i. s itself determined and a tode ti, 
the same being true of its objects. Indeedl Aristotle 
goes so far as to say that the study of universals is 
incidental to the study-of Particulars. Returning to 
Z, 4, it is found that it is precisely this sort of 
considerationt i. e. the change or transformation (7-b 
of knowledge which introduces the candidacy 
of the Z. 7,6. as substance. In fact the passage to which 
I refer (1029b 3-12) is found in all manuscripts to 
follow the introduction ofý-'the essence as a candidate for 
substance. Though the editors are right that the passage 
cannot fit grammatically as' it is placed in Z, 4, the 
- 166 - 
probability that it was intended as an introduction to 
. the topic is extremely high. 
Assuming, '. th. en, -that the passage is properly located 
at the end of Z9 3. the following fact is extremely 
illuminating. It is precisely the study of the third 
type of substance, viz. 'the combination of matter and 
form, the kind which Aristotle claims is 'most problematic'# 
that introduces the notion of the transformation of 
knowledge from what is less knowable by nature, -but more 
knowable to. -usy- to what is more knowable by nature. 
But it was shown in Part I that to conceive. sensible 
substances as a combination of matter and form is to 
conceive them in a universal mode. In terms of the analysis 
of, the essence-formula given in Part II, it becomes 
possible to state more precisely what is wrong with this. 
viewf 
The problem is this. A sensible particular regarded 
as the subject of universal predicates cannot be viewed as 
'one thing in another'. Thib is clearly true of accidental 
predicates. Ifs for example, it is claimed that white 
men burn easily in the sunt 'white man' is the subject 
of the claim in a merely grammatical sense. I. e. it is 
men who burn easily when they happen to be white. This 
can be stated by direct appeal to the essence formula, i. e. 
'A white man and a man's being white are two different 54 
things'. One'may also say that that a man's being is not 
his being white or even'that a white man's being is not 
his being white. Furthermore, it is because of a man's 
.1 
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essence, 1. e. his being as a subject, that whiteness 
may count as a significant characteristic of a man. It 
is not, that is, the mere presence of a characteristic 
that makes it count. 
The same argument may be applied to every universal 
when predicAted in a universal mode. For the presence 
even-of essential characteristics in a subject is not 
the subject. I mean, for instance, that a man's being a 
rational animal is not the subject of qualities. And 
further the-significance of both th6--adhus and the 
differentia'is-de'termined with reference to men. This 
is not to say, of course, that such terms as 'animal' and 
'rational'-are not vastly different in kind ýroi-n accidental 
predicates. The claim is that the analysis of such-terms 
cannot be carried out save by reference to the subjects 
to which they belong. 
Finally, it cannot be the presence of a form in matter 
which is the subject of universal predicates. From this 
it does not follow that material objects are not subjects 
in the required senses but that the analysis of sensible 
substances as 'combinations' of Matter and form, i. e. 
as the presbnce of onenature in anotherg does not furnish 
an adequate notion of sensible substances as subjects. 
It is the man, body and soul', which is the. subject of 
qualities as their possessor. Insofar as such a claim 
indicates a 'relatio n' between body and soul, this 'relation' 
is analyzed as that between. potency and actuality conceived 
contemporaneously. The actuality of a particular sort 
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of body is the subject of universal predicates insofar 
as it is with reference to this that their significance is 
determined. F6r this reason whatever can be said to 
compose a substance is not a substance, whether the 
components be properties and attributes or materials. 
The actuality is not a property or attribute of a potentiality 
any more than the art of housebuilding is a property of 
the capacity to build houses. 
The essence-question arises because, though we know 
things about sensible objects, they are not known very 
clearly. It arises not primarily to discover new facts, 
but in order to make 'from things more known to someone 
1 
55 
things known by nature known to him , The major thrust 
of Aristotle's argument against platonism and materialism 
is that both perceive the advance to greater knowledge 
in terms of the analysis of things said about others 
without reference to the things about which they are said. 
Aristotle's view is that it is through knowledge of the 
things about which universals are predicated that the 
knowledget even of universals, becomes definite. For 
this reason the essence-question arises primarily in the 
context of categorial inquiry and is treated as a form of 
the question 'why'. 76 M ivc-wocc is with respect to 
sensible substances the expression ofev&, ýOfecz( or 'what 
is as being'- from, the categorial point of view. 
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Chapter 
Are individual substances identical with their essences? 
a 
In Met. 0 Z, 6 Aristotle argues strenuously for the 
view that 'in the case of primary things and things said 
/ e- le 
1 
, Zvro each thing is one and the same as its essence'. 
He argues that only those things which are not said of 
2 
something else are identical with their essences and rather 
strongly 
; 
uggests that this is only true of subjects. 
3 
From previous argument it is clear that by 'subject' 
Aristotle cannot mean the material substratum which is known 
,e, 
4 
only in a universal mode and not M& V67-b. At the end 
of the chapter Aristotle makes the following claimi 
The sophistical arguments concerning this position, 
i. e. whether Socrates and Socrates' being are the 
same, are clearly resolved by the same analysis. 
For there is no difference 'either in the point of 
view from which someone asks the question or in the 
point of view from which one approaches itsresolution. 
This passage is a clear indication that in some way or 
Lother Aristotle regards Socrates as identical with his 
essence. That sense is made clear elsewheAe: Socrates 
is identical with his'essence in the sense in which 
Socrates is his soul. As a-combination of soul and body 
he is not identical with his essence. 
I 
- 170 -. i 
It has been shown by the argument so far that a 
subject is conceived inadequately as the presence of one 
thing in another, e. g. as soul in body. Only insofar 
as it is possible to conceive a substance as a fundamental 
unity is it a subject in the fullest sense and a definite 
thing. But the following problem arises. Though it 
has-been established that the conception of substances as 
Icombinations' is a problematic mode of conceiving them, 
Aristotle never abandons the three-fold classification of 
substances, viz. as matter, as forms and as the combination. 
Tt has been established that the unity of matter 
and-form is understood by Aristotle through the notions 
ý: he, n 
of actuality -and potentiality. Why,, does Aristotle continue 
to refer to individual substances as. combinations of form 
and matter -in t OSe very contexts in which, 
according to my argument, the possibility of separable form 
is considered in the light of the difficulties ste=ing 
froAthe third class of substances? In this chapter I will 
speculate about a possible answer to this question. 
In order to outline the position I will return to 
Book II, Chapter 1 of De-Anima. At 412a 15 Aristotle says: 
every natural body having a share of life would 
-be a substance, but a substance as a combination 
(avy&&J). Since it is indeed such a body, for it 
-possesses life, the soul would not be a body. 
For the body is not among things predicable of a 
subject but exists rather as the subject and as 
material. 
This passage seems to argue that the soul is not a body 
because its unlike the body, is predicable of a subject, 
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namely-the body to which it belongs. From this Aristotle 
concludes that the soul is a substance, but as theform 
of a certain kind of body, i. e. an organic body which 
has life potentially. - The connection of the two views 
would seem to lead inevitably to the conclusion that 
to... be lsubstanceýas form' is to be a predicate of some 
sort. To this viewt however, an Aristotelian should 
protest immediatelya "To be a predicate is not to be 
a substance. " No one is more familiar with this 
objection than Aristotle. It is as if in response to 
the protest that he, asserts at 412a 20 that substance is 
actuality (6Y7-C- CW-R) - As was shown earlier in this 
thesis, it is in view of the analysis of form and matter 
I 
as actuality and potentiality that, according to 
Aristotle, the issue of the unity of soul and body is 
laid to rest. But can the problem be resolved with 
such glib facility? 
A closer look at the Passage suggests that Aristotle 
is only sketching'his positions First, the definition 
of soul given at 412b 4 is prefaced by a conditional 
antecedent. Aristotle says; 
If it is required that we ascribe something common 
to every soul, it would be that it is the first 
actuality of a natural organic body. (my emphasis) 
Sepondlyt ab mSr emphasis is meant to bring outl what is 
common to every soul, if one is required to speak in that 
wayl is actuality of one sort, only. Thirdt Aristotle's 
statement at 41A 61s very rough indeed. He says; 
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On this account it is unnecessary to seek whether 
the soul and the body are one thing, just as it 
is unnecessary in the case of wax and an impression 
nor whether the matter of each thing 
and that of which it is the matter are one thing. 
The roughness to which I refer is indicated by Aristotle's 
use of wax and shape as an example. For shape is surely 
a universal predicate of wax. Though this objection is 
obviated to some degree by the consideration that Aristotle 
probably has in mind a wax tablet whose purpose is 
realized by the impression made in it, it is extremely 
unlikely that Aristotle is very-serious about the precision 
of the analogy. Finallyg the question of separable soul 
intrudes 'surprisincily at the end of the chapter. At 413a 
3 Aristotle says. - 
That the soul is not separable from the body, or 
some part of it, if is it divisible into parts, Is 
quite clear. For in some cases soul is the 
actuality of these very parts, But nothing prevents 
some parts from being separable because they are 
the actuality of no body. 
suggest that all these Ideficienciest are intentional 
and-of a piece. First, what is*ascribed in common to 
every soul is in terms of the argument of this thesis 
a potential ascription corresponding to a potential 
condition in the thing described. Indeedl the level of 
actuality which Aristotle calls 'first' in the passage 
under consideration is itself a potentiality. It is 
compared, to the, possession of knowledge and being asleep 
"rather than to the exercise of knowledge and being awakeý 
I 
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Secondly, the neglectexcept in its mer. e mention., of the 
second sort of actuality. becomes conspicuous just prior 
to the introduction of the. question of the soul's 
separability. At 412b 27 Aristotle says: 
C As the acts of cutting and seeixýg 3; 401 Cre 5 
X44 L 
C 
, 
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#1 OPOLCris ), so also is being awake actuality, while 
the soul is like sight and the power of an 
instrument. The body is what is potentially. 
But just as an eye is a pupil and sight (; )hS 
so also is an animal soul and body. 
Whatp then, corresponds to the'actuality of an animal? 
So far an animal is defined as the combination of two 
potentialities$ soul and body. But this is a universal 
mode of description which appropriately represents the 
beginning of a study and not actual understanding. It is, 
as Aristotle says at 413a qj a sketch or a dtawlng. in 
outline. 
Given this itis Possible to gain a clearer under- 
standing of the relevance of the question about the soul's 
separability. For the description of the soul as given 
represents it as a conglomeration of faculties tied to the 
presence of particular organs. The problem with this view 
is that the exercise 
'of 
the faculties belongs, not to 
the organg, but to the substance as a whole. It is animals 
who see. Neither the eye nor the power of sight sees 
in the full sense of the. term, Seeing is an act of the 
animal as a whole which, in termsothe ai-gament as presented, A 
may be regarded as the'actuality of no body. If the 
6 
eye were an animal, sight would be its soul. " But the eye 
is not an animal. Nor indeed is it the possessor of sight,. 
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What kind of actuality, then, is the Possessor of sight? 
If my speculations are correct Aristotle suggests his 
answer to this question at the end of the chaptert 
Moreover it is unclear if the soul is the actuality 
. of a body in the way that a pilot is the actuality 
of a ship. 
About this passage Hamlyn remarks as followss 
The remark about the 
soul and a sailor in 
Meditatio VI) -is al: 
up to this point has 
opposite direction. 
7 lecturer's aside. 
possible analogy between the 
a ship (with which cf. Descartes, 
so puzzling, since the argument 
tended completely in the 
It can be set down only as a 
Probably Hamlyn has in mind the sort of separability which 
a sailor has from his ship. But a much more probable 
reading is that Aristotle is here introducing the notion 
of actuality in the sense of a director or efficient 
cause. This view is argued by H. J. Easteiling, who 
says 
in this sentence 
19 
Aristotle is not introducing 
an alternative to the 6-vrC, 1C-1_C-CK doctrine. Rather 
he is suggesting that this doctrine does not entail 
the rejection of the familiar idea of the 7 as 
the controlling element and efficient cause, but that 
the latter can be re-interpreted in terms of the 
ý1 e8 C-V7LV p. &ý doctrine. 
In Chapter 6, Part I of this thesis it was argued in 
some detail that the unification of formal and efficient 
causality was central to Aristotle's position that 
form or substance is the cause of its matter. But it 
was argued'further that the concrescence of these sorts 
N 
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of causality cannot be adequately conceived as the presence 
of a controlling element in a material substratum. In 
Met,. ', ' &, 1049b 10 Aristotle says, as will be recalled from 
previous argument, that actuality is prior to every sort 
of principle of movement'including 'nature' regarded as 
a principle of movement 'in itself as itself'. The 
similarity between this language and that of Aristotle's 
statement in De Anima, 412b 16 is striking. There the 
soul is described as the -essence and the . 
14, rax of 'a 
natural body having a principle of motion and rest within 
it',, The combination of these passages makes it plausible 
that, while the analogy of a pilot in a ship is itself 
imprecise, Aristotle is nevertheless suggesting that 
the notion of actuality can be understood in such a 
way as to include or accommodate the self-directing aspect 
of natural substances. The presence of a principle of 
I 
movement within a bodyl from the viewpoint of actuality 
in this sense, would be a potentiality analogous to 
the possession rather than the exercise of knowledge, 
to being asleep rather than being awake. 
Why is the notion of actuality as the. exerelse of 
the natural principle of motion within a body insufficient 
to comprehend Aristotle's concept of the soul? There is 
a straightforward answer to this question. The actuality 
of a principle of motion as such is motion. But actuality 
in this sense, as Aristotle clearly asserts in the 
9 Lh, ysics and states explicitly in Met. 01 1048b 29 is 
I 
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incomplete. (<ýTCOL 73) It will also be observed 
10 
that 'actuality of the potential as such' has, for 
Aristotle, the explicit force of excluding material as 
such from the definition of motion. -As Ar; istotle 
says iii the Physics, 200b 30: 
Bronze is a statue potentiallyp but nevertheless 
movement is not the actuality of bronzes as bronze. 
Thýit is; the actuality of bronze as bronze is expressed 
in its composition of a substance. It would sebm to 
follow that the actuality of a natural bqdy qua containing 
a principle of motion is inadequate even as an account * 
of the material of a natural substance. 
These arguments lead to the conclusion that an 
important part of De Anima II, I is sketchy because the 
notion of actuality, though forcefully employed in the 
chapter, is insufficiently developed. The problems 
raised at the end of the chapter, i. e. whether there is 
an actuality of no body and thereby a viable notion of 
separate form for natural beings, and whether'the soul 
is*an actuality in the sense of an efficient cause, reflect 
this insufficiency. It is also fairly clear which sense 
of Rctuality remains undeveloped, namely actuality as 
the exercise rather than the possession of knowledge. 
But as was argued in Part I of this thesis it is this 
neglected, sense, 'of whi*'ch neglect Aristotle continually 
reminds his reader, in terms of which materials and 
material processes are drawn into the form, obviating 
the distinction between matter and form. 
lk 
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Thetýdilemma with which this chapter began concerned 
the. fact that Aristotle retains as a kind of substance 
the combination of matter and form despite the fact that 
his arguments tend, to show the inadequacy of this notion 
of-substance. For if individual substances are identical 
with their essences, while combinations of form and 
matter are not, then individuals should not be conceived 
as such combinations. I propose the following solutions 
The right question is not whether, individuals are 
identical with their essences but when. I mean that it 
may be only at certain times and in certain activities 
that individuals are subjects,, in the full sense, of their 
materials, properties, movements and acts. Most of the 
time individual substances (except for eternal ones) are 
composite, i. e. this in that. When their state of being 
is such they are inadequately understood, not because of 
a failure on the pdrt of the mindt but because they can 
be known in such a state only in a universal mode, i. e. 
because the object of knowledge is not e c-k e- ta 'in 
possession of its end'. It is also possible that in the 
case of some kinds of individuall e. g. artificial 
substances, they are never, subjects in the full sense of 
the term. 
Whether, plantso animals, and men ever exist in a 
state of complete actuality, is a hard question. Because 
Aristotle himself never answers the question whether 
separable generablb forms can exist, but only asks it 
in pointed contexts, it is not entirely clear 
I 
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what his answer to this question would be. That men, 
. at 
least, and probably other natural substances as well, 
are more coherent and less 'composite' when they are 
at work in some ways rather than others seems both true 
and Aristotelian. In Book X of the Nicomachean Ethics 
Aristotle praises the contemplative life exactly in 
proportion to the extent that it differs from 'composite' 
existence. He says at 1177b 27: 
By so much as this (sc. contemplative life) differs 
from the composite (a*uvOC-"? bLr) , by so much also 
) differ from the does the activity (CP-OL 
activity corresponding to the. other virtues. 
But Aristotle is not at all certain that, in this respect, 
0 
contemplation is properly regarded as a human virtue. 
He-suggests that such activity may be regarded as that 
of a god belonging within a man. Though he also 
says at 1178a 2 that 
C. each may be this part of him 
S. #* 
insofar as it is more authoritative (7b. KLIPLOv ) and 
better, this passage is difficult to reconcile with the 
strain of-Aristotle's thought I have attempted to 
develop in this thesis. It supports my position only 
in making it clear that Aristotle sought a notion of 
self beyond that of a composite of matter and form. 
In this respect it may be said that I have expressed the 
philosophical demands placed by Aristotle upon the notion 
of essence and substance better than their fulfilmentý 
Contemplation, as understood by Aristotle in. N. E., 
10, suggests transcendence of material and individual 
existence rather than its transformation. It represents 
i 
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an independence from the connections of one human being 
with another and from virtues- of character in general, just 
as it represents independence from or transcendence of 
material existence. It is nott as described, the sort 
of actuality which draws or transforms matter into form. 
It is analogous to this sort of actuality only insofar as 
it stands in contrast to 'composite' existence. But 
a philosopher's praise of the contemplative life before 
auditors whose relation to it is in doubt should probably 
be regarded with some suspicion. 
I therefore propose another solution to the question 
when individuals are identical with their essences, viz. when, 
in Aristotle's sense of the term, they are happy. It is 
important, of course, that Aristotle's view of 'happiness' 
is distinctive. Happiness is not, for Aristotle, a state 
of Mind, a result of activity, a''. quality or-a process, but the 
.1 
12 
iy of a -certain kind of life. The activity very act 
of &Mý"opz'cL is neither so paltry as to exclude from 
the life of the happy man pain and misfortunet nor so 
exalted as to be able to survive any pain or misfortune. 
Cý/ 
The activity is neither a Glis nor a motion but the t: 
exercise of a completed life. In this sense happiness 
may be said to correspond to being awake or the exercise 
of knowledge in the analogy to being asleep or mere possession 
of knowledge. 
The exploration of Aristotle's notion of happiness 
is beyond the scope of this thesis. I wish only to 
suggest its relevance to the question of individual 
I 
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essences in the light of the extremely general remarks 
made in the last paragraphp and the following rather 
general claim: Of all the things which might be said about 
a man, the claim that he is happy is as close to a unique 
qualification as one could find. I mean that we are 
less tempted to regard happiness as a universal predicate 
than, perhaps, any pther. predicate. Conceived as an 
actuality, it would not be a universal predicate at all, 
but the exercise of a man's being and in no sense an 
attribute of his being. An essence, as will be recalled, 
belongs to its subject uniquely, - i. e. in a sense comparable 
to that in which Kallias is Kallias. Further, it expresses 
the being of something as the subject of its qualities, 
0 
i. e. as the principle determining their signficance but 
as a principle which is inadequately conceived as belonging 
within the subject-as an element. I suggest that Aristotle's 
thoughts about 'happiness' and the good for man may be 
profitably viewed in their relation to his thoughts about 
essences. In particular I am struck by the possibility 
that the desire to know oneself and the desire for happiness 
as the particular exercise of one's being may be, for 
Aristotle, identical. 
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FOOTNOTES 
General Introduction 
1. Both passages are from. "Aristotle on Kinesis, " 
Essays in Ancientýreek Philosophyl J. Anton and G. 
Kustasj eds. (Albanyq 1971). 
2. Gen. ' et Corr., 317b 31- 
3- Ibidt 317b 19. 
_4. 
D. M. Balmeq "Greek Science and Chance. 1. Aristotle 
on Nature and Chance, 'IqQ, Vol. 33t 1939i A. Preus, 
I 'Aristotle's Natural-Necessity,,, Studi Internazionali di 
Filosofia, Vol. 1,19699 and Aristotle's Biological 
Works. (New York, 1975). 
5- "Aristotle's Natural Necessityp" see n. 4. 
6o' "Greek Science and Chance, " see n. 4. 
7. Met., , 5@ 
8. Physicst 2215a 1-4. 
9. P. A., 639b 25 
10. Ibidt 642a 33- Such necessity may be suggested here. 
ll. ý Po; A -9 74a 13-16t_Pr. An., 66a 11-15- 
12. Physics, 200a 19. 
- 162. - 
Introduction to Part I 
1. Summa Theologicas Question 21 Article 
2., E. - g. De Animat 
417b 8. 
3. De Anima, 412b 17 
4. Ibid, 412a 27,412b 4. 
lbids 412b 25-27. 
6. Cf., howevert Met. j 1049a 1-3s and 1049a 14-18. 
7, met., 1040b 5-8- 
8. E. g., at 412a 16-22 in De Anima. 
9. De Anima, 412a 16-22; Met., 1045b 17-24. 
lo. Met. 1040b 9. See also, 1041b 12,1044a 4,1045a 9, 
1084b 22. 
ii. met., 1049b 1; and cf. also 1007b 29,1037a 27- 
12. The Doctrine of Beingin the Aristotelian Metaphysics 
(Toronto 1951)s P- 353- 
13-. E- 9- Met-, 1070b 33t 1032b 13P 1634a 249 1075b 7. 
Chapter 1 
1. Three Philosophers (New York 1961). 
2. Physics, 190a 329 Gen. et Corr., 1,4. 
3. Gen. et Corr., 319b 25-31# 319b5ff-i Physics, 
190a 9-13,17-28s 31-b lp though the account in 
the Physic involves a restricted use of the 
C ON term 'alteration' cf. 190b 8. Forer, 6<, 15 (xr, -Al 
see, e. g., Met., 1069b 10,1088a 33- 
- 183 
Chapter 1 (cont. ) 
4. Though Aristotle may be understood to express doubts, 
on a number of occasions, that the products of art 
are genuine substances insofar as their forr. -is-are 
inseparable (e. g., Pdet., 1033b 209 1043b 219 1060b 
27,1070a 15), he constantly uses artificial products 
to illustrate the relations of matter and form, 
and to illustrate the distinction between genesis 
and alteration. E. 9- 1033a 13-22,1041b 169 
1041b 4,1043a 7-20v 1043b 4; Physicgo 246a 4, 
etc.. 
5. Physics, He 3. 
6. Met-t 1033a 16-23. For various senses of 'from' 
a . 0e cf. G. A., 724a 20ff. For 
, 
ynK64Ae-YeV' see Physics, 
190b 10-17 and Met. 9 1032b 4, lo69b 4. 
7. met., 1033a 13- 
0 
8. Physics, 194b 24,195a 19. 
9. P"sics, 190a 24,190a 28,190a 31-33l Gen. et Corr., 
319b 25: 
10. Physics, 246a 1-9. 
ii. Phvsics, 190a 24. 
12, "Aristotle's Introduction of Matter", Ph. R., 831 
1974. 
13- Ibid, p. 485- 
14. The only examples I can find are rather elliptical# 
e. g. Met., 1041a 26,1032b 32. 
15. E. g., Gen. et Corr, s 329a 15-21. 
Chapter 2 
1. PAS, 1973- 
2. Ibido P. 125. 
Met., 1069b 159 Physics, 257b 7. 
Chapter 2 (cont. ) 
4. E. g. Gen. et Corr., 317b 231 Physics, 191b 28l 
met., lo6gb 15,1089a 28. 
5. Physics, 201a 11. 
6. Met., 1040b 6-8. 
7. De Anima, 412b 25- 
8. Met., 1048b 37. 
9.. Though Aristotle did not in fact believe that the 
sperm is 'matter' for an organismi he adopts this 
posture in the present passage. Howeverl cf. G. A., 
724a 20ff. 
10' * Met., 1046b 30-36. 
lie 1046b 36-47a 4. 
12.1047a 4-8, cf. De Animag 426a 20-26. 
13. De Anima, 417b 89 417b 29. 
Chapter 
originally published in The Concept of Matter in 
Greek and Medieval Philosophy (Notre Dame 1963)t 
but reprinted in Moravcsik, ed. t Aristotle, 
Collection of Critical Essays (London 1968). 
2.1 am in general agreement with William Charlton 
that the notion of prime matter is an import from 
medieval philosophy (see his appendix, "Did Aristotle 
Believe in Prime Matter? ", in Aristotle's Physics, 
Books I and II (Oxford, 1970))- Some of Robinson's 
criticisms'of Charlton are dealt with in passing 
in my treatment of the argument from Z, 3 in this 
_chapter. 
Other objections are addressed in chapters 
4 and 5. See Robinson's "Prime Matter in Aristotle"# 
Phronesis, V. XIX9 1974. Other important articles 
on the. subject are H. R. King's "Aristotle without 
v 
- 
Chapter 3 (cont. ) 
Prime Matter", JHIq Vol. 17,1956 and F. Solmsen's 
"Aristotle and Prime Matter: A Reply to H. R. King", 
JHI, vol. 19,1958. Barrington Jones remarks in 
"Aristotle's Introduction of Matter", Ph. R., vol. 
83P 1974, p. 4759 that ". .. 'prime matter' has 
come. '. to seem more and more of a bad joke, the 
typical illusion of a metaphysician. " 
3- Ibid, Charlton and Robinson. 
4.1029a 7. 
5- 1029a 24. 
6.1029a 11-12. 
7.1029a 21-24. 
8.1029a'12-16. 
9. Cf. 1049a 27-34 for a similar distinction* 
10.1038b 8p 27-29t 1038b 34-1039a 29 1041a 3-5. 
Particularly helpful in understanding Aristotle's 
argument in Chapters 13-16 of Book Z are M. J. 
Woods' "Problems in Met. Zt. Chapter 13" in 
Moravcsik, ed., Aristotle: A Collection of Critical 
Essays, and D. K. Modrak's "Formst Types, and 
Tokens in Aristotle's Metaphysics"; JHPht v. bl- 17t 
1979. Both argue that Aristotle preserves a sense 
pf universality for an essence which does not 
imply. that an essence ascribes common attributes 
to the subject of an essence. 
11.1038b-15-18. 
12.1038b 35-36. 
13.1039a 14-19. 
14. lo4la 3-5. 
15. E. g. 1029a 1-2,13-16 which, allowing Jaeger's 
removal of the apparently intrusive lines 3-13o is 
a continuous passage. Aristotle in a number 
Chapter 3 (cont. ) 
of passages either connects intimately or positively 
identifies the substance and the essence. e. g., 
1031a 189 1032b 29 1032bL14,1035b 149 1017b 219 
1007a 21. The interpretAve error of treating 
Aristotelian essences as a special sort of attribute 
or quality-like entity may be seen to infect Ross' 
translation oft e. 9.1007a 21-22. The Greek is 
eýl I XdL T-6 Olr6? 04rtý91ý ýJ, 
Ross translatesl 
"For they must say that all attributes are accidents 
and there is no such thing as 'being essentially 
a man' or van animal'. " 
This translation pointedly suggests that Aristotle 
here means to criticize his opponents for the failure 
to distinguish from among attributes essences from 
other sorts. Strictly, however, Aristotle is 
accusing his opponents of treating. L11 things as 
attributest while failing to recognize essences 
at k1l. Thus, Aristotle saysl starting at 1007a 20, 
"In general those who say this do away with substance 
and essence. For it is necessary for them to say 
that all things are attributed (ap, 901KOZtL) 'and 
that whatever it is for a man to be or for an animal 
to be does not exist. 11 The effect of this sort of 
misinterpretation has conseqpenceq even more 
devastating to the understanding of the middle books 
of the Metaphysics, as will be shown later. 
16.1029b 14-15. 
17.1030a 13-14. 
17a. 1031a 19. Cf - 1030a 3-5- 
17b. 1031a 28. 
18.412a 8. 
19.412b 6-9. 
- 119y- 
Chapter 3 (cont. 
l9a. The Platonists. 
20. Or, ". .. the substance is what those who ignore 
the matter say. " I prefer the other translation 
because it seems that Aristotle is talking about 
. 
those who investigate the elements of things. Here 
he is saying that a man is what they say when they 
are not talking about composing materials or, es g., 
the letters which form 4 syllable. Cf. 1041b llff. 
21. Cf. 1049a 34-36. 
22.1043a 12s cf. 1044b 2. 
23- 1040b 5- 
24. Of - 1035b 23- 
is 
?s 25. Here my translation of -rd Tqs A; 
differs from Ross'. Though it not crucial to 
my interpretationg the bodily parts I think Aristotle 
has in mind by 'parts closely related to soul' 
are the /<O? 
LýcL 
-q gaXý6S mentioned at 1035b 25-27. 
In this passage David Wiggins sees a suggestion of 
brain/soul or heart/soul identity theory in 
Aristotle., See his Identity-and Spatio-temporal 
Continuity (New Jersey 1971). 
26. lo4la 3- 
27.1040b 27. - 
28.1035b 27ff. 
29.1039a 3- 
30,1039a 7. 
31- P'-. 185v note 85.. 
32-ý 'This tack is taken by Robinson in "Prime Matter in 
Aristotle", Phronesis, Vol. XIX, 1974. 
33- PhR, Vol. 85, no. 4,1976, P. 557. 
34. 
-Four kinds are listed in Chapter VIII of the, Categories. 
v 
-I 88- 
Chapter 
Relevant and helpful remarks on this passage are 
found in Ross' note on 1029a, 29 Vol. II of his 
commentaryt p. 164. 
2. The passage c ontinue s as f ollows e 1-cy, 
G 7-b CCX 
ýýk a YOV /KO(L 47ýýC()ý C_ 76u, rwV) ov a,! 6Y6-cr1.5 jA6pa Xt4)01_a, 7Z)VUjj1,, 
OS. 
It ia notable that the Greek makes it less clear 
whether the compound is to be considered as a sub- 
stratum than whether the form is so considered. 
Conspicuouslyt the claim is not made that the 
compound of matter and, essence is a tode ti. 
Possibljj Aristotle regarded this as too obvious to 
be, 
IL C 
worth stating since the compound is 
3- Physics, 194b*q. The following passages* from the 
Metaphysics are probably relevant: 1042b 6,1069b 26, 
1042a 32-b 19 1044b 7,1050b 22. 
4. Cf. also Physicst 193a 29. 
5- Aristotle does not use the term t 
'paronymous' in 
this passage. He uses 1? ýWrtýulqýW in maýing a 
similar observation at 245b 11-12 of the Physicst 
andll'ýOVO, "t-in*the Metaphysicsq 1033a l6ff. For 
a definition offra?, JVýýkk, see Categories, la 12. 
An interesting use occurs at Physics, 207b 9, not 
involving a verbal change. 
6. There is a textual question whether Aristotle wrote 
at 1049a 27 that first 'Matter (in this case 'fire') 
was or was not a tode ti. If, however, the passage is 
meant as a parody of the materialist search for the 
ultimate reality, it is entirely possible that 
Aristotle did not include the negative. Perhaps 
Jaeger failed to get the joke. Another passage 
doubted by editors in which Aristotle seems to call 
matter a tode ti is Met., 1070a 10. There Aristotle 
adds that "... whatever is characterized by pontact 
and not by organic nature is matter and substratum. " 
This sounds like a hedge against a materialist claim 
that matter is a tode ti. 
- sq- 
Chapter 4 (cont. ) 
7- Here I 'am followinp the Apeltt Ross emendation 
which reads -115 /1ý%O ovc at 1049a 28 instead of the 
k 
manuscripts' reading of 76 Abt&b/IOLr There is, 
however, in the light of my argument, some plausibility 
to the view that Aristotle wrote 7ý/W60ýOW-and that 
he wished to distinguish what, like qualities, is 
predicated in the universal mode from the tode. ti 
which is the subject of qualification. Ross mentions 
that it is rare for Aristotle to connect two terms by 
kai when he wishes to distinguish them. However, 
he himself, provides two examples: An. Pr. 57a 33 
and An. Post. 77a 14. Further, the emendation does 
not remove this ambiguity. Aristotle may still be 
distinguishing 7-o KV6 OV from -rý a*FIOAýýGVW, that 
is, the subject of properties M& o from the 
% e- 
material substratum (ro U-=XVC&LFJ0V) . Compare e 
Modrak's argument with ref erence to 1<ce6 
at ý038b 15: "Since Aristotle allows matter to be 
the substratum of substance, the import of the 
phrase kath' hupokeimenon here must be 'of the 
substratum of properties. "' "Formst Types and Tokens 
in Aristotle's Metaphysics"9 JHPh, XVII9 19799 P. 
373- 
8. Philosophical Perspectives (Springfield 1967), p 146. 
9. Individuals (London)1974), e. g., p. 104. 
10. Cf. De Animas 408b 11-15, where Aristotle argues not 
only that souls do not get angry but that it is not 
even right to, say that they think. Rather, it is 
a man who thinks. 
Ross helpfully observes Q*Aetaý113slc-'-v Vol., II, p. 257) 
that Aristot 
,; e, could 
hardly have believed that the 
word Xr-LrKowl was derived from the, word AWA67'ý. C. It 
is a difference in ro"les rather than a difference in 
spelling that Aristotle is interested in. This 
observation may have important consequences with 
refe? rence to Chapter I of the Categories. For 
Chapter 4 (cont. ) 
though it is clear that Aristotle uses the terms 
e- Ou4AtYm'4(anddVVuJV5v-aLto denote things, not terms, 
this view is normally abandoned when it comes to 
171'PWY9<. It is possible that Aristotle believed 
that one is not considering the same thing when 
considering something as a predicate rather than 
as a subject. 
12. In the Categories Aristotle might have been more 
inclined to call quality-like predicates 
,0 'homonymous' rather than 'paronymous' on the 
grounds that in such cases the name, but not the 
definition-is predicated. Compaýre, for instance, 
la 1-3 with 3a 15-17- 
13- Timaeus 51 A, ' Gen. et Corr. P 329a 14. 
14. The Greek is ambiguous here and I have translated 
it ambiguously. 
15- 1032b 26. 
Chapter-5- 
I. 
1. Ross' commentary on. the MetaphygLps, Vol. IIj P. 188. 
2. Ibid, P. 189. 
3- Metaphysics, 1033b 16. 
4.1033b 7. 
5- Physics, 190b 5- C-C. 'Met., 1042b 15-25, where Aristotle 
indicates the vast list of properties and changes 
that mayl in different cases, count as differentiae. 
English does not usually reflect this difference by 
a verbal change. As Barrington Jones remarks on 
p. 485 of "Aristotle's Introduction of Matter"I 
"Now, of course, in English we do readily use mass- 
words as adjectives. We talk of bronze statues and 
stone houses. Were we to speak of a brazen statue 
I 
v 
- 
Chapter 5 (cont. ) 
we would either be using an archaism or else referring 
to a rather risque statue. " He points out, however, 
that while a woodshed need not be made of wood a 
wooden'shed must be. 
7. Ady4AP7-ý cVl-ýoedin Gen. et Corr., 317b 19. 
8. Commentary o_p týe Physics, p. 675. 
9. It-is not clear whether Aristotle here has in mind 
the further distinction betweenc,, utdvy ! PýwS and V-VV41r"#J5 
as in Categories, Chapter I. 
lo. cf. lo49a l8ff. 
Similarly, when movement is defined as the 'activity 
of*the potentialýas such', one of the things 
Aristotl e means is*that bronzes as potentially moved, 
is not regarded as bronze Per. Lej but as what has 
certain capacities and susceptibilities (Physics, 
201a 9-15,201a. 29ff. ). This is in line with my 
view that what is regarded as a component is not 
regarded as an actuality, 
It is notable, however, that in Physics, Ho 39 
Aristotle does not speak of matter as a Jýýv 
He introduces the term only in the context of 'states' 
of the intellectual part of the soul at 247b 4. 
1/ His claim is that when one who knows (/<. c7ý9&. ý"tv/) 
comes to use his knowledge, *this transition is 
rightly called neither alteration nor genesis. 
12. Aristotle often uses the term 'becoming' in a 
general sense which covers both cases of simple 
genesis and alterationt e. g. 0 throughout Physics, 
A, 7. This partly reflects the fact that 'alteration' 
was used in a-special sense, e. g. j at 190b 8. In 
A, 7, however, Aristotle distinguishes between 
COTI though the latter 
expression is awkwardly ambiguous, e. g., at 190a 21 
and 190a 32. 
I 
ChaPter 5 (cont. ) 
13, On the probability of an early date for the whole 
of book H, see Ross' introduction to the text and 
commentary, p. 11-19. 
14. Ross mentions that Aristotle ignores the 
-fourth kind ofjMto? -)S recognized in the CategoriLq 
probably because the fourfold division of 
7Toj6T,, jT&S had not yet been worked out by him. " 
15. Cf. 246b 16-17. 
16. Categoriest 3a 10.. 
17. Ibidt 3a 22. Ackrill in Aristotle's Categories and 
De Interpretatione (Oxford 1963)o P- 85, objects 
to"Aristotle's claim. He says, "If the differentia 
of a genus. is not a substance (secondary substances 
being just the species and genera of substance), it 
ought, to belong to some other category and hence be 
in a substance. " Though, I think my explanation is 
valid, Aristotle's claim is indeed an awkward one. 
The distinctionis apparently abandoned in the 
Metaphysics. 
18. Aristotle's denial 
bronze can be said 
in "Aristotle's In 
same significance. 
of bronze. 
in the Physics at 190a 25 that 
to become a statue (Dace Jones 
troduction to Matter. ") has the 
A statue is not a modification 
19. Aristotle probably holds that certain kinds of 
properties can never differentiate between substances, 
e. g., the properties white and black-(cf. 1058a 32- / r- / *j -%I 36) Only /<cýR OV7b divisions of a genus, or 
77a are differentiae. But not every/Vi9aMdivision 
of a genus differentiates a species. 'Ylale' and 
ooe 'female' are U70 divisions among animals, but 
'man$ and 'woman' are not species. 
20. Cf. 1030a 3-6t'met. 
21. E. g. Met., 1038b 16,1029b 131 1040b 24. 
N 
Chapter-5 (cont ) 
22. Rbss'(, Metaphvsicst Vol. ZI, p. 225. The comment is 
very strange considering that throughout the 
chapter (Z, 17) Aristotle is using the example of- 
a syllable to make his point, i. e. that the 
substance of something is not an element or something 
composed of elements but something else. Cf. Met. 
1045a 10 and 25ff- 
23- 1032b 28-1033a lt 1033a 4-5. 
24. Physics, 190a 7-13,190a 21-23,190a 26-28. 
25. Ibid, 190a 13P 190a 20. Cf. Gen. et Corr., 319b 25-31t 
wheFe the same case is treated as alteration. 
26.190a 31- 
27. This is foreshadowed in Physics, At 7 by the distinction 
drawn at -190b 13-17 between an 6CYV K6ý44GVOY and 
C. / 
a UITOK6ýACVW Shapelessness, amorphousness and A. . 40 
. 
ýttevoý while bronzet stone disorder are called OLIr741<4 
-and gold are uwoN6ýWOICC. 
28. Met-v 1033a 19-23- 
29. Here I shift from the example of bronze because 'a 
bronze' is an English expression for a statue. 
30- met., lo45a 9. 
31- 190b 25. It is not exactly clear what Aristotle 
means by 6(f eeý4ý7ý or 'countable matter' here. 
He may mean matter of a certain kind, or matter in 
a unified lump, or both. Probably he at least 
wishes to distinguish from matter in general or en 
masse. 
32. Cf.. 1044b 2 (Met. ), where Aristotle asks: "What is 
- matter? 
Not fire or earth but what is peculiar to it. 
0 
33- Met. 1040b 9. 
34. Met-s 1035a 31-35,1035: b 11-12t 1036a 34. 
35. My reading here diverges significantly from Ross'. 
While Ross takes these remarks to apply to particulars 
-I 
Chapter 5 (cont. ) 
or 'the concrete thing' (as he translates o'vyo V), 
I take them to apply to parts and materials. IrCv J6. 
I ýI I-ov; Ace 1ý; , though elliptical, is already a complete 
sentence and is comparable in significance to A-901 
e, 6Wb(TI7*mr Cr C-x CrTz V 
at 1035b 31- 1. e. 'ITV, de OIIVLýOV means 
'The parts of the combined substance are already 
present'. My translation makes good sense of 
&ýiraJa'T-PS Ac(t- olLeIT11V at 1036a 8 which in Ross' reading 
is an irrelevant aside. 
36. Aristotle and the Earlier'Peripatetics, tr. Costelloe, 
(New York 1963)t Vol It P-ý 342. 
37. E. g. Met. 1040b 11. 
38- Ibid, note 36, P- 347- 
39- Ibidt P. 349. 
40. Ibid, P. 348. 
41. Ibid, P- 349. 
42. Gen. et Corr., 317b 23- 
43- E. g. 9 Robinson in "Prime Matter in Aristotle"p 
Phronesist XIX, 1974. 
44. Of. also Gen. et Corr. 9 317b 9. - 
45- Ibid, 318a 26. 
46. Ibid, 318b 3- 
47- Ibid, 318b 15-19. 
48. Ibid, 319a 7. 
49. Ibido 319a 9. 
50- Ibidt 319a 12. 
51- Ibid, 319a 13- 
52- 319a 14-17. 
53- 1 have been influenced throughout this argument by 
Chat(ton's "Did Aristotle Believe in Prime Mattez. --'? ". I 
Chapte 
1. Met. , 1050a 15. 
2. Ibidj lo4la 9. 
i3- Ibidq 1041a 
10. 
4. Ibidt lo4la 15, lo4la 23- 
5- Ibid, 1041a 18. 
6. Ibidt 1041a 20. It is notable that ftýcsv 7v&vrcrý' has 
the form of a definition. I incline to the view that 
Aristotle would allow, for instances the question 'Why 
is a man a rational animal? '. In this case the questioner 
would be seeking an account of the , unity of 
the definition's 
elements, 'rational' and 'animal'. This would indicate 
that, however good a definitionmay be, the essence-question 
may still be asked. That is, one may ask both , 
'What is it 
for a man to be a rational animW' and 'What is it for 
an, animal to be rational? '. 
7. Ibid,. 1041a 32. 
8. Ibido 1041b 7. Cf. 1041a 24, b 269 28. 
9. -Ibidt 1041b 8. 
10. Ibids 1041b 10. Here I follow Ross who takes rjr 
r7reurr as a genitive of comparison. 
11. Ibidq 1041b 6. 
12. Ibid, 1041a 28.1 cite this passage ignoring 
Alexander's precipitous claim that lro(Dro (r ee-rc To TC 1) _% 
-rc P7r Oiseect., WS crtlr6cy AO? 1&jJ%Lr is spurious. Cf. Rossq loc. 
cit.; lo4lb 6. 
13. Ibid, 1041a 28-30. These two causes are often the 
same. Cf - 1050a 8. 
14. Ross moves in this direction when he says, "In other 
words the formal cause is not a distinct cause over and 
above the final or efficient, but is either of those 
when considered as forming the def-Inition of the thing in 
question. " 
15. Met., 1032b 13t, 1034a 24,1070b 339 1075b 10,1070a 29. 
16. Met., lo4la 31 may be understood to limit the explanatory 
power of efficient causes to the genesis and destruction 
II>Iý 7r of things. But &ýnep6jý, Cý6 eýocr, Crj7e ncr ekes(( at a 32 
Chapter 6 (cont. )- 
probably means that the final cause as well as the efficient 
cause applies to the 'being'. 
0" 17. o-rotp-Zov is also the Greek word for 'element'. 
Aristotle frequently uses a-r0ty-621% in apparent apposition 
with cL? Xc<c. and e. g. in A, 2 of the Physics (see 
Bonitz' Index, 702a 26 ff. ) . However, yXoCe and 
awLXe, c4 are pointedly distinguished at, e. g., Met., 
1070b 23, 'Element' is often used by Aristotle in the 
restricted sense of the matter from which something is made 
or into which something is divided when it is destroyed 
as in Z, 17,1041b 31- Of coursel the term is also used 
,C 0% .4 
of the four 'elements' or 7k oe7? A*( 910jat'rq (Met. 1042a 8) 
fire, earthg water and air. The use of 'letters' and 
'simple bodies' together in Z, ý7 combines under one 
umbrella two types of 'element, i. e. those which, though 
divisible, have parts which are of the same kind as the 
wholes (e. g. water) and th6se which are either indivisible 
themselves or are not divisible into parts of the same 
kind as the wholes, e. g. letters (see Met-# 1014a 26-30)- 
At 1035a 11 Aristotle claims that the letters of a syllable 
are parts of the account and the form, and not matter, 
in contrast to segments of a circle. 
18. Met., lo4lb 18. Cf. Physics, 245b 12-17. 
19. Ibid, 1041b 11-12. See also 1040b 0,, 1044a 4,1045a 9. 
20. Poetics, 1456 b 22, where a 'letter'. is defined as 
tan indivisible sound, not of every sort, but the sort 
from which an intelligible sound is naturally produced'. 
21. Ibidj 1456b 28; Lle_t. 9 1041b 17. 
22. Met., 1041b 22. 
23. Ross understands Aristotle here to be introducing a 
distinction between natural and artificial substances. 
There are, however, other plausible interpretations. He 
may, for instancet have in mind the distinction between 
simple things (1041b 9) and wholes which are constituted 
in accordance with nature,. i. e. put together out of parts 
I 
Chapter-6 (cont. ) 
in an intelligible or natural order like the syllable (see 
footnote 20). Ross says, "The statue retains the 
substantial or essential nature of wood, houseq &c. And 
gua wooden , 
it is a natural substance; it is only qua 
having such and such a shape that it is artificiall and 
in this respect it is not a substance. " But why would 
Aristotle in this context suddenly want to assert that 
artificial products are mere combinations of characteristics 
with real substances? Is a syllable artificial or natural 
in this sense? The sheer fact that something is the product 
of art need not imply that it is unnatural as is evidenced 
by Aristotle's ubiquitous use of 'health' as an instance 
of such a product, i. e. of the art of medicine. Mainly, 
what Aristotle seems to have in mind by speaking of 
things constituted ýe-crswl. 0v1,4r-&v kac' 0Vr, &c9 is the distinction 
CP between a dwýos and a &r Though Aristotle does in a 
number of passages express doubts that artificial products 
are genuine substances, this has to do with the kind of 
'separability' their substances have (see, e. g., 1043b 13- 
23)- -This 
issue will be discussed later in this chapter. 
24. Met., 1041a 3; see also 1033a 25. 
25- 200a 33- 
26.200a 22. 
27, get., 1041a 8. * 
28. Met., 1017b 14-16 tends to suggest that while the 
soul is 'the cause of the being' of an animal, it is not 
predicable. 
29. Met. 1032b 11 23. 
30- See also, Met., 1046b 7. On similar grounds9 P. T. 
Geach in Mental Acts argues that no concept may be 
abstracted from a recognition of sameness of characteristics. 
For if the concept ofj e. g. healthl involves recognition 
of illness, and it is through the action of one and the 
same concept that both, states are recognized, this single 
concept cannot be built out of common characteristics. 
31, Met., 1032b 61 1032b 26-309 1033a 4,1035a 11. 
32, The elements which constitute health will be different 
for different beingsl possibly even for members of the 
I 
II 
Chapter 6 (cont. )- 
same species. This is a further indication that the term 
'health', though by no means equivocal on this account, 
cannot simply denote a common set of characteristics. 
r_ of 
33. Christ secludes &K/a(- -es 9awwmovat 1034a 23, 
C 
adding "ujv"mf after C-izý04&U at a 24. Ross preserves 
the manuscriptst and paraphrases, 
All artefacta are produced from a thing having the 
same name as themselves, as are natural products, or 
(more exactly) from an element in themselves which 
has the same name as themselves (e. g. a house is 
produced from a housel inasmuch as it is produced by 
reasonj for the art of building is identical with the 
formal element in a house), or from something in- 
volving an element in them (and having the same 
name as it). 
This interpretation seems to me to be on the right trackt 
though it is coloured by the view that the form of something 
is an element in it. About the use of. the term 'homonym' 
Ross helpfully points out: 
7; 0( are actually produced &A-- al-JvcaAýrýatf 
(A. 1070a 5)t from that which shares their nature 
as well as their name, but Arist2t3-:, e occasionally 
ignores the distinction between S)&&fv5"Ov1 and cm*V'Wvýýov- 
which did not, exist in ordinary Greek usage; cf. 
A. 987b 9 n., De Gen. et Corr, 328b 21. 
In fact, however, Aristotle rarely, if everl uses the 
term 'homonym' to describe things which have the same 
name but share no more than the name, i. e. as the English 
term 'homonym' suggests, e. g. 'hear' and 'here'. The 
science of medicine and a certain state of the body are 
botht according to Aristotle, called 'health'. Though 
this is by no means a matter of sheer equivocation, they 
need not on this account be regarded as strict 'synonyms'. 
More will be said about Aristotelian homonymy in the 
next chapter. 
34. Met., 1032b 15. 
35- EE. g. the ko(t9rovt-ro., UryaS which Aristotle call. - a 
$primary cause of production' at 1034a 26. In this 
connection Aristotle's claim at 1032b 25 that 'heating' 
is a principle in doctoring is important because it implies 
that one and 'the same thing is part both of the practice 
of medicine and of the bodily process. I 
,,. apter 6 (cont. ) 
36. Met., 1032b 15-17- 
37- See note*35, 
% C- loe 38-7? 1 (, ), A4 D &t &5 is supplied here by Christ. Zeller's 
emendation is also satisfactoryl viz. &v9? wj, -r&u ctv- arro 
f or Qtv For the use of in 
similar contexts see 1071a 16-17,1032a 24. 
39. Met., - 1070b 18. 
4o. - Ibid, 1070b 28. 
41. Ibids 1032b 5-- 
42. Ibid, 1032b 14. 
43. Physics, 199a 18, b 30; De Part. An., 639b 30. 
44. Just as the soul is the 'cause of the being' for 
an animal without being a characteristic of it. 
45. This appears tobe Aristotle's point at 1050a 16 ff. 
46.1 am not claiming that there is a change in doctrine. 
Aristotle in the Physics accommodates Antiphon's position 
because he is interested in a different problem. 
47. Physics, 193a 12,193b 8. Aristotle elegantly uses 
the very same example which establishes matter as substance 
to show that the form is substance - even on the materialist 
account, i. e. at 193b 11-12. 
48. Compare the similar point made at 1035b 16-18. 
49.1jet. 1035b 27-30- 
50. Ibial 1035b 21. 
51. The form as opposed to the substratum is described 
as 'that which 
* 
being a tode tj is also-separable' at 1017b 25- 
5ý- Cf. 1049b 8 where, is described as 'a kinetic 
principle, not in something elset but in itself gs itself. ". 
In this context such a principle is construed as a potentj--. -týk 
The actuality is prior to all such principles both in 
2 .0 account (A "w) and in substance ('ýJj OL-? IrL(X 
53. Met., 1043b 18,1060b 23- Ross, following Alexander, 
understands the non-generability of the art as reflecting 
the instantaneousness with which the artist thinks of 
forms and ceases to think of them. He regards it as a 
general fact about forms of all kinds that 'they come 
into being not by a process but instantaneously'. 
N 
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A more probable account is that, in Aristotle's view, 
the artist does not create the art when he comes to 
practice it. Inqtead, he* engages in the practice. The 
'change' from the mere possession of an art to its 
exercise is not a case of genesis but the fulfilment of - 
a practioner as such. Nor is it a case of destruction 
when the artist ceases to practice. Aristotle makes a 
comparable point in De Anima at 417b 6: 
For one who has knowledge comes to contemplate, 
which either is not alteration (for it is an advance 
toward himself and toward actuality) or it is a 
different kind of alteration. 
Similarlyl the existence at one point of an art, and 
the non-existence of it at another, should not be regarded 
as a case of genesis and destruction. Cf. Physics, 247b 9, 
where Aristotle says that the ga. ining of knowledge is 
neither genesis nor alteration. Further, the more plausible 
account ot Aristotle's view that there is no genesis 
of forms is given simply by the Qlaim that when 
a housebuilder makes a house, he does not make what a house 
is. Instantaneousness is'not at issue. 
54. Met., 1070a 24-26. 
55. Ibid, 1045a 20. 
56. Ibid, 1042b 10,1043a 20, '23,25,28,1050b 2,10, 
1043b 1,1050a 169 1074a 35; De Anima, 412a 21,412b 9. 
57, Met., 1049b 5-10- 
58. Ibid, 1050a 28. 
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Introduction to Part II 
1. Met. 9 1029b 
2. Ibid, 1030a 
3- Ibid, 1038b 
4. See footnot 
5- Met., 1030a 
1031a 10. 
6. Categories, 
14,1032a' 5- 
13-14. 
35- 
2. 
3-6,1030a 11-14,1030a 28,1030b 26j 
1a4,11. 
7- It has been observed that this doctrine seems to be 
in direct contrast to the position expressed elsewhere 
by Aristotle to the effect that knowledge is always of 
universals, while perception or sensation is only of 
individuals. Instances of this position are found at 
De Anima, 417b 22, and Met., Z, 1039b 27. But passages 
which support the position expressed in the quotation 
from Met. 9 1087a 10 are also in evidence, e. 9. De Anima 
417a 28 and Met., 1048a 34. This apparent conflict in 
doctrine especially'in relation to the question of 
the fotms and essences of individuals is the source of 
considerable frustration among commentators (s , ee, 
for 
instancel R. Albritton's "Forms of Particular Substances 
in Aristotle's Metaphysics", JP . Vol. LIV, October, 1957, 
and J. H. Lesher's "Aristotle on Form, Substance, and 
Universals: A Dilemma, "Phronesis, Vol. 16,1971). 
Hopeful approaches to solutions of such difficulties are 
found in W. 
; 
Leszl's "Universal and Particular in Aristotle", 
Review of Metaphysicsq Vol. 26 , 1972, M. J. -Woods' 
"Substance and Essence in Aristotle'19 PAS, 19759 and 
"Problems in Metaphysics Zj Chapter 13" in Aristotle: 
A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. Moravcsik, London, 1968, 
E. Hartman's "Aristotle on the Identity of Substance and 
Essence" PRt Vol. 85,19769 D. K. Modrak's "Forms, Types 
and Tokens in Aristotle's Metaphysics", JHP, Vol- XVIIr 1979* 
Part II, Chapter 1. 
1. Met., 1022a 27-29. 
2. An important version. of the position I oppose here 
is argued by Pierre Aubenque in Le Probl'6me de 1'Etre 
chez ýristote (Paris, 1962). Aubenque's claim is that 
the includes everything attributed -to a subject 
-per se including per se accidents. I will attempt to 
refute this position in the next chapter. 
3- M. J. Woods argues persuasively that in, Met., Z 
genera, but not speciest are regarded not as substance- 
terms but as analogous to common predicates in their 
mode of predication (. "Problems in Metaphysics Z, 13" In 
Moravcsik's Aristotle). A genus is nott that is, a tode 
ti but a such (7-oLoer4) as at 1039a 1. This view is 
supported further by reference to Met., 1014b 9-15, 
1038b 16-18,1042a 219 ke Anima, -402b 8; as well as to 
the Physics at 249a 21 where Aristotle says that a genus 
is not a unity but a plurality. My claim here may seem to 
parallel what appears to be a shift in doctrine from that 
of the Categories in which genera are treated-as differing 
from species terms only in their distance from primary 
substances. For my argument goe's against Aristotle's 
claim in the Categories (la 6-8) that a man and an ox 
are synonyms with respect to the name animal. This, however, 
turns out to be a separate issuet as will be shown later. 
One need not hold that genera are exactly analogous to 
quality-predicates in order to say that they are insufficiently 
determinate to be classed as substances according to 
Aristotle's mature view. 
4. Met. 1045b 29-32t 1028a 35 ff. 
5. Ibidl 1049b ll, 1087a 16 ff. 
6. Gen. et Corr. t 329a 259 10P 327b 22t 317b 10,33, 
Physicsp 185a 31, Met., 1040b 51 this thesis, p. 67. 
7. Though other things than substanc es have essences$ 
they have them in a derivative sense. See, e. g., 
Met-9 1030a 28-32. 
t 
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8. Met., 1029b 27-29, Cf - 1037b 14-18. 
9. Ibid, 1030a 3-6. 
10. A slightly different issue is involved here than 
the non- substantiality of ! one thing ip another', for 
differentiae are not predicates of genera ( Met. 1037b 
18, Po. An., gob 34). But Aristotle goes on to argue 
that even if this were allowedt the same problem would 
remain. In this context the analogy occasionally drawn 
by Aristotle between genera and matter has some importance 
(Met., 1024b 6-9,1038a 5-8) -A genus is in a sense 
determined by differentiae in the way that matter is 
determined by qualities. 
11. E. g., Cooke notes*in the Loeb edition: 
Z; ývv,, in Greek had two meanings, that is to say, 
living creaturep andt secondly, a figure. or image in 
painting, embroideryg sculpture. 
Ackrill, too, remarks (Aristotle's Categories and De 
interpretatione (Oxford, 1963)t P. 71): 
The word translated 'animal' originally meant just 
that; but it had come to be used also of pictures or 
other artistic representations (whether representations 
of animals or not) . 
The probability that Aristotle did not have this in mind 
when he wrote the passage is supported by reference to 
De Partibus Animalium, 641a lt where Aristotle speaks of 
a doctor in a picture as so called homorýVmouslyr and to 
the passage I note from De Anima, where a painted eye is 
used as the example. Neither the word 'eye' nor the word 
'doctor' are regarded in their contexts as puns. 
12. 'Homonymst may be related to one another in a broad 
range of fashions for Aristotle. In theThysics at 
249a 23, Aristotle says, 
Among homonyms, some are far removed from one 
another, some have a certain likenesso and some are 
near one another either in genus or by analogy, on 
which account they seem not to be homonYms at all. 
In N. E. t 1096b 27 9 Aristotle suggests that the term 
I 
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1good' may not be homonymous if goods are related by 
analogy or are so called in relation to one thing. In 
1 7.1 the Metaphysics at 1003a 339 Aristotle says that 'ro ow, 
rt % 
though 77, oAloýýZj is nevertheless 7; ý'a'*5 &e KXc. 
, rUte(V 711YbIC 
ovd-W I<X(, 0ý4 94wY*twr- A similar claim is 
found at 1030a 32-b3 about 'beings' insofar as they may 
be, like medical things, related to one another not 
/ C/ P446 ey but 7pas ec: "v For discussion of 'homonymy' in 
relation to the Metaphysics, see Fr. Owens' The Doctrine 
of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysicst pp. 107-135t 
and Leszl's Logic and Metaphysics in Aristotles Aristotle's 
treatment of types of equivocity and its relevance to 
metaphysical theories . 
(Padova, 1970). 
13- Categories, la 11. 
14. Aristotle. Metaphysics. p Vol. J, p. 127- 
15, Met. l 1041a 14-15t104lb 3-4. 
16. Aristotle's Theory of Being. (Cambridget Mass., 1962)t P-39- 
17. Hermann Dimmlert Aristotelische MetaPhvsik-auf GrUnd 
der ousia-Lehre entwicklungsgeschichtlich dar&eatelit 
(Kempten and Munchen, 1904), P- 56. 
18. Aristotle's Theory of Being, PP. 30-31. Buchanan 
follows Ross-in this division. Though Ross divides the 
field of interpretation into three camps (see footnote 14), 
he says that the last two, i. e. those which take the 
imperfect as indicating duration and those which take it 
as indicating the pre-existence of the forml differ only 
in that the latter interpretation "takes more explicit 
account of Aristotelian doctrine .., -" Fr. Owens' 
The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics, 
181-188 has extensive references. 
19. Hamburgo 1938ttf. 17-19. 
20. In the context Aristotle seems to drawl perhaps 
invalidly, the conclusioh that when both the name and 
the definition of the name are predicable of a subject, 
the subjects are 'synonyms'. This is inconvenient for 
lb 
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my interpretation of 'homonymy', though it is important 
to notice that in the Physics at 248b 16 Aristotle that A 
even definitions can be homonymous. I believe that in 
this part of the Categories Aristotle makes a philosophical 
slip in view of other interests, namely, his interest in 
the distinctive way in which words for kindsl as opposed 
to properties, apply to subjects. 
21. Lives of Eminent Philos. ophers. With an English 
translation by R. D. Hicks (London and New York, 1925). 
22. This view is refuted by Arpe in Das rt die g-b-giL. 
bei Aristotelesp pp. 14-15. 
23. However fortunate in this instance, one ought to 
avoid translating the phrase as 'This was what was to be' 
which imputes to the Greek the English idiom 'what was 
to be' in the sense of what is plannedp designed or fated. 
24. Buchanan, footnote 3, P. 31., 
25- Ibidq P- 36, footnote 19. 
26.. Met., 1029b 23- 
27- Ibidt 1030a 22. 
28. Ibidq 1030a 32.. 
29. Ross4. puzzles helpfully over the passage in his 
commentary on the Phvsic_sl pp. 457-458. His comment on 
the use of -re KWIIAUMis especially notable: 
7; 4 WIOýr7b( seems to have here an unusual meaningt i. e. to mean the various senses of an ambiguous term. 
Though it is essentially the business of definition 
to state the logical elements of a complex term, 
incidentally in doing -this it will distinguish the 
various meanings of the term if this happens to be 
ambiguous. Only on this interpretation# apparently, 
will the remark about definition serve to illustrate, 
even remotely, what it is put forward as illustrating, 
viz. the transition from the recognition of the 
generic nature of an object to the recognition of its specific nature (a 23-20). 
0 
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- 206 - 
1. P. 462. 
2. P. 463 - 
3- P. -464: 
La question rt" eý--trr-t entendue au. sens strictLd'une 
question portant sur le genre, ne suffit pas a satisfaire 
n'6tre curiosite concernant Vessence. 
4. P. 463- 
5. P. 466. 
6. P. 464. 
7. P. 464. 
8. P. 461. 
9. Met., 1025a 30- 
10. E. g. Met., 995b 20,25,997a 20,1003a 21. 
11. Po. An., 73a 38-b 3- 
12. Ibids 73b 20. 
13- Met.,. 1022a 31 and Z, 5. Aristotle often treats 
colour as primarily a surface phenomenon# a view which 
he attributes to the Pythagoreans in De Sensu, 439a 30- 
In that passage Aristotle raises objections to the doctrine 
based on transparent but coloured things like water and 
air. But cf. Physics 248b 23, where white is said to 
belong primarily to surface and 249a 3 where it is 
claimed that every attribute belongs primarily to one 
subject. The extent to which Aristotle held to this 
view in the Metaphysics is less than clear. Passages like 
1049a 29-30 incline me to think that he. Lcirýaýt) 
abandoned the notion. There, as will be recalled from 
earlier discussion, Aristotle claims that it is the 
man, body and soulp which is the subject of qualities like 
white. 
14. Poý A -P 73b 16. 
15. P. 467. 
16. P. 465. Reference is to -rt KATA -rit4oiL, (Freiburg, 
1958). 
v 
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17. Relevant to this position would bd Aristotle's use 
of 44ýý 
/ 
. 7% qgcýlv in the Physics at 246a 15 and c-i r dt/no in 
De Anima at 417b 6. Cf. EN, 1177b 27. 
18. On the relation between these terms see Chung-Hwan 
Chen's "The Relation between the Terms C-V6? r6LV_ and 
6V7Z>Zy, &Lcc in the Philosophy of Aristotle, " CQ, Vol. LII, 
1958. G. B. Kerferd in his article on Aristotle in 
The Encyclopedia of Philosophy remarks: "Strictly speaking, 
factuality' refers primarily to the process which reaches 
its termination in the 'entelechyl. " However, Aristotle 
frequently uses the terms with no distinction apparently 
in mind. 
19. Ross favours c-. ýUa-rctr rather than the dative solely on 
palaqographic grounds. 
20. A possible support for Aubenque's position is the 
fact that Aristotle uses not only the relation of white 
. 
to surface but the relation of living to man at 1022a 3. 
Though 'living' may not define a mang it is a property 
without which a man is a man only homonymouslyt a fact 
which Aubenque emphasizes, e. g. on p. 470. Howeve2ý, 
c Aubenque mistakenly denies that white belongs 1, eK6fo(V'r0e 
to surface on p. 473*- 
21. Perhaps this is what G. B. Kerford has in mind by 
rendering the essence-formula as 'the what it was to be 
(something)' in "Aristotle" (The Encyclopedia-of Philosophy). 
This reading is supported by 1030a 3, especially if Bonitz' 
insertion of 7zýJ_& is disregarded. This would make 7&, G r4 
at lines 4 and 5 explanatory of the primary sense in 
which something is (something). , 
22.1029b 15. It is a little surprising that Aristotle 
constantly treats musicality or culture as a sheer 
accident. Wouldn't this attribute belong primarily to 
men? Mightn't it be in Aubenque's sense a*O/oeuc: 7-a*'predicate 
of Pablo Casals? 
23. The contrary position about the success of this 
'definition' is maintained by N. J. Woods in "Substance 
and Essence in Aristotle, " PAS, 1975. 
Chapter 2, Part II (cont. ) 
24. Seclusion* of 71 le Aeuxw c&, 6/2w7? k* at 1029b 27 is 
unnecessary. If 4ýteatL is to be supplied mentally, then 
the phrase may mean 'what was a white man's being *hitd-, p In 
that case Aristotle may be asking whether there is an 
essence for a man's relation to the property white or 
an essence of white in relation to man. I am placing 
no special importance on the phrase. 
25. Ross' translation Of "ýýVe at 1029b 28 as 'but, 
it may be said that' is hard'to defend. See Smyth's 
Greek Grammar, revised by Gordon Y1. Messing (Cambridge, 
Mass-p 1966)t articles 2786,2921. 'We reply that' is 
equally dubious for 1) at 1029b 29.1 suspect that his 
philosophical position causes him to reverse the force 
of the Greek particles. 
26. This, howeverp is not required for Iny argument, 
My translation makes-it ambiguous, as I believe the Greek 
to be. 
27. Here, I offer 'definite something' as a translation 
of 7ý4 -M .- The translation 
is justified, I think, both 
in the context and inlýelight of the argument up to this A 
point. I believe that at 1030a Y 'whatever -is something' 
should be understood to mean 'whatever is something as 
its subject'. Thisp however, is not required for the 
present argument. Aristotle goes on to clarify his 
meaning at 1030a 18 ff., a passage which has already been 
discussed in the last chapter. 
28. Met., 1030a 10. 
29. Met-t 1017b 129 1019a 6,1025a 8,1038b 159 1037b 3- 
30; Ibid, 1030a 11-12. 
31. A good account of the difficulty is given by Lesher 
in "Aristotle on Form, Substance and Universals: A 
Dilemma, " Phronesisp VOL XVI, 1971. As Lesher puts it 
the following three fundamental Aristotelian views form 
an inconsistent triad: 
(A) No universal can be a substance. 
(B) The form is -a universal. 
(C) The form is that which is most truly substance. 
Chapter 2, Part II (cont. ) 
31 (cont. ) . Lesher says: 
What Aristotle says in 1038b 9 is that nothing predicated 
universally is substance. He says elsewhere that the 
species form is substancel and thus he ought to say that 
the species is not predicated universally. But what he 
does say, repeatedly, is that it is predicated universally. 
At the very least it is shown in this chapter that Lesher 
underestimates Aristotle's sensitivity to this problem. 
32.1 have-paraphrased or expanded the text in some 
instances, but not in such a way, I hopel as to violate 
the sense of the argument. Rather different interpretations 
are given by Ross and by Cherniss (in Aristotle's 
Criticism of Plato and the Academyt P- 318, n. 220). 
33- 1 am in agreement with Woods that lines 16-30 
constitute objections to Aristotle's position, but I 
doubt his claim that they are all platonic objections. 
34. A few notes on the translation of this passage are 
required. First, It is clear from the translations of 
Ross and Creed (in Bambrough's The-Philosophy of Aristotle) 
that 0 ceviýwTra; at 1038b 30 is taken by them to refer 
to the species 'man' rather than to a man 
The 
use of quotes A 
in Apostle's translation suggests*a similar line of thought, 
but is more ambiguous. I see no reason to follow either 
alternative. My way of-translating the term is less 
friendly to Woods' position since he believes that Aristotle 
preserves a special mode of predication for species as 
opposed,, genera. By translating the term otherwise than 
Woods in this instance I am not expressing a disagreement 
with Woods' general position. But I do thinki as will become 
evident, that Woods does not develop what Aristotle views 
as the solution to the problems posed. 
A more important disagreement in translation involves 
lines 1038b 33-34. Here all the translations I have seen 
take Aristotle to be saying that no animal exists apart 
from particular instances. I take him to mean that no 
such animal is a substance. I see no evidence to support 
the view that Aristotle would have denied that to be a such 
Chapter 2, Part II (cont. )- 
I 
rather than a tode ti is not to exist, (1039a 1-21 1030a 
33-b 3)- 
Aristotle's shift to an absolute or intransitive 
C #' 
sense of 07r%(pX&tV at 1038b 32 is rather elegant insofar 
as it is this term which has in part given rise to the 
difficulty. 
35- M. J. Woods in "Problems in Metaphysics Z, Chapter 
13- " 
36. M. J. Woods. in "Substance and Essence in Aristotlell, 
D. K. Modrak in "Formst Types and Tokens in Aristotle's 
Metaphvsics. " 
37- Ylodrak distinguishes two sorts of universal predication, 
one as type to token, the other as property to thing. 
38. An important article on the difference between 
quality-predicates and kind-predicates is Sellars' Substance 
and Form im Aristotle. 9" ! Mt Vol- 54,1957. Also 
relevant is "Raw Materials, Subjects and Substrata, " 
The Concept of Matter in Greek and Medieval Philosophy, 
McMullin, ed. . 
39. Lesher denies this in "Aristotle on Form, Substance 
and Universals: A Dilemma. " 
40. Especially the 'third man'. This is not the only 
problem. In this thesis I emphasize the view that a 
universal predicate is not fixed in its meaning unless 
it exists K-VOW7bl. But this sort of existence is incompatiblb 
with universal predication. 
41. According to Aristotle, Democritus would admit this. 
See 1030a 9. 
42. Met. , 1030b 30. 
43- Ibido 1030b 29. 
44. Ibid, 1040a 33- 
45. Aristotle seems to ignore the possibility that 
spatio-temporal characteristics may serve to isolate an 
individual. Whether they could or not is an extremely 
complex philosophical questkon beyond the scope of this 
thesis. 
v 
Chapter 2, Part II (cont. ) 
46. Met., 1039b 20-22. 
47- Ibid, 1039b 22-25- 
48. Ibidt 1030b 31-40a 2. 
49. Ibids 1039b 25. 
50- W. Leszl in "Knowledge of the Universal and Knowledge 
of the particular in Aristotle'. 1 says: 
on this account, then. potential and actual knowledge 
have the same contentst namely the rule or connection 
expressed by the mentioned hypthetical proposition. The 
difference between them lies in the fact that potential 
knowledge is the unactualized capacity to apply the 
general rule to any Particular case which falls under it, 
and actual knowledge is the actualization of this capacity 
by application of that rule to a given particular case. 
The Meno paradox results from the view that there 
id noýmiddle ground between knoi-ýl . ddge--and'ignorance. For 
Aristotle's approach to this paradox see Po. An., 71a 
27-30 where he*claims that the paradox is irresolvable 
C 
unless one can know something w&XaL) but not s0, TX7, vS 
The use of the word kdolor in such contexts is in 
keeping with my argument. 
51. A better reference than Z, 15 for Aristotle's resolution 
of the problem would have been ýo Z, 16-170 
52. I-let., 1045a 12. ' 
53. Ibid, 1045a 20. 
54. This is what Aristotle probably means at lb3la 20. 
55, Met., 1020b 7. See also, 1040b 19-21. 
N 
Chapter 3. Part II 
1. Met., 1032a 5- 
2. Ibids 1031b 13- 
3- Ibidj 1031b 15-18. 
4. Ibid, 1036a 5-9- 
5. De Anima, 412a 23-277? - c 
6. Ibid, 412b 18. 
7. Aristotle's De-Anima, Books II and III (Oxford, 1968), 
P. 87- 
8. "A Note on j2e Anim 413a 8-91" Phronesis, Vol. II, 
1966, p. 162. 
9.257b 8,201b 32. 
10. Phvsics, 201a 10. 
11. Met., 1050a 16. 
12, 'Happiness' is defined as an 'activity of the soul' 
in N. E., 1098a 16-18; *An important article on this 
notion of. happiness is J. L. Austin's "'ý4rAft#%J-and 
EroAlmoMiA in the Ethics of Aristotlell, published 
posthumously in Aristotle: A Collection of Critical 
Es says, Moravcsikj ed. (London, 1968). On the distinction 
between processes and activities see Terry Penner's 
"Verbs and the Identity of Actions -A P-hilosophical 
Excercise in the Interpretation of Aristotle" in Rylet 
A Collection of Critical Essayst 0. P. Wood and G. Pitcher, 
eds. (London, 19? 1). On p. 452 Penner mentions, but 
does not pursue, the relevance of the energeia-kinesis 
distinction to Aristotle's ethical theories, especially 
linr.; connexion with determining what Ryle would call the 
"logical type" of candidates for the supreme good'. 
